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Most of the cities around the globe have suffered from serious housing affordability problems, and 
the situation becomes worse as economic inequality and social disparity widen. Based on this 
concern, this paper compares the affordable housing policy of two representative global cities: New 
York City and Seoul. As the first comprehensive cross-sectional study on the two cities, this paper 
primarily encapsulates financial tools for the enhancement of housing affordability.  
Granted their contrasting market contexts and policy strategies, this paper tries to derive 
some important implications and policy recommendations for each city from the intensive 
comparisons of demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds, housing policy history, and 
contemporary representative housing support programs including LIHTC and public housing. As a 
comparative methodology, the author utilizes his self-developed policy comparison model, coined as 
the SMART model, whose five major components are Subject class, target Market, policy Approach, 
Regulation intensity, and policy Tools. 
This paper portrays that New York’s affordable housing finance policy primarily puts 
weight on indirect subsidy including tax incentives and public-private partnerships as a conduit while 
specifically targeting low-income households via mixed-income developments. Instead, Seoul more 
centers on the broader range of classes such as young people and newlyweds via direct support 
programs including public housing and subsidized loans for rent, mainly utilizing $163.3 billion 
National Housing & Urban Fund. 
In conclusion, this paper makes some policy suggestions for each city to fill the gap of 
housing inequality through the lens of urban planners, policymakers, and financial experts. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to a report released by the Korean National Assembly, as of 2Q.2019, Price Income 
Ratio (PIR) of the bottom 20 percent income earners in Seoul has increased by around 70 percent 
to 48.7 from 28.6 in 1Q.2015, which means that it would take 48.7 years without spending any 
incomes on other necessary living for low-income families to buy an average market-rate 
housing in Seoul. Aside from the fact, other several data also show that housing affordability in 
Seoul has worsened. Housing prices in Seoul have skyrocketed while household incomes have 
plateaued over the last 10 years since the unprecedented 2008 housing finance crisis. The 
housing market boom, which was catalyzed by the record-low base rate of the Bank of Korea 
and the misguided housing policy of government authorities, became a pivotal trigger to 
facilitate the speculation or investment in the housing market. A Korean legislator, Dong-young 
Chung insisted that as of 2018, the top ten individual persons owned a total of 3,800 housing 
units with a value of $ 0.6 billion. Specifically, from 2009 through 2017, the number of people 
owning three to eleven housing units more than doubled from 54,420 to 109,797 people, and 
multiple homeowners with eleven units or more also soared to almost three times that of 2009.  
Nor is this experience unique only in Seoul; most of the global big cities regardless of 
their locations in Global South and North such as NYC, London, and Shanghai have also been 
suffering from a similar severe housing affordability crisis. At a glance, the housing market 
boom seems to be able to benefit everyone in our society and help boost up the economy; 
however, in reality, only the haves could accumulate more wealth, while the have-nots would be 
exposed to the higher risk of involuntary displacement and economic exclusion. What is worse, 
more and more people want to live in big cities to have access to better job opportunities or enjoy 
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superior amenities as well as the well-connected social infrastructures; the UN projected that 68 
percent of the world population will be living in cities by 2050. Based on the recent trend and 
projection, equitable housing, public health, and socioeconomic disparity have been exacerbated. 
According to UN Habitat (2016), only 13 percent of the worlds’ cities have affordable housing. 
Nearly 1 billion people dwell in slums worldwide, and the number is forecasted to double by 
2030. Approximately 330 million urban households are living in substandard housing or feeling 
the crunch for housing costs, and the figure is estimated to increase to 440 million by 2050 
(Mckinsey, 2014). Richard Florida (2017) warned that over 50 percent of the world population 
lives in substandard conditions; approximately 25 percent of the population resides in informal 
settlements. Now, the affordable housing issue is not a choice of better living places, but a matter 
of survival to low-income households and underprivileged class. 
In response, various approaches have been chosen to address or mitigate the serious 
housing crisis. But in terms of methodology, each country and city has implemented its unique 
programs that conform to its economic and political circumstances as well as social urban 
contexts. It was because every city has its idiosyncratic traits in terms of demography, economy, 
society, and culture. Different circumstances such as racial composition, governmental budget, 
level of household income, housing market vitality, and social attitude led to the development of 
discrete and distinct housing policies. Some cities, for instance, focused on the top-down 
approach mainly by way of government-led public housing provision and direct subsidy to the 
most needy, while other cities zeroed in on indirect subsidy and public-private partnership 
through tax benefits and the zoning ordinance including Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH). 
There is no panacea compatible with every situation and environment. However, it is worthy to 
learn invaluable lessons from other cities’ best practices and historical experiences.  
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For this reason, the effectiveness of various housing policies employed in major cities 
has been intensively examined by many policymakers and scholars in academia; housing 
affordability is one of the most principal topics in the Urban Planning and Public Policy arena. 
Despite an increased interest in affordable housing, it is surprising that so little empirical 
comparative research on housing finance policy between different continents has been conducted. 
Particularly, comparative research on the affordable housing finance setting is scarce. Most of the 
research has focused on each country’s contemporary and unique specific topics such as Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) or “Jeonse” (the money deposit), which do not have a 
counterpart to compare. Moreover, the existing small amount of relevant research also has 
already been outdated; new up-to-date research on the topic is required. 
Some cross-sectional comparative research between the West and the East on housing 
policy has been conducted in Western academia; however, only a handful of studies have 
specifically conducted the comparative analysis between the United States and South Korea, and 
especially comparative research on affordable housing finance policy has yet to come. The City 
of New York is a paragon case study city for the research as one of the most populated and 
expensive cities with severe housing cost burdens as well as a cutting-edge financial hub therein. 
Seoul is also taking the smart city initiative while experiencing rapid urbanization as one of the 
highly-dense cities in the world. So, this paper attempts to contribute to the literature on 
addressing severely worsening housing unaffordability in the U.S. and South Korea as well as 
broadening the knowledge base by exploring housing finance policies in New York City and 
Seoul. This study purports to scrutinize the existing major affordable housing programs for low-
income households as well as finding a lacuna in the housing policies of both the cities. Finally, I 
will derive some suggestions for the enhancement of the two cities’ housing affordability. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND APPROACH 
Housing, a Fundamental Issue in Human History 
If we choose the biggest challenge that our human history has ever confronted regardless of 
ethnicity, skin colors, nationality, and continents, the housing problem must be one, particularly 
affordable housing for low-income families and underserved people. According to Maslow’s 
“Hierarchy of Needs”, the shelter belongs to the fundamental need called “Physiological need” 
together with clothing, water, food, etc. However, although human society has drastically 
evolved in terms of technology and economy, the housing affordability problem has never been 
resolved enough in any societies regardless of political paradigm and region, and it was the case 
in both under economic recession and expansion periods. To make matters worse, the housing 
unaffordability issue has become deeper due to the recent unprecedented massive urbanization 
and development frenzy as well as population concentration caused by the inflow of returning 
suburbanites into the inner cities and Central Business District (CBD) area over the last decades. 
Most of the major cities in advanced and developing countries, regardless of their topological 
size and economic rank, have seriously struggled with this housing affordability problem. The 
housing problem even looks like an unsolvable riddle. 
The Purpose of this Comparative Housing Research 
Spurred by the non-disputable concerns mentioned above, every country has made efforts to 
preemptively address the ever-worsening housing affordability issue. But their diagnosis and 
solutions showed a big discrepancy because of the different standards. The housing market is like 
a kind of a social organism, which interacts with socio-political issues, government interventions, 
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and environmental issues as well as economic factors; therefore, the extent of affordability, 
fundamental causations, and policy solutions could be varied and intertwined in multi-
dimensions. However, at the same time, human society also has commonly shared-values. In 
retrospect, human history has been repeated over and over, and it will be replicated again for the 
coming future. Based on the assumptions, a comparison on the advanced countries’ housing 
markets and policy countermeasures could have an invaluable worth particularly to many low- 
and middle- income counties (LMICs). Through this comparative study, we can have a deeper 
understanding of how the affordable housing mechanism works, how market participants react to 
a certain urban circumstance, and what the implications or lessons could be learned from. 
The Trend of Comparative Housing Affordability Research 
Cross-sectional comparative research in housing policy scholarship has been conducted by many 
researchers and academia in the urban planning arena. Housing affordability is still one of the 
biggest topics along with economic development, climate change, and inequality in the global 
South. But researchers and scholarship that concentrated in the housing policy of East Asia were 
very limited in Western academia. John Doling and R. Ronald, who are renowned scholars 
concerning comparative housing policy research, dealt with major countries’ housing issues 
including East Asia; however, they also focused on general housing policy comparisons without 
a deeper understanding of housing finance mechanisms and housing affordability itself in detail.  
More specifically, Connerly (2005) conducted comparative research on fair housing in 
the U.S and U.K, and Priemus (2000) focused on rent subsidies in the U.S and Housing 
allowances in the Netherlands. Bentley et al. (2016) examined the role of tenure in the 
relationship between housing affordability and mental health of individuals in Australia and the 
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U.K, and they showed that the U.K housing context provides a greater level of protection to 
tenants living in subsidized housing than Australia through the empirical analysis. Basolo and 
Hastins (2016) explored the obstacles to the regional housing solutions through a multiple case 
study about four U.S. metropolitan areas, and showed NIMBY against race and growth is a big 
impediment to regional housing policies. Bjorn Harsman and John Quigley (1990) conducted 
comparative research about housing markets and housing institutions in some international cities, 
and they mainly focused on European metropolitan cities and San Francisco. Desiree Fields and 
Sabina Uffer (2014) conducted comparative research about the financialization process of New 
York and Berlin. They argued that the two cities’ fiscal instability motivated the privatization of 
state-owned housing stock and the abandonment of public housing subsidies, but the tenant 
harassments soared in the property purchased by private equity funds. Robert Buckley and Jerry 
Kalarikal (2005) also overviewed housing policy in developing countries including Korea, China, 
and Mexico. They concluded that high housing price was the consequence of the misdirected 
government policies that failed to make housing supply more elastic by restricting the absolute 
level of the housing units available. 
As seen so far, most of the previous cross-national research on housing policy was 
saturated in the contemporary research trend with the concentration on the supply and demand 
mechanism of the housing inventory in the market. The prior research with a fine-tuned focus on 
up-to-dated affordable housing policy and housing finance system simultaneously was hard to 
find, and especially no research conducted a direct comparative analysis on affordable housing 
policy between the U.S and South Korea. The bottom line is that research on affordable housing 
finance tools between the two cities could fill the research gap and enrich the affordable housing 
scholarship in urban planning context with the most recent reliable data. 
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Research Design and Process 
This research aims to evaluate contemporary affordable housing policies in New York City and 
Seoul. It is an effort to figure out what upsides and pitfalls of the policies are, especially from the 
perspective of how to fill the housing finance gap. Then, policy implications and suggestions to 
enhance the housing affordability of low-income families will be derived. To do that, a 
comprehensive mixed-method research scheme including qualitative document review and 
interviews as well as basic quantitative research using statistical data are employed here. 
First, the demographical comparison between New York City and Seoul will be done to 
clearly understand the two cities’ economic and social conditions, which are the principal 
fundamental factors to affect the contemporary housing policy.  
 Second, based on demographic analysis, the overall brief review of housing policy 
history will be conducted. For this analysis, publicly-released statistics, public documents, and 
existing scholarship will be thoroughly investigated. The evolvement of housing policy will be 
explored first, and then seek to understand the causation and background behind the scenes. 
Third, the interviews with some knowledgeable and qualified housing experts including 
city agencies, government officials, private developers, and scholars will be included to build 
concrete arguments and find supporting shreds of evidence. The intensive and heuristic 
interviews enrich the arguments and understanding of the housing phenomena. 
Finally, based on findings from the previous sections, the efforts of generating the 
grounded theory to explain the contemporary phenomenon as well as some singular policy 
suggestions will be followed. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE COMPARISONS OF TWO CITIES 
Demographic Backgrounds: Seoul 
According to the 2019 World Economic outlook
1
 by International Monetary Fund (IMF), South 
Korea ranked as the world’s 11
th
 largest economy with $1.63 trillion GDP with a total population 
of 51.36 million people as of 2017 (Korea Statistics Bureau), which means that Per Capita GDP 
is approximately $31,737. As the capital and the largest city of South Korea, Seoul is the 
economic and cultural hub of Korean Society. The Brookings Institution showed that as of 2014, 
Seoul had the fourth largest economy with GDP of $845.9 billion after Tokyo ($1,617 billion), 
New York City ($1,403 billion), and Los Angeles ($860.5 billion). Seoul’s economic size is 
much greater than London, Paris, Beijing, and Washington D.C. 
   In terms of population size, Seoul is a megacity. As of November 2018, the South Korean 
population was 51.63 million, and the population of the Seoul Capital Area accounted for 49.8 
percent of the total national population. According to the city of Seoul, as of 2018, Seoul’s total 
population was 9,763,936, and the number of households registered was 3,981,741. Given the 
land size of 233.7 square miles, the population density was intense; 41,778 people per square 
miles. Moreover, the inhabitants including adjacent commute cities including the Kyunggi 
province amount to 24.7 million, which placed the Seoul Capital area
2
 in the 7
th
 rank among 
major urban agglomerations in terms of the population across the globe. The infusion of the 
young creative class will make the population density of Seoul would be greater.  
                                           
1 IMF puts South Korea in other advanced economy category. 
 
2
 Generally, Seoul Metropolitan region contains Seoul, Incheon and Kyunggi province, but, a few big cities in 
Kyunggi province were included for the analysis. For this reason, there is a report to say that Seoul Metropolitan 
ranks 5
th
 largest in the world when including all cities within Kyunggi province.  
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< Table 1. World population in major urban agglomerations > 
Rank City Name Country Population Remarks 
1 Guangzhou China 45,600,000 Incl. Dongguan, Foshan, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhongshan  
2 Tokyo Japan 40,200,000 Incl. Chiba, Kawasaki, Maebashi, Sagamihara, Saitama, 
Utsunomiya, Yokohama 
3 Shanghai China 35,900,000 Incl. Changzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi 
4 Jakarta Indonesia 30,600,000 Incl. Bekasi, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Tangerang Selatan 
5 Delhi India 29,400,000 Incl. Faridabad, Ghaziabad, Gurgaon 
6 Manila Philippine 25,200,000 Incl. Kalookan, Quezon city 
7 Mumbai India 24,700,000 Incl. Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Thane, Ulhasnagar, Vasai-Virar  
7 Seoul S. Korea 24,700,000 Incl. Bucheon, Goyang, Incheon, Seongnam, Suwon.  
9 Mexico City Mexico 22,800,000 Incl. Nezahualcoyotl, Ecatepec, Naucalpan 
10 NYC U.S.A 22,400,000 Incl. Bridgeport, Newark, New Haven 
Source: www.citypopulation.de 
 
By the way, South Korea including Seoul has faced drastic population challenges driven 
by low birth rate and rapid aging. Statistics Korea, a government bureau announced that the 
childbirth rate is drastically declining in Korea; the lifetime birth rate plummeted to 1.05 in 2017 
from 2.99 in 1977. The number of annual newborn babies is projected to keep decreasing from 
358,000 in 2017 to 212,000 in 2067. The annual population growth rate is also downwards; it 
peaked at 2.34 percent in 1967 and forecasted to reach minus 2.16 percent in 2067. As a result, 
the total population will dwindle to 39.29 million in 2067 after reaching its peak in 2027. 
Another demographic challenge is aging. The national statistics bureau warned that Korean 
people over 65 years of age in 2018 were 14.3 percent, but by 2050 the figure is expected to rise 
to 38.2 percent, which means that Korea will become the most aged society among OECD 
countries by 2050 (Statistics Korea). 
Korea has been a single-ethnic nation over thousands of years of history, so the racial 
issue has not been brought up officially, but the number of households that became Korean via 
naturalization, international marriage, and legal immigration reached to 334,856, and the number 
has been increasing rapidly; therefore, it is necessary to keep vigilant on trend change. 
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Demographic Backgrounds: New York City 
The United States is the world’s biggest economy, and New York City is the harbinger city of the 
U.S. in terms of many aspects including finance and culture. New York State itself had $1.5 
trillion GDP, which accounted for 8 percent of the whole country as of 2017 (NYS Comptroller). 
As of 2014, New York State’s economy size was almost as big as South Korea’s and Canada’s. 
New York Metropolitan’s GDP ranked the second with $1,403 billion after Tokyo Metropolitan 
with $1,617 billion (Brookings Institutes, 2015). The Oxford Economics projected that by 2035 
New York Metropolitan would reach $2.5 trillion and surpass Tokyo, the world’s wealthiest city. 
The New York Metropolitan area is the largest in the world including New York City-Newark-
Bridgeport, NY, NJ, CT, and PA. According to Census (2013-2017 ACS 5-Year estimates), the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area had 20.2 million residents in 2017. Another report indicated that 
New York Metropolitan city including Bridgeport, Newark, and New haven attained the ranks of 
10th in the world with 22.4 million residents. The population size of New York City is parallel 
with that of Seoul. As of 2017, New York City alone had 8,438,271 people, and the number of 
households was 3,159,674; population density was 28,188 per square miles. In 2016, the city had 
3,463,870 housing units. But the population density is much lower than Seoul. The median 
household income of New Yorkers’ reached $60,762 in 2018, and persons in poverty accounted 
for 18.9 percent (ACS, 2014-2018 5 years estimates), which outlines New York’s the Janus-like 
stark contrasting facets: the extreme income disparity among the splendid richness. 
American history cannot be explained without talking about racism and discrimination. 
Diversity is a big advantage of New York City, but at the same time, racial dissimilarity has been 
a big challenge to the city. The city composes of diverse races and ethnicities. Based on the 2019 
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American Community Survey (ACS), New Yorkers compose of 42.7 percent of Whites, 24.3 
percent of Blacks, 13.9 percent of Asian, and others
3
. However, their socioeconomic status (SES) 
is not commensurate with the racial composition ratio. According to the Census data (2017), 19 
percent of Latinos, 17 percent of Blacks, and 13 percent of Asians live in poverty while only 7 
percent of Whites do. Lightfeldt (2015) outlined that Black and Latino families are the least 
likely to own their homes in New York City. Only 26.5 percent of Black households own houses, 
and Latino families’ ownership was just 16.1 percent, whereas, the homeownership of White and 
Asian households was 41.4 percent and 41.6 percent respectively. The results are closely 
connected with financial discrimination. New York City’s mortgage denial rate was around 18 
percent, which was higher than the national average, 12 percent. Besides, the denial rate for 
black people was 34 percent, which was still far greater than the New York City average (Ibid.). 
Historically, the minority, particularly Black people have been discriminated de jure and de facto 
in terms of jobs, housing, education, and so forth. The phantoms of the Jim Crow laws from the 
late19
th
 to early 20
th
 centuries and Redlining by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in the 
1960s might have not gone yet. 
Another demographical issue in New York might be a concern of population decline. 
The U.S. Census Bureau data showed that New York City is losing its residents. The bureau 
estimated that New York City’s population was 8,398,748 as of July 1, 2018, and the number fell 
for two consecutive years from 8,438,271 in 2017 and 8,475,976 in 2016. The main reason why 
people left the city might be the high cost of living including relatively high taxes and extremely 
unaffordable housing costs. The ongoing housing crisis has been forcing people out of the city.  
                                           
3 Hispanics account for 29.1%, but they maybe be of any races, so also are include in applicable race categories 
(The Census Bureau). 
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Home Affordability: Seoul 
Homeownership 
As of 2018, the city of Seoul had 3,682,384 housing units. Homeownership ratio was 49.2 
percent in 2017, which was 7 percentage points lower than the national average, 56 percent. 
Housing supply ratio that calculated as housing inventory over the number of households has 
been incessantly increased, but in 2018 the ratio fell for the first time. It was mainly because the 
number of single households spiked despite the consistent supply of new housing into the market. 
< Table 2. Housing supply ratio in Seoul (1,000 units) > 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Nation-wide 100.4 100.8 101.1 101.3 101.9 102.3 102.6 103.10% 104.2% 
Seoul 94.4% 94.7% 94.8% 95.1% 96.0% 96.0% 96.3% 96.3% 95.9% 
Households 3,646.46 3,673.38 3,700.63 3,728.24 3,756.18 3,784.49 3,784.70 3,813.30 3,839.76 
Housing units 3,442.08 3,477.83 3,509.79 3,546.44 3,607.64 3,633.02 3,644.10 3,671.50 3,682.38 
Source: http://stat.molit.go.kr/ 
Also, the owner-occupancy ratio was much lower. According to Statistics Korea, the home 
occupancy ratio in Seoul has increased from 39.7 percent in 1995 to 42.1 percent in 2015, but 
there was de facto no meaningful progress over the last 20 years. 




Housing Market  
As of November 2018, housing properties in South Korea consisted of 61.4 percent apartments, 
22.4 percent detached housing, and 15 percent Rowhouse /Apartment units in a private house, 
and 1.2 percent housing within a commercial building. South Korea is the small nation in terms 
of the land territory, and as described above, the population density is so high that the 
construction of high-rise high-dense residential units was inevitable and necessary. The Korean 
housing market is apartments-oriented. For this reason, in general, when discussing the housing 
market regarding Seoul, most of the research is based on the apartments. Another distinguishable 
trait of the Korean housing market is that it is the ownership-oriented market. Seoul’s registered 
rental residential units in 2017 were 533,795 units, which accounted for 18.4 percent of the total 
housing units, 2,894,078 (MOLIT
4
). 
 < Figure 2. Seoul’s rental housing unit inventory > 
 
Source: MOLIT 
                                           
4
 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
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  The housing prices can be determined by the power dynamics of supply and demand on 
the properties as well as future market expectations. The interest rate is one of the primary 
factors to have an impact on the housing price change because it is closely related to the funding 
costs of housing construction and property purchases. The Bank of Korea (BOK) has kept 
lowering its base money rate and maintained it at the bottom level over the last ten years, which 
became a trigger to stimulate the housing price increase. In October 2019, the central bank 
dropped another quarter percent of the base rate and keeps it at a record low level of 1.25 percent. 
< Figure 3. BOK Key base rate and household loans rate > 
 
Source: Global Property Guide 
 
  Housing affordability becomes worsening seriously in Seoul. The housing price index for 
apartments has been skyrocketing since the 2008 financial crisis. Over the last 10 years, the real 
property value of luxury condos in central Seoul more than doubled, and some properties even 
have tripled. According to the Real Estate 114, a real estate information provider, the annual sale 
prices growth in Seoul has soared: 8.9 percent for 2016, 12.6 percent for 2017, and 17.6 percent 
for 2018. The apartment price index explicitly shows how rapid the price increases are. The 
housing price index for multi-housing units in Seoul persistently and dramatically increased from 
56.6 in January 2006 to 124.3 in November 2019.  
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Source: Korea Appraisal Board 
 
  The recent housing booms also brought up serious speculations in the residential property 
market. According to the data released by the Korean Assembly in 2019, the top 10 individuals 
owned 3,800 units with a value of $ 0.6 billion as of 2018. The top 1 percent of individuals 
owned 7 units on average, and the top 10 percent of persons owned averagely 3.5 dwelling units. 
< Figure 5. The increase of multi- homeowners in Korea > 
 
Source: Korean Assembly (2019) 
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In Korea, as a measurement of housing affordability, three indices are generally used: Price to 
Income Ratio (PIR), Rent to Income Ratio (RIR), and Korea-Housing Affordability Index (K-
HAI). PIR is measured as the average property value over average income. As of 2Q of 2019, 
PIR of Seoul was 14.1, but the bottom 20 percent income earners’ PIR was 48.7, which means it 
takes 48.7 years for a low-income family to buy a market-price home without other spending. 
< Figure 6. PIR change in Seoul (units: years) > 
 
Source: Sang-Hun Kim, a legislator’s office (2019) 
 
Rent to Income Ratio (RIR)
6
 is a measurement for the monthly rent burden of median-
income households, but the Korean monthly rent market is so small that RIR is not a meaningful 
indicator yet. It is because the Korean residential rental market is dominated by the lump-sum 
deposit lease system called “Jeonse”. So, the index has been only used as an auxiliary tool. As of 
2018, RIR in Seoul City alone showed a small improvement; its RIR has been slightly decreased 
from 19.9 in 2006 to 15.5 in 2018 (MOLIT). 
                                           
6
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Korea-Housing Affordability Index (K-HAI)
7
 is an index to measure the housing loan 
payment burden of median income families to purchase a median-priced home with a standard 
loan. The higher K-HAI means the greater financial burdens regarding housing purchases. Based 
on the database from Korea Housing Finance Corporation (HF), as of 3Q 2019, K-HAI of Seoul 
was 123.6, which indicates that median-income families were paying 123.6 percent of adequate 
incomes
8
 for their homes on average. Historically, the index peaked at 164.8 in 2Q 2008 and 
began to plummet. In 1Q 2015, it hit the bottom and bounced back; the current level of K-HAI is 
approaching the pre-crisis levels due to the steep housing price increase despite the recent 
record-low mortgage rates. 
Contrarily, the national average has slightly decreased and plateaued. It is because the 
government’s expansionary monetary policy lowered interest rates persistently. Simultaneously, 
the property values of small cities and rural areas have been stabilized due to the fewer demands. 
< Figure 7. K-Housing Affordability Index (K-HAI) > 
 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation (HF) 
                                           
7
 K-HAI is calculated quarterly by Korea Housing Finance Corporation since 2008. The formula is that K-HAI = 
Required available Income for Loan Repayment / Median Household Income * 100.  
 
8
 K-HAI of 100 indicates that median income households spend adequate amount (25 percent) of their income for 
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Home Affordability: New York City 
 
Homeownership 
The number of owner-occupied units in New York City in 2017 was 1,031,793 units, which has 
been almost recovered to the pre-crisis level. However, given the population increase during the 
same period, New York City’s homeownership has worsened. As of 2017, the city’s owner-
occupancy ratio was 32.7 percent. The rate peaked at 33.8 percent in 2008 and declined to the 
bottom level in 2011 due to the ensued subprime mortgage crisis. After that, the ratio began to 
climb up slowly, but it remains below the pre-crisis level.  
< Figure 8. Owner-occupancy ratio change in NYC > 
 
Source: Census Bureau, ACS 1-year estimates, each year 
 
  Specifically, at borough levels, the Bronx had the lowest owner occupancy of 19.15 
percent, and the highest rate was given to Staten Island with 69.58 percent. The homeownership 
could depend on the housing prices level and the residents’ income level; Manhattan shows off 
the most expensive property price, and the Bronx has the lowest average income
9
. 
                                           
9
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< Table 3. Owner occupancy ratio in New York City by Boroughs > 
Borough 2005 2008 2010 2015 2017 
Manhattan 22.79% 23.73% 22.26% 23.54% 24.66% 
The Bronx 20.98% 21.56% 18.75% 18.74% 19.15% 
Brooklyn 30.06% 30.78% 30.21% 28.72% 30.41% 
Queens 45.78% 46.35% 43.84% 43.22% 44.27% 
Staten Island 70.36% 70.91% 69.62% 68.86% 69.58% 
Source: Census Bureau, ACS 1-year estimates, each year 
Approximately one-third of New Yorkers have their own homes, and over 60 percent of 
homeowners are from Queens and Brooklyn: Queens 34 percent, Brooklyn 27 percent, 
Manhattan 18 percent, the Bronx 11 percent, and Staten Island 10 percent. In terms of race and 
ethnicity, the Blacks and Hispanic homeowners are still underrepresented in the homeownership 
market compared with Whites and Asian inhabitants (Baker et. al, 2018). The majority of 
homeowners in New York City are Whites, while Blacks take charge of only 12 percent of all 
homeowners, which was half of their racial composition.  
< Figure 9. NYC Homeowners by race/ethnicity in 2017 > 
 




The residential property price in New York City has kept increasing after the 2008 crash and has 
already surpassed the pre-crisis levels. The median sale price of condos reached $ 1 million in 
2017 with an approximately 67 percent increase from $600 thousand in 2005 (Baker et. al, 2018). 
The NYU Furman Center’s data indicates that the properties with five or more rental units show 
the largest sales value gains since 2000. Over the last 18 years, the multi-rental building price 
soared to almost 5.5 times that of 2000. Particularly, since the 2008 financial turmoil, the home 
sales price has skyrocketed dramatically; the property values more than doubled over the last 8 
years. Aside from the multi-rental building, all types of homes experienced a similar pattern. All 
the five boroughs in New York City boast of its steep price increases. Among them, Manhattan 
showed the highest hike; Manhattan’s housing price index spiked from 100 in 2000 to 340 in 
2018. The speed of home sales price increases in New York City is too steep to stop worrying. 
  < Figure 10. Residential home prices change in NYC > 
A)Median sale prices for residential homes 
 
 
Source: Baker et. al. (2018) 
B)Index of housing price appreciation (100 in 2000) 
 
 




Baker, et. al. (2018) pointed out that as of 2017, the number of residential properties 
purchased by investors in New York City more than doubled since 2008; 18 percent of all home 
purchases were by investors. The investors’ purchase behaviors focused on the 1-4 family homes 
and condos market; in detail, 64 percent of the 1 to 4 units-family home sales were gone to 
investors; 23 percent for condos; and 4 percent for co-ops. The flipping
10
 could inflate the home 
prices by acting as a pushing factor, which could infect nearby properties too and forfeit the 
chances of the first-time home buyers. The report insisted that on aggregate, the flippers sold 
homes at up to 50 percent higher prices than similar non-flip sales (Ibid.). 
 
< Figure 11. Number of residential properties purchased by investors > 
 
Source: Baker, et. al. (2018) 
 
Another data also revealed that the number of young homeowners who are at and under 
34 years old has tumbled by 34 percent from 2008 to 2017. On the contrary, the seniors aged 65 
years and above have increased by 29 percent for the same period (Ibid.). It can be putatively 
postulated that the investment purpose demands for housing properties have increased while the 
real demands for the living places have diminished. 
                                           
10







 units have been steadily supplied to the housing market inventory since 2012. 
The Housing Supply Report (2019) revealed that in 2018, the number of new housing 
construction permits, new completion, and demolition was 20,910, 26,992, and 1,888 units 
respectively. However, a housing permit, which is a measure of how many new housing units 
will enter the housing market, plummeted after the 2008 housing crisis and still failed to fully 
recover the pre-crisis levels. The number of permits authorized for new construction fell by a 
greater proportion, 13.6 percent between 2017 and 2018, while the average size of buildings 
receiving a permit rose 9.3 percent, which means that the new housing supply could be not 
enough to support the increasing housing needs for the coming years given its construction time 
lag and the number of existing units scheduled to be demolished. 
< Figure 12. Housing supply trend in NYC > 
 
Source: 2019 Housing Supply Report (2019) 
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According to the 2019 “Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey” (DIHAS), 
which uses Price to Income Ratio (PIR) as methodology as an evaluating affordability index, 
New York Metropolitan area with 5.5 PIR ranked 243
th
 among total 309 international 
metropolitan cities under its survey. The worst city was Hong Kong with 20.9 PIR. New York 
City showed better performance than other major U.S cities: e.g. San Francisco for 8.8, L.A for 
9.2, and Santa Cruz for 9.6 (DIHAS, 2019). The national average of the U.S cities was just 3.5 
PIR, which was the lowest among the eight countries that were surveyed. 
The problem is that the average income of residents has not been modest enough to 
support the price change. Over the last 7 years, the median housing prices increased by more 
than 60 percent while incomes have not kept the pace. While the median gross rent continuously 
increased, the median renter’s household income has been decreased and plateaued, which means 
that low-income households’ purchasing power of housing was weakened. 
  However, according to the NYU Furman Center’s core data, the median household income 
of renters recently has been up rapidly with economic recovery from the 2008 bubble bust. The 
median rent of New York City has been up by 23.3 percent from 2000 to 2018, while the 
simultaneously median income of renters has also increased to 22.8 percent for the same period. 
The extent of rent increase was very limited given home price increase over the same 
observation period. It was owing to the rent stabilization policy in New York City. By the way, 




< Figure 13. Median rent and income change (renters) in NYC > 
Index of real median income and rent (100 in 2000) 
 
Source: Center for NYC Neighborhoods 
Median rent and Median household income (renters) 
 
Source: Furman center (Core data) 
 
According to the NYU Furman Center, New York City’s moderately rent-burdened 
household
12
 explains of 24.51 percent in 2018, which has slightly increased from 23.83 percent 
in 2005. In contrast, severely rent-burdened households
13
 occupied 28.09 percent of whole 
households, which indicates that approximately one-fourth of New Yorkers are spending more 
than 50 percent of their monthly income on rents. The figure has increased by 4.4 percentage 
points from 23.69 percent in 2000 over the last 18 years. Specifically, New Yorkers in the Bronx 
and the northern part of Brooklyn are still suffering from severe rent burdens despite the federal 
and municipal governments’ mediating efforts to resolve the recent rent crisis.  
< Figure 14. Rent burden in NYC (2018) > 




Source: Furman Center (Core data) 
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 Share of renter households whose gross rent made up at least 30 percent of their monthly pre-tax income 
13




According to the Furman center data, as of 2019 there existed 191,199 public housing units in 
New York City, and the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) has the largest portion of 
them. By boroughs, Brooklyn has the largest public housing (60,424 units or 32 percent), and 
there were relatively small public housing units in Queens (8 percent). Among them, 93.7 
percent of the public housing units in New York City belonged to NYCHA. As of Jan 2019, 
NYCHA’s units amounted to 179,177 units, which were homes to 393,966 low-income New 
Yorkers. Public housing represented 8 percent of housing stocks in New York City, and 181,090 
families were on the waiting list for public housing as of March 2019. NYCHA provided 51 
percent of all apartments in New York City with a rent of under $800 per month, and 74 percent 
of those were under $500 per month (NYCHA, 2015). The authority is known as the nation’s 
oldest and largest public housing authority. 
 
 < Figure 15. Public housing in NYC > 
A)The location of public housing 
 
 
B)Distribution of public housing 
 
Source: Furman Center (Core data) 
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CHAPTER 4. AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN NYC 
A. History, Backgrounds, and Orientation 
In May 2014, the De Blasio administration released a comprehensive plan called “Housing New 
York” to create and preserve 200,000 affordable housing units over the next ten years. Then in 
November 2017, New York City unveiled updated “Housing New York 2.0” with a new 
increased goal of 300,000 homes by 2026. The city’s new plan promised to commit more 
housing to seniors and extremely low-income households. The city concentrated on improving 
decaying existing home conditions as well as promoting mixed-income housing through 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH), Mitchell-Lama reinvestment, New vacant land tax, 
Tiny homes, and so forth. The city’s new plan seems to be able to cover almost all of New York 
City’s housing issues, and this comprehensive plan shows citizens a strong leadership and the 
mayor’s will to address the housing crisis in New York City. The city of New York’s housing 
policy was a pioneering and highly innovative effort even though it could not always be a 
success during the past two decades. The city has the first titles of the tenement law and 
comprehensive zoning ordinance in the U.S (NYU Furman Center). For these reasons, the city of 
New York may be the best exemplary city to scrutinize and derive some seminal implications and 
lessons. However, New York City’s housing policy has not looked like this in the beginning. 
Before the 20th Century, New York’s politicians were not yet to feel the necessity of 
supporting low-income households by providing subsidized housing. There were no tax 
abatements and cash grants for low-income housing at the time. Only a few lucky low-income 
families lived in low-cost tenements that were developed by some kind and wealthy 
philanthropists. The city leaders believed that the housing problem was personal (Bloom, 2015).  
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According to Richard Froehlich, first Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of 
the New York City Housing Development Corporation (HDC), New York City started addressing 
affordability and habitability starting in the 1890s and then providing for affordable housing 
under Mayor La Guardia and the first public housing in the country. Essentially every mayor 
since then has had an affordable housing policy.  
Since the 1910s, New York City’s “housers” emerged and concentrated on the need and 
the importance of government subsidies for the improvement of low-income family’s housing 
conditions. In 1926, Governor Alfred E. Smith passed the nation’s first financial support program 
for below market urban housing, which was the beginning of New York’s affordable housing 
policy (Bloom, 2015). The assortment of subsidies have become various and evolved to cash 
grants, mortgage loan at a below-market rate, and tax break over time. Before the Great 
Recession, the city targeted poor foreign immigrants living in substandard squalid conditions in 
East Side slums. The city’s policy in the nascent stage concentrated on sanitation and health with 
the growing awareness of urban living conditions. 
During the Great Depression, a lot of banks went bankrupt, which restricted working 
lower-income households’ access to home credit loans. To address those urgent housing issues in 
the 1930s, the United States found the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created in part 
under the National Housing Act of 1934. The federal agency aimed at the amelioration of 
housing standards and physical conditions as well as providing home financing schemes via 
mortgage insurance. The FHA came under fire of acute criticisms for practicing red-lining at the 
expense of black communities. Then in 1934, the New York City Housing Authority called 
NYCHA, the city agency was built with the aims of providing sufficient public housing units. 
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From the 1930s to the 1960s, as immigration waned and suburbanization exploded, city 
leaders broadened the city’s role to cover the middle class. Housers concentrated on low-income 
public housing like Jacob Riis Houses (1949) and middle-income housing like Queensview 
(1950) to attract people leaving the city (Ibid.). In the years following World War II, to resolve 
acute housing shortage, Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1949, which extended federal 
financing for slum clearance, or what came to be known as urban renewal, as well as enhancing 
public housing and FHA mortgage insurance. Meanwhile, a severe criticism of poor planning 
was also brought up regarding the massive urban redevelopments: corruption and discrimination 
against the minorities. Poor working families living in the destroyed places were displaced, and 
more than 30 percent of whom could not return as promised. The federal government spent $13.5 
billion on urban renewal and slum clearance projects between 1953 and 1986 (Rusk, 1999). 
James Baldwin, an African-American writer renamed the policy “Negro removal.” 
Since the 1970s, the housing policy faced monolithic political challenges. Policymakers 
had become more pessimistic on the effectiveness and efficiency of public housing projects, 
which was under the criticism that the subsidized housing was not sustainable and a waste of 
public budgets and public-oriented projects were a failure. Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis (1956) and 
Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago (1962) are mostly cited cases as a policy failure of the public 
housing program. Public housing became the lawless places of a disorder occupied with extreme 
poverty, violence, and prostitution. Finally, in 1973, President Nixon placed a Moratorium on 
new public housing programs, and the ensuing Reagan Administration cut the federal budget for 
housing assistance. Influenced by the political complaints, in fact, NYCHA stopped an additional 
new supply of public housing since the early 1980s. In 1974, The Housing and Community 
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Development Act of 1974 consolidated diverse HUD’s funding streams into the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program (Bloom, 2015). 
Another big challenge for New York City in the 1970s was that the city lost over 
800,000 citizens because of the white flights to the suburban areas. Combined with rising 
maintenance costs and stagnant tenant's incomes, the city was obsessed with abandonment and 
arson. By 1979, the city’s housing agency, the Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development (HPD) established in 1977, had taken ownership of more than 60,000 units in 
vacant buildings and another 40,000 units in occupied and semi-occupied buildings through tax 
foreclosure (NYU Furman Center). Simultaneously, in 1977, Congress passed the Community 
Reinvestment Act, which required banks to report their lending practices in communities where 
deposits were gleaned to prohibit discriminatory lending practices like the Red-lining against 
low-income neighborhoods as well as in particular minorities. 
From the 1980s, the U.S. housing policy has experienced a dramatic shift; the city’s 
affordable housing policy changed its orientation from a direct subsidy to indirect support 
through primarily Public-Private Partnership. The primary reason why this happened was that 
other programs were either too expensive or didn't work well. For instance, public housing was 
expensive and was branded as the concentration of violence and poverty. In 1983, the Housing 
and Urban-Rural Recovery Act introduced the Section 8 voucher program, which provided 
qualified low-income tenants with rental subsidies. In 1986, a breakthrough has come; Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) was designed to provide private developers initiating the 
construction and rehabilitation project of low-income housing with lucrative tax credits. By the 
way, since the mid-1980s, housing prices and rents restarted to rise throughout the city. As a 
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result, homelessness became prominent and pervasive, so the city was compelled to provide 
shelter houses for them. Moreover, foreign immigration resumed, and the displacement became a 
big social issue.  
However, tax-foreclosed, or in-rem housing continued to deteriorate despite the largest 
expenditure of budget under the city’s ownership. Particularly, disinvestment from the federal 
government led to a serious maintenance issue of public housing in New York City. In 1992, 
HUD stepped in again with a new program, the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program or 
Home Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) VI to resuscitate the moribund nation-wide 
public housing properties by proving grants to local governments. The typical HOPE VI was 
designed to tear down distressed public housing properties and rebuild new lower-rise, mixed-
income townhouses as well as single-family homes. At the time, policymakers focused on the 
design and role of the buildings rather than systematic divestment and mismanagement on the 
properties. The author of defensible space theory, Oscar Newman, an architect and city planner 
provided them with a ground for the program. Oscar Newman argued that the poor architectural 
and alienating environmental design of high-rise public housing was a breeding ground for crime. 
Most of the American cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia received the grants and dismantled 
the problem by demolishing the old projects. From 1997-2000 the HUD had approved 120 
demolition grants for over 50,000 public housing units across the U.S. (Khafagy, 2018). 
Later, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 that adopted the policy 
accelerated demolition of public housing. According to the National Low-Income Housing 
Collation, between the mid-1990s and 2010, HOPE VI eradicated approximately 200,000 public 
housing units while replacing with about 50,000 low-income units and providing 57,000 former 
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public housing residents with housing vouchers instead of housing replacements. In addition, 
after the rehabilitation, approximately one-third of former residents could not return to their 
homes and instead were displaced to other subsidized housing facilities, which broke the social 
fabric of the communities. 
However, New York City approached the program in a different way. The city 
reluctantly was inactive for the program; the city only received three HOPE VI grants from the 
HUD accounting for only $88 million. One reason why NYCHA barely participated in the 
program was that the city wanted to preserve the public housing property. It was because it was 
almost not possible to rebuild low-density mixed-income public housing in New York with the 
federal grants given the extremely high costs of land and construction. But the condition of 
public housing in New York City had become worse and worse because of systematic 
underfunding, divestment, mismanagement, and neglect from the federal government. 
In 2012, as an ultimate solution to the dilapidated public housing maintenance, HUD 
introduced the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, which was designed to convert 
existing public housing projects into privately-managed properties funded by Section 8 vouchers. 
New York City was also reluctant to take part in the new public-private partnership program 
again. But, later in 2016, NYCHA participated in the RAD program through Ocean Bay, a 1,395-
unit public housing complex on the Far Rockaway. NYCHA was authorized to leverage $560 
million in the private sector and disaster recovery funds as long as all the units remain as 




B. Principal Affordable Housing Programs 
 
New York City’s housing prices are so high that the city has attempted various affordable 
housing support programs to address its citizens’ housing burdens. New York City’s housing 
programs are multi-scaled being divided into Federal, State, and City levels, and there are lots of 
diverse sorts of housing support programs in New York City: Zoning ordinance including 
Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH), Mortgage loans for individuals’ homeownership 
increase, and Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), etc. However, it is not possible to deal with all 
the programs of the city in this one paper at one sitting. So, this research will limit its scope to a 
handful of primary and important affordable housing finance tools: federal subsidy programs 
such as LIHTC and Section 8 as well as city-level incentive programs including J-51 and M2. 
 
Rent Regulation 
According to the National Multifamily Housing Council (NMHC), as of fall 2019, 32 states of 
the U.S prohibit rent-control. Only a few states such as Oregon, California, District of 
Columbia, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey are running the regulatory scheme
14
, and 
New York City boasts of the most tenant-friendly and vigorous rent regulations. Nobody can 
deny that the city’s well-established rent regulations contributed to its current relatively low PIR. 
Given the portion of rental housing units and the percentage of low-income households living in 
rent-regulated housing in New York, rent regulation scheme is pivotal without a doubt. Rent 
regulation is one of the unique staple marks of New York City housing and the real estate 
market. According to the 2017 New York City Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS), 365,000 
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 The rest of states have no rules: no rent control, no preemption. 
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families, or approximately 38 percent of low-income households
15
 reside in regulated 
apartments (Miranova, 2019).  
< Figure 16. Low-income households by housing type (2017) > 
 
Source: Miranova (2019), CSS analysis of 2017 New York City Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS) 
 
The first rent regulation was introduced in New York City in 1920 to tackle the housing 
shortage problem after World War I under the Emergency Rent Laws, but the laws could have 
not survived until later than1929. Later in 1942, the federal government passed the Emergency 
Price Control Act to tame inflation by the economic impact of World WarⅡ. The Roosevelt 
government stepped in to set rent controls nationwide via the federal Office of Price 
Administration (OPA) established in 1943 (Ibid.). In response to the expiration of the act, 
Congress passed the Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, which exempted construction after 
1947 from rent controls, but maintained the regulation for properties already completed by that 
date. After World WarⅡ, the authority and responsibility for the rent control were devolved to 
the state level, and a lot of states abandoned rent regulation. However, New York State preserved 
rent regulation; the state took over the federal regulation program that ended in 1950. 
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 CSS defines “low-income” as individuals and families whose earnings are at 200% of the federal poverty level 
(FPL), or $38,636 for a family of three. 
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In 1962, New York City began to administer its program, and rent regulation was put 
under the dual administration of New York City and the state government. But, just a few years 
later, in 1964, the responsibility of administering rent regulation in municipalities within New 
York City was transferred to the state department again: the Division of Housing and Community 
Renewal (DHCR). In 1969, the downturn of the construction business and the vacancy rates 
prompted the rent increase of the non-regulated housing units. As a countermeasure, New York 
State enacted the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, which lifted the bar of the regulation on the 
units built after the 1947 cutoff for the application of the rent control. Around an additional 
400,000 previously regulation-exempted apartments were added under the new regulation. But 
ensued several acts gradually deregulated the rent-controlled and rent-stabilized housing stock. 
 In 1970 and 1971, the new laws allowed landlords to pass the rent costs to the tenants 
upon vacancy and forfeited New York City’s authority to regulate the rents. Increased tenants’ 
concerns regarding landlord harassments and rent hikes caused the enactment of the Emergency 
Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) in 1974, which allowed applying the rent stabilization system in 
Nassau, Rockland, and Westchester counties; the rent stabilization can be applied to non-rent 
controlled apartments in buildings of six or more units built before January 1, 1974, in localities 
that have declared an emergency and adopted the ETPA.
16
 The ETPA also affected the New York 
Rent Stabilization Law, thereby by re-regulating the decontrolled apartments and placing 
additional buildings under the regulation. However, the responsibility for administering New 
York City’s rent regulation was still in the n-hands of the state’s DHCR. 
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 In order for rents to be placed under regulation, there must be a rental vacancy rate of less than 5% for all or any 
class or classes of rental housing accommodations. Some municipalities limit ETPA to buildings of a specific size, 




In 1997, The Rent Regulation Reform Act was passed extending the Rent Stabilization 
Laws until 2003 and at the same time, broadening "luxury decontrol" to households earning 
more than $175,000
17
 in two consecutive years with rents of $2,000 or more. And the law also 
had been amended further by the Rent Law of 2003, the Rent Act of 2011, and most recently 
with the Rent Act of 2015, which has extended New York’s rental laws until 2019. Most recently 
in June 2019, New York State enacted the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019, 
which made rent regulation system permanent. This act strengthened the tenants’ rights; the main 
modifications are like below (New York State Assembly, 2019). 
1) Repealed the provisions that allow the removal of units from rent stabilization when 
the rent crosses a statutory high-rent threshold and the unit becomes vacant or the 
tenant's income is $200,000 or higher in the preceding two years 
2) Repealed the "vacancy bonus" provision that permits a property owner to raise rents 
as much as 20 percent each time a unit becomes vacant 
3) Prohibited owners who have offered tenants a "preferential rent" below the legal 
regulated rent from raising the rent to the full legal rent upon renewal 
4) Lowered the rent increase cap for Major Capital Improvements (MCIs) from six 
percent to two percent in New York City 
According to NYS DHCR, rent regulation is the policy to limit the extent that the 
landlords can increase the rent every year: frequency, timing, and amount of rent increase. The 
policy aims to protect the low-income tenants in the privately-owned residential building from 
the illegal rent increases as well as allowing the property owners to maintain their buildings 
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 Previously the income threshold was $250,000. 
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while realizing a reasonable profit. 
 There are two systems of rent regulation: rent control and rent stabilization. As 
aforementioned, the rent control only applies to buildings built before 1947. Rent control 
restricts the rent landlords from charging more rents and puts the limits on the right of the 
homeowners to evict their tenants. Under the rent control, the tenants can live in their apartments 
as long as they want as “statutory” tenants
18
 without the renewal of the lease contract. However, 
even under the rent control, the rent increase is still possible, but the extent of increase is limited 
by the Maximum Base Rent (MBR) system, which is set by Rent Guidelines Board (RGB)
 19
 for 
each apartment and adjusted every two years to reflect changes in operating costs. At those 
intervals, the homeowners can raise the rents to 7.5 percent annually until the rents hit the MBR. 
The qualified owners are entitled to raise the rents at the lesser of either the average of the five 
most recent RGB’s annual rent increases for one-year renewal leases or 7.5 percent each year 
until they reach MBR (NYS DHCR). The rent that a tenant ultimately pays is known as the 
Maximum Collectible Rent (MCR), and it can increase annually until it reaches MBR. New York 
City Local Law 30 of 1970 stipulates that MBR should be established for each apartment 
according to a formula to reflect real estate taxes, water and sewer charges, operating and 
maintenance expenses, return on capital value, and vacancy and collection loss allowance (Ibid.). 
On the other hand, the rent stabilization covers the buildings of six or more units built 
after 1947 and before 1974 that are not subject to the rent control as well as the apartments 
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 Tenants whose tenancy legally expired, but has the rights by statute to pay rent and occupy under rent contr
ol forever without a lease 
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 The board is mandated to establish rent adjustments for rent stabilized residential units. The board consists of 




removed from the rent control. It also includes pre-Mitchell Lama
20
 housing units that have lost 
affordability protections, rent-controlled apartments and legally converted industrial lofts, and 
buildings that receive J-51, 421-a, 421c, 421-g, and article 11 tax benefits. The rent-stabilized 
apartments can exit the program when they meet one of the conditions below (Ibid.): 
1) When the rent reaches $2,733 upon tenant vacancy (repealed in 2019). 
2) Rent reaches $2,733 and tenants’ income is higher than $200,000 (repealed in 2019) 
3) The Building converts to a condo or co-op upon vacancy of tenant 
4) The building is substantially renovated or converted to commercial/professional use 
5) Temporary tax incentive expires 
6) The building is condemned, demolished, or permanently removed in some other way. 
 
The rent stabilization provides the tenants with several protections including rights to 
receiving required services, renewing leases, and not be evicted except on grounds allowed by 
law as well as limitations on rent increases. The rent-stabilized tenants have the right of 
succession. It is possible to inherit an apartment when the main tenant passes away or moves, 
and an immediate family member living in the home wants to stay in it constantly. Most tenants 
also can share and sublet their apartments with their landlord’s permission. 
As of 2017, 57 percent of rental housing was rent-regulated, most of which are rent-
stabilized. The rent-controlled units accounted for 1 percent, and the rent-stabilized units were 
44.2 percent. In 2018, 885,205 units were registered as rent-stabilized units (Curbed NY, 2018). 
 
                                           
20
 The program was primarily designed to supply affordable housing for middle-income families. Roughly 75,000 
rental apartments and 50,000 cooperative units were built under the program between the 1950’s and the 1970’s. 
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< Table 4. Rent regulation inventory in New York City (unit: thousands) > 
Type 2002 2005 2008 2011 2017 
Units % Units % Units % Units % Units % 
Non-regulated 665.0 31.9 697.4 33.3 772.7 36.0 849.8 39.1 936.0 42.9 
Rent controlled 59.3 2.8 43.3 2.1 39.9 1.9 38.4 1.8 21.8 1.0 
Rent Stabilized 
pre-1947 
773.7 37.1 747.3 35.7 717.5 33.5 743.5 34.2 692.7 31.7 
Rent Stabilized 
post-1946 
240.3 11.5 296.3 14.2 305.8 14.3 243.3 11.2 273.8 12.5 
Other regulated 346.5 16.6 308.0 14.7 308.6 14.4 297.6 13.7 258.0 11.8 
Total 2,085 100 2,092 100 2,144 100 2,173 100 2,183 100 
 
Source: Housing Supply Report (RGB) 
 
A rent increase for the rent-stabilized units is determined by RGB in New York City. The 
RGB sets rates for rent increases in the stabilized apartments, and the rates are decided once a 
year and are effective for renewal leases beginning on or after October 1st of each year. RGB 
must consider the economic condition of the residential real estate industry in NYC including (i) 
real estate taxes and sewer and water rates, (ii) gross operating maintenance costs (including 
insurance rates, governmental fees, the cost of fuel, and labor charges), (iii) the costs and 
availability of financing (including effective rates of interest), and (iv) the overall supply of 
housing accommodations and overall vacancy rates (Ahe, 2018). RGB also should reflect 
relevant data from the current and the projected cost of living indexes for the affected area. The 
Rent Stabilization Law and City Charter require annual hearings before the adoption of rent 
guidelines. Based on the guideline by NYS DHCR, owners can also raise rents during the lease 
period in any one of three ways: 1) with the written consent of the tenant in occupancy, if the 
owner increases services or equipment, or makes improvements to an apartment; 2) with DHCR 
approval if the owner installs a building-wide major capital improvement, or 3) in cases of 
hardship with DHCR approval (NYS DHCR).  
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< Figure 17. The rise of rent stabilization > 
 
Source: Miranova (2019) 
 
Unregulated rental units continuously increased, while apartments under rent control 
dramatically have decreased. Specifically, from 1994 through 2018, 155,558 rent-stabilized units 
were added, but 298,426 rent-stabilized units were subtracted from the program over the same 
period (NYC RGB, 2019). The majority of additions were subsidized-housing under 421-a 
(88,495 units), and the next largest portion was housing that exited from the rent-control program 
(38,833 units). But over half of subtractions were caused by high-rent, high-income deregulation 
(160,292 units). Co-op and condo conversion (50,431 units) were followed. The only good news 
is that net rent-stabilized units have increased for the last two consecutive years. 
< Figure 18. Annual net changes in rent-stabilized units 2018 > 
 
Source: NYC RGB (2019)
21
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 Referred to “Changes to the rent stabilized housing stock in NYC in 2018”. 
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 However, not everyone advocates rent regulation. Rent regulation is also one of the 
controversial policy topics in the U.S. The primary concern is that the leasing regulation can 
discourage additional rental housing supply and lead to the decay of the property by prompting 
landlords to disinvest on building maintenance. The opponents believe that rent regulation has 
facilitated a housing shortage and housing quality deteriorations. Neoliberal economists 
including Edward Glaeser argue that deregulation and de-zoning are the only solutions to 
promote more housing supply into the market, which can lower the housing price level through 
the power of the invisible hand. They blame that the benefits of rent regulation can go to higher-
income households because the regulation could limit the supply of market-rate rental housing, 
which drives up rents of the non-regulated apartments. They also insist that the too much safe 
shelter makes poor incumbent tenants rely on the rent-controlled apartments. The fact that the 
tenants can stay in the rent-regulated apartment as long as they want could make those people 
less diligent in economic activities. Also, it can deprive other vulnerable households of 
opportunities to share the benefits. In response to the grumblings, the city loosened the law, 
which caused the loss of thousands of regulated apartments. 
 However, if zoning ordinances and rent regulation were repealed, will housing prices be 
stabilized? Unfortunately, it would not happen like that. In June 2019, most recently, RGB raised 
rents by 1.5 percent for a one-year renewal lease and 2.5 percent for a two-year renewal lease, 
which is effective October 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020. The board initially 
contemplated 6.75 percent of rent increase to reflect landlords’ recent operating cost increase of 
5.5 percent from March 2018 to March 2019. But the board finally decided this year’s rent 
increase at the same level as the previous year (NYC RGB). The board also has approved a rent 
freeze for a one-year lease for the first time in 2015 and 2016 consecutively. The board’s 
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decision weighs on housing equity and tenant protection over property owners’ profits. The city 
needs a brake to tame skyrocketing market rents to make the city a livable habitat. If rent 
regulation is the main reason for the affordable housing shortage, Hong Kong must not have the 
most expensive housing market in the world. Rent control in Hong Kong was adopted during the 
British ruling period in 1973 but abolished it in 1998 after the Asian financial crisis. Rent 
regulation is working, and historically, rent regulation has contributed to reining the rent increase 
in New York City. 
 
Rental Assistance Program: Section 8 housing choice voucher (HCV) 
Section 8 is a federally-funded rental subsidy program that is designed to assist low-income 
families to lease decent private housing. In New York City, the program is administered through 
several agencies. There are two types of section 8 programs: people-based voucher, which gives 
the eligible tenants portable vouchers and project-based voucher, which only allows being used 
in specific housing apartments. HCV is managed at multi-scales by federal, state, and city 
agencies under their own application process and rules. The federal Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) oversees a project-based Section 8 program in New York City. A 
state agency, the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), and two city agencies 
such as NYCHA and HPD administer the program. 
DHCR directly runs the HCV Program in New York City through its Subsidy Services 
Bureau, and the statewide average monthly voucher assistance payment is currently $725 with a 
range from $8 to $2,446 based on the region and family income (DHCR). However, a new 
application for the voucher is closed now. At the same time, the state agency runs the HCR 
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Section 8 Voucher Home Ownership Program, which helps current voucher holders obtain a 
home of their own. The households are required to be an HCR Section 8 participant for one year 
or more and have no previous home ownership records or single-parent displaced homemakers.  
NYCHA, the nation’s largest PHA, administers the largest Section 8 program in the 
country as well. According to the NYCHA fact sheet (2019), as of Dec 2018, the city agency 
supported 185,127 low-income residents in 83,225 apartments. Also, 2,991 Section 8 households 
lived in the RAD developments. The average household income was $17,150 and the average 
monthly rent was $360. NYCHA’s Project-Based Voucher (PBV) accounted for only a small 
portion; as of 2019, there were only 8,736 units, and NYCHA had 24,954 private landlord 
partners. The NYCHA program is also not available now; the waitlist for NYCHA Section 8 is 
currently closed, and 138,705 families are waiting for the vouchers. 
The city's HPD also administers Section 8. According to HPD, as of June 2019, 39,965 
households and 81,606 people are having benefits of Section 8 housing voucher program: 
specifically, Regular voucher 60%, Enhanced 13.5%, and others. In terms of race, most of them 
are white (49.0%) including Hispanics (39.75%) and Blacks (46.4%). 81.7 percent fall on 
extremely low-income class with $17,656.94 of average gross income, and average rent and 
subsidy are $ 1,444.72 and $1,043.58 respectively. The total landlords who participated in the 
voucher program numbered 8,397. Unfortunately, HPD also currently stopped receiving new 
applications. Instead, the agency runs other programs including Emergency Housing Services, 










Staten Island 1,266 
Others 2898 
Total    39,965  
 
Types Units 








Source: NYC HPD, Section 8 program indicators 
 
It should be noted again that each agency might have a different set of rules; however, to 
understand the program components more in detail, HPD’s section 8 program briefing book will 
be referred to for the investigation in this paper. NYC HPD issues a voucher to the eligible 
households and the families can choose their homes among the participating houses that the 
requirements are met. HPD directly pays the landlords of the property the rents subsidy on behalf 
of the voucher holders. The program aims to keep the tenants’ share of the rent at 30 percent of 
their monthly adjusted income by paying the difference from “Fair Market Rent (FMR)
22
”, 
which is calculated by HUD annually in a Metropolitan area. Originally, FMR was determined 
based on an entire Metropolitan area at the 40th percentile of rents paid by recent movers. But 
FMR was calculated lower by including far away cheaper suburban areas; therefore, in practice, 
the voucher holders had difficulty to find a conforming housing in the city. Responding to the 
criticism that the inaccurate calculation kept the voucher-holders in the poor neighborhoods, 
since Jan 17, 2017, HUD adopted a new formula, called “Small Area Fair Market Rent” 
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(SAFMR), in which rents are determined based on ZIP
23
 codes for the Metropolitan area.  
The voucher size (the number of bedrooms) is determined by the subsidy standards 
reflecting the number of family members, sex, and age, etc. The voucher holders should search 
for the proper houses conforming to the subsidy standards within 120 days. Regarding house 
search, the qualified tenant can select a housing unit where the gross rent is higher than the 
Payment Standard
24
 (unit size and rent) that is determined by HPD. However, the maximum rent 
payment cannot exceed 40 percent of the tenant’s monthly adjusted income. HCV program also 
requires tenants to complete and report annual recertification, and HPD will reexamine voucher 
holders’ income and family composition review their eligibility. The tenants who fail to report 
the changes will lose the government subsidy. 
What if the owners of the building and rental house determined to leave the housing 
subsidy program? “Conversion” can happen when private owners terminate the rental assistance 
program at the end of the contract term. Public Housing Authority (PHA) can end the contract, or 
the landlords pay off the subsidized mortgage before the due date. When conversion happens, 
rental assistance deemed “Enhanced Voucher” (or Sticky voucher) can be provided to protect the 
existing tenants who lived in the subsidized housing such as Mitchell-Lama from the rent 
increases and make them remain in the property as long as the unit continues to be used for the 
rental purpose. In this case, a tenant can have two options as either an Enhanced Voucher to stay 
or Housing Choice Voucher to move. The enhanced Voucher program, also known as sticky 
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 ZIP Code areas are small enough to reflect differences of communities within a metropolitan area. 
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 HPD sets the Payment Standard at 110% of the HUD Fair Market Rent (FMR) for the New York City 
metropolitan region, which is determined as the lower of the Payment Standard amount for your voucher size or the 




vouchers, provides a more generous income limit and higher payment standards to cover the 
increased rent due to conversion. The income standards for Enhanced voucher are below 95 
percent of Area Median Income (AMI)
25
, instead of the 50 percent limit for the regular voucher. 
Aside from the tenant-based Voucher aforementioned, there also exists a project-based 
voucher, which requires the tenants to move into the specific apartment assigned by HPD. 
Voucher holders do not need to search for the conforming housing, but at the same time, they 
forfeited the discretionary authority. Voucher holders must live in the designated apartment at 
least for one year before moving to another apartment while meeting family responsibility as 
tenants. There are several forms of project-based voucher: Moderate Rehabilitation (Mod Rehab), 
Moderate-Single Room Occupancy (Mod SRO), and Shelter Plus Care (SPC). These programs 
provide rental assistance to the qualified low-income households and individuals to dwell in 
specifically designated housing, particularly apartments. The big differences from the tenant-
based voucher are that 1) the rental subsidy is tied to the apartment, and tenants must live in the 
assigned units and cannot move to another house with the subsidy, or tenants will lose the 
subsidy. 2) Vouchers will not be issued. 3) It is prohibited to add additional family members 
without prior approval (NYC HPD). These programs already expired, so the assistance is limited 
to properties that were previously rehabilitated pursuant to the rent assistance contract between 
PHA and private owners.  
Specifically, the Moderate Rehabilitation (Mod Rehab) program incorporated Housing 
Choice Voucher (HCV) into the rehabilitated privately-owned housing units (The program was 
repealed in 1991). Moderate Single Room Occupancy (SRO) and Shelter Plus Care (SPC) are 
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 The AMI is the income level to be used to determine income qualification for affordable housing program, which 
is determined based on household median income of American Community Survey (ACS). The figure is measured 
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development annually. 
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rental assistance programs for homeless people. SRO assists very low-income, unaccompanied, 
homeless individuals who rent a small, furnished room. The rental assistance payments cover the 
difference between the tenant's income (normally 30%) and the market rent. The rental assistance 
for SRO units is provided up to 10 years with subsequent renewal terms. SPC also serves 
homeless individuals with disabilities and their families, most of whom are those with serious 
mental illness, chronic problems with alcohol and drugs, and HIV/AIDS. In 2009, the Homeless 
Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act called the HEARTH Act, 
consolidated the three separate McKinney-Vento homeless assistance programs into a single 
grant program known as the Continuum of Care (CoC) Program. SRO and SPC no longer exist; 
however, their components are still alive under the umbrella of CoC (HUD Exchange).  
 
Public Housing  
Although New York City does not have a tile of the first public housing in the U.S.
26
, the city has 
the largest inventory of public housing as well as the nation’s largest Public Housing Authority, 
known as NYCHA in the U.S. As of Jan 2017, the agency has 173,762 public housing apartments, 
which represent 7.9 percent of the city’s rental apartments stock and 4.4 percent of the 
population of the city. NYCHA serves 166,870 families and 381,159 authorized residents of 
New York City (NYCHA, 2019). 
Despite the reputation and its incessant needs, public housing has waned incessantly 
nationwide including New York City. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
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(2017), the public housing inventory loss in the U.S. has totaled more than 250,000 units since 
the mid-1990s, and only a small percentage of demolished units have been replaced with new 
housing. Moreover, the deteriorating condition of public housing has become a big burden to 
both the city government and residents in public housing. The public housing program in 
America is the same as the European social housing system in that they both received 
government subsidy or owned by the public sector. But they are different from each other in 
terms of the service target scope. The U.S. public housing model concentrates only on the poor 
and the elderly as well as the disabled. HUD defines that public housing is established to provide 
decent and safe rental housings for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons with 
disabilities. On the other hand, generally social housing includes the middle class as well as the 
poor at the same time. Then what made the difference? We can find some clues in history. 
 The public housing program first came out to the world with the Housing Act of 1937. 
The program originally targeted on providing more sanitary cheap housing for working-class 
people temporarily suffering from the Great Depression as well as stimulating job creation and 
economic growth. In response to the concerns of socialism, the encroachment of local 
government’s discretion, and crowding out effect on the private market, the federal act restricted 
that public housing properties should be constructed and owned only by state-charted or locally 
managed public housing authorities (PHAs). The act also gave the states and municipalities the 
right to create PHAs in order not to encroach the local government’s sovereignty. So, the statue 
set the income restriction of qualified residents in public housing by limiting the family income 
not to exceed five times the rents and required to eliminate unsafe or unsanitary units. Not long 
after that, during World War Ⅱ, The Lanham Act of 1940 halted new public housing 
constructions to fund housing for war workers.  
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 Soon, the public housing program restarted by the Housing Act of 1949, which 
authorized the Urban Renewal program by setting new policy goal of “a decent home and 
suitable living environment for every American family.” The priority for public housing was 
given to the households displaced with urban renewal policy. The law expanded the size of 
public housing development (800,000 units by 1954) and instituted some important guidelines: 
construction cost limit and requirement of rent (at least 20 percent below the prevailing market 
rents). However, political issues such as the Korean War and the antagonism from local 
communities restricted the supply of public housing only to 210,000 units by 1957 (McCarty, 
2014). From this act, the policy focus of public housing changed gear to families of low income 
and color. From 1952 to 1962, the number of families living in public housing while receiving 
income from private or public assistance programs rose from 29 percent to 46 percent (Ibid.). In 
conclusion, the 1949 housing act scooped up the resistance from the white dominant 
communities, the negative stigmatization of the subsidized housing, and the perpetuation of 
segregation in public housing. The concentration of poverty also led to the slumnization of 
public housing, which negatively branded it as a core of violence, prostitute, and drug dealing. 
In the 1960s, in response to the criticism and the increasing construction cost of public 
housing, the federal government changed the policy orientation from creating publicly-owned 
public housing to subsidizing privately-owned properties. For example, the Section 23 allowed 
PHAs to utilize the private units for leasing to qualified households. Particularly by the 1960s, 
the new Turnkey model, in which private developers build the property on their land and sell 
them to PHAs for the public housing usage, became popular (Muth, 1973). Another big concern 
was the concentration of poverty in public housing. In response to that, in the 1960s, the 
Supreme Court made it illegal to discriminate public housing applicants and to segregate public 
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housing residents by race. The growing concerns about the economic segregation in public 
housing properties led to the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which preempted the 
construction of new high-rise public housing (McCarty, 2014). Following the 1969 Brooke 
Amendment established tenants’ contribution cap at 25 percent of family income to make 
programs more affordable from the perspective of a low-income family, and HUD began to 
provide an operating cost subsidy to PHAs to fill the finance gap. But ironically, the policy 
change forced the program to focus more on the extremely low-income class, which worsened 
the financial and operational burden of PHAs. The federal subsidy and rent revenues were not 
sufficient enough to meet the maintenance cost. Finally, that caused serious disinvestment and 
disrepair, which was the starting point to drive the vulnerable program to the cul-de-sac. 
 Since 1970, the negative responses to the efficiency of public housing construction 
became dominant. The federal government also felt burdened on the cost of public housing 
development and its maintenance. As a quicker and less costly alternative, housing policy began 
to concentrate on the utilization of existing housing stocks rather than the new construction of 
public housing. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 required to utilize at least 30 
percent of new public housing via the Section 23, and authorized the Experimental Housing 
Allowance Program to test the feasibility of housing allowance program instead of public 
housing provision. Finally, in 1973, President Nixon imposed a moratorium on housing 
construction commitments except for the section 202 Elderly housing program. After the 
moratorium, the orientation of the federal housing assistance program transitioned from the new 
construction of public housing to the utilization of existing stocks and private markets (Ibid.). To 
avoid the aforementioned criticisms, the federal government chose an alternative; the Housing 
and Community Development Act of 1974 authorized the section 8 program to provide people-
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based subsidies for the privately-owned property. 
 Since the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, housing policy preference has 
more stuck to the assistance of the homeless, the severely rent-burdened, and people under 
substandard housing. The act also raised the tenants’ contribution ratio from 25 percent to the 
current 30 percent of the household income and focused on families with income below 50 
percent of AMI. The Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 almost prohibited new public housing 
construction by restricting the conditions of new construction and authorized the section 8 
voucher demonstration, which was later made permanent in 1988. Furthermore, with the passage 
of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, new public housing construction was 
further confined only to cases where section 8 could not meet the housing needs (Ibid.). 
 The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 authorized the Family Self Sufficient 
program to provide incentives for assisted families to increase their employment. At the same 
time, the formal PHA management assessment system was installed. In 1992, the Housing and 
Community Development Act brought up the Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public 
Housing program, named HOPE VI, which was a competitive grant for PHAs to implement 
redevelopment of distressed public housing projects. Also, the Quality Housing and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1988 provided PHAs with the power to convert public housing stock to the 
voucher program and allowed them to use the leverage in funding the properties. But, no funds 
have been given to construct new public housing since the mid-1990s. 
 Public housing properties started aging and deteriorating rapidly due to mismanagement, 
disinvestment, and funding lack from the federal government. The cost of repairs and 
replacements increased to the unmanageable level. In response to the public housing crisis, in 
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2012 Congress began the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), which was designed to 
convert existing public housing projects into privately-managed properties funded by Section 8 
vouchers. RAD is generally perceived as a sustainable alternative to address worsening repair 
backlog problems. But at the same time, it prompts another controversy of the privatization of 
public assets, given the high values and preferential locations of public housing portfolio. This 
topic will be dealt with more precisely in a later chapter. 
Based on the brief history of public housing, from now on, I will dive into how the 
current public housing system works more in detail. The governance structure of PHAs seems 
democratic. To incorporate participatory planning in the planning process, PHAs are required to 
have at least one resident in the governance board and must run Resident Advisory Boards. The 
residents of public housing also have a right to organize a resident council, and PHAs have to 
champion the activities. Currently, to get permission to enter public housing, the applicants must 
meet some requirements: family gross income must be at or below 80 percent of AMI,
27
 and 
family members should be citizens or eligible non-residents. PHAs aim the two contradictory 
pillars of goals: servicing the neediest families and the de-concentration of poverty. PHAs should 
ensure that a minimum of 40 percent of public housing in a year be assigned to extremely low-
income families who have income at or below 30 percent of AMI. However, PHAs are also 
obliged to facilitate the de-concentration of poverty and income mixing; they are required to 
report the admission policy to HUD (MaCarty, 2014).  
Under these requirements, public housing rents are determined at the level of no more 
than 30 percent of the family’s monthly adjustable income based on the definition of “affordable” 
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under Federal Housing Law. Rent is calculated as the highest of the following: 1) 30 percent of 
the family’s monthly adjusted
28
 income, 2) 10 percent of the family’s gross monthly income, 3) 
welfare rent if receiving welfare payment, 4) a minimum rent up to $50 set by PHAs (Ibid.). A 
family who expects income increase for the near future could choose market comparable “Flat 
rents” option that is notified by PHAs each year. PHAs have to reexamine tenant families’ 
household composition and income every year. However, it is for annual rent adjustment. The 
tenants also have some obligations to abide by. The tenants are required to report the relevant 
information to determine rents, and the general tenants also have to participate in eight hours per 
month of either community service or economic self-sufficiency activities to maintain the public 
housing residency. In terms of tenure, there are no federal rules and limitations in public housing. 
As long as the tenants wish to stay as long as they follow rules and keep paying rents, they can 
stay continually. Theoretically, PHAs can vacate them if a family income surpasses the income 
qualification; however, in reality, PHAs do not necessarily oust them; PHAs cannot kick out the 
tenants solely for being “over-income” in case that they are participating in the Family Self 
Sufficiency program or are receiving the earned income disregard. Also, in some cases, although 
the tenancy is terminated, the unit may be considered unassisted while it is occupied by an 
ineligible family without eviction (Ibid.). But PHAs are encouraged to set stricter eviction 
grounds such as sex offender and criminal conduct. 
As noted above, the public housing program runs under the contract with the federal 
government, HUD; therefore, PHAs’ sovereignty is highly limited in reality. Specifically, PHAs 
need to get permission from HUD to get rid of public housing units. Also, HUD strengthened the 
control over PHAs through Public Housing Assessment System (PHAS), under which PHAs 
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could be placed in receivership in case of its default. In late 2018, HUD tried to declare NYCHA 
in substantial default and placed the agency into receivership, but NYCHA announced “NYCHA 
2.0” and finally HUD and NYC reached an agreement to appoint a federal monitor
29
 to NYCHA 
instead. The agency in trouble must prepare action plans to address the repair issues. The U.S. is 
struggling with a serious public housing crisis; HUD currently has a $35 billion repair backlog 
for 1.2 million poor families’ shelters. The biggest PHA in America, NYCHA’s projection is 
more pessimistic. According to NYCHA
30
, the average age of its properties is 60 years, and 70 
percent of the portfolio was built before 1970. The agency projected that as of 2017, the total 
cost
31
 of repair and replacement for the decrepit properties over the next five years numbered 
$31.8 billion and $45.2 billion over 20 years. 
As a solution, RAD was authorized as a demonstration program by the Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012.
32
 RAD has two separate components. The first 
component, which is competitive, allows the portfolio funded by the public housing program to 
convert to the long term Section 8 rental assistance contracts. PHAs can choose one between 
project-based vouchers (PBVs) or project-based rental assistance (PBRA) as a form of Section 8 
Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) Contracts. PHAs can convert their assistance at the current 
subsidy level without incremental funds. Congress
33
 lifted the unit cap from 60,000 units to 
455,000 units in May 2018. The second component describes the conversion of Section 8 
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Moderate Rehabilitation (Mod Rehab) projects, which is non-competitive and without a cap. 
Technically, HUD allows the transfer of ownership of the public housing projects to the private 
entity to facilitate the use of tax credits for the converted project, which is a big concern of the 
RAD program. But NYCHA pledged not to transfer the ownership of projects to private 
developers while maintaining principle control over the project. But as a result, as of Oct 2018 
over 100,000 obsolete public housing units across the nation were converted to the section 8 
program under RAD, while $12.6 billion was funded nationwide through this (HUD, 2019). 
HUD (2019) released the survey result to indicate that 80 percent of residents in surveyed 
properties said they were happy with the repairs, and more than 95 percent of residents have 
returned to the same building after the repair process
34
. 
In Feb 2016, NYCHA also passed over the management burden of the Ocean Bay public 
housing project with 24 building and 1,400 units in the Far Rockaway to the hands of the private 
management firms to cover the cost of about $174 million in major improvements and upgrades 
over the next 20 years, which was NYC’s first RAD project using a combination of public and 
private tools including tax-exempt bonds, housing tax credits, and federal subsidies. After that, in 
June 2016, NYC introduced “Permanent Affordability Commitment Together” (PACT) aiming 
to renovate 178 public housing buildings with 5,200 units that have fallen into disrepair via RAD 
Program. In Nov. 2018, NYC announced a plan to renovate 62,000 dilapidated apartments 
benefitting 142,000 residents while anticipating a $12.8 billion capital raise by 2028. 
 RAD program is applauded as a solution to insufficient funding by using the public-
private partnership approach for other housing using bonds, and tax credits for the proper 
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maintenance of the subsidized housing. Theoretically, PHAs can sell the properties to private 
developers and asset management companies, so existing residents worry about displacement 
because they do not believe government and private landlords. Unfortunately these concerns 
have deep roots in past misbehaviors. Low-income tenants and social activists remember exactly 
what happened from the 1990s to the 2000s. They have a previous trauma regarding HOPEⅥ 
program. Under the public housing revitalization program, almost one-third of original residents 
were displaced; HUD and PHAs promised the tenants that all of them could return to their home 
after reconstruction was completed as long as the residents want because they had the priority, 
but the authorities did not keep the words. It was not possible to trace where they had gone either. 
 
 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)  
One substantial breakthrough as an addition to the affordable housing finance scheme was the 
introduction of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which was established under the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986. LIHTC provides private developers with a tax-based subsidy to 
facilitate the investment in affordable rental housing for low-income households. Since the mid-
1990s, LIHTC helped to develop more than 110,000 affordable housing stocks each year, totally 
the number reached more than 2 million units. These days, around 90 percent of affordable 
housing development projects are known to use this tax benefit scheme (New York Times, 2012).  
There are two types of LIHTCs; 9 percent credit generally subsidizes new construction 
of affordable housing, instead, 4 percent credit is reserved for rehabilitation and new construction 
project that is funded with tax-exempt bonds. 9 percent credit is allocated to each state based on 
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each state’s population size. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) allocates federal tax credits to 
State Housing Credit Agencies (HCAs), and HCAs award tax credits to eligible affordable 
housing projects. In 2019, $2.75625 per person of the tax credit was distributed to the states, with 
a minimum allocation of $3,166,875 (Congressional Research Service, 2019). On the other hand, 
4 percent tax credits are non-competitive as of right one, so the state allocation limits are not 
applied here; the credits are automatically packaged with tax-exempt bonds that financed 
projects. In this paper, I will elaborate on the structure of 9 percent tax credits more in detail. 
LIHTC program provides equity that is used by developers to subsidize the construction 
and rehabilitation cost of affordable rental housing. During annual funding rounds, the 
developers can apply for the tax credits. Under IRC Section 42
35
, HPD administers the tax credit 
program in New York City. HPD evaluates the tax credit applications under its Qualified 
Allocation Plan (QAP) on a competitive basis. QAP sets out the state’s priorities and eligibility 
criteria for awarding 9 percent tax credits. Preference goes to the projects that 1) serve the 
lowest-income residents, 2) serve for the longest time, 3) be located in qualified census tracts. 
Project “readiness” is an important element for the selection. It requires developers to incur at 
least 10 percent of the project costs no later than six months after the allocation date or by the 
close of the allocation year. Once a project received an allocation of credits, the developer sells 
the credits to market investors and acquires the equity capital to cover the portion of the 
development. Investors such as banks purchase the tax credits to lower federal corporate tax 
liability. Developers generally construct LIHTC projects as Limited Partnership (LPs) or Limited 
Liability Companies (LLCs) and provide the banks with limited liability, which allows investors 
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to receive tax credit benefits and passive losses. It is because, under federal income tax law, legal 
property owners
36
 with the benefits and burdens of ownership can take LIHTC (Comptroller of 
the Currency Administration of National Banks, 2008). For instance, a bank that has 99 percent 
of ownership in a limited partnership can receive 99 percent of the tax credits and passive losses 
including depreciation and interest expenses. 
 
< Figure 19. A typical legal structure of LIHTC: direct investment > 
 
 Source: Comptroller of the Currency Administration of National Banks (2008) 
 
Fund investment structure combining multiple LIHTC projects is also available. The 
upper-tier LP/LLC includes multiple investors with 99 percent fund ownership and 
syndicator/fund manager (fund) with 1 percent ownership. The lower-tier has ownerships of 
several projects, and the fund possesses 99 percent ownership in each project, while the 
developer/general partner owns 1 percent ownership. Tax credit distributions equate to the 
investor’s share of ownership in the upper-tier investment fund; the investors can reduce their 
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corporate federal income tax bills for ten years via the tax credits. It is known that syndications 
typically have a minimum investment amount of $ 1million or less. The investors often 
participate via the pooled equity funds raised by the syndicators, such as the New York Equity 
Fund and the Enterprise Community Investment, Inc. 
< Figure 20. A typical legal structure of LIHTC: fund investment > 
 
Source: Comptroller of the Currency Administration of National Banks (2008) 
 
 Developers who are selected to receive tax credits can claim federal tax credits over the 
10-year time frame, called “credit period,” which begins either the same taxable year in which 
the property is placed in service (or ready for occupancy) or the following taxable year. In place 
of that, developers are obliged to follow the tax credit law to keep the project in compliance over 
15 years, which is known as “compliance period” Aside from that, the property is required to 
maintain affordable rents for at least 30 years (Ibid.). The additional period is named as the 
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“extended compliance period.” If generally, developers fail to keep the compliance period, tax 
credits benefits may be recaptured. So typically, investors have a tendency to exit the investment 
as soon as 15 year-compliance period ends. 
There are two types of tax credits in the LIHTC program: 9 percent and 4 percent tax 
credit. The 9 percent tax credit is made to cover 70 percent present value of the eligible costs of 
affordable housing development projects. The tax credits are allocated on a competitive basis.  
 
< Figure 21. The flow of 9 percent LIHTC investment > 
 
Source: Comptroller of the Currency Administration of National Banks (2008) 
 
Despite the name of 9 percent tax credit, in practice, the actual tax credit rate is not 
exactly 9 percent. The rate is referred to as a monthly Applicable Federal Rate (AFR)
37
, which is 
indexed to 10-year U.S. Treasury note yields. Since 1986, the 4 percent credit rate has ranged 
between 3.15 percent and 3.97 percent, and the 9 percent credit has moved between 7.35 percent 
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and 9.27 percent. In 2008, a floor under the 9 percent credit was set, which prevents new 
construction credit rate from falling below the threshold (Congressional Research Service, 2019).  
But each state is subjective to the annual 9 percent tax credit volume cap allocated by the 
federal government based on population size. The cap is a product of a fixed per capita rate 
multiplied by the population of a state. Novogradac & Company LLP (2018) estimated that 9 
percent LIHTC allocation is projected to steadily increase to above the $ 10 billion by 2025, 
based on the historical increase of per capita credit and population growth speed. 
 
< Figure 22. 9 percent LIHTC allocation > 
 
Source: Novogradac & Company LLP (2018) 
 
The 4 percent tax credit is designed to support 30 percent present value of eligible costs 
for the acquisition of existing buildings for rehabilitation and new construction financed by tax-
exempt bonds. When 50 percent or more of the project’s eligible costs are funded with tax-
exempt private activity bonds, 4 percent LIHTC can be awarded to developers on an “as of right,” 
 
 61 
non-competitive basis, in which tax credits are not limited by the state’s cap allocation. The 
bonds that have been used to finance land or building construction costs are included in the 
numerator of the 50 percent calculation. Developers that are seeking 4 percent tax credits can 
utilize other funding sources including federal programs such as Community Development Block 
Grant, and 4 percent tax credits do not compete with projects pursuing 9 percent tax credits, 
which are the biggest benefit and convenience. 
In order to become eligible for the tax credits, the housing project must meet the 
requirement that either 20 percent of the units are rent-restricted and rented to the households 
with income at or below 50 percent of the area median income (AMI), or 40 percent of the units 
are rent-restricted and rented to the households whose income is 60 percent or less of AMI. The 
rents for LIHTC are determined at 30 percent of AMI, but the rents are set by the target AMI 
levels tied to the unit, not a tenant’s income levels. Households who are included in the same 
target percentage of AMI are required to pay the same rents. NYC HPD annually announces the 
table of AMI based on family size and percentage of AMI
38
. According to the AMI table (HPD, 
2019), 50 percent AMI for a one-person household is $37,350 and $42,700 for two-person 
households. Then let’s assume that there is a family of 1.5 people who are eligible for the 
housing units targeted for 50 percent of AMI; in the case, the monthly rent is calculated as 
$501.
39
 As a result, despite the substantial increase in household income, the existing tenant's 
rent will not change. Besides, tenants are still allowed to stay in their residence even if the 
income increase goes above the unit’s income requirements to promote tenants’ earning and 








wealth increases. If the tenants’ incomes increase to more than 140 percent of the income limit 
(e.g. 140 percent above 50 percent of AMI), the “creeper units” can be counted as low-income 
units only when following conditions are met: 1) the units are continuously under rent-restriction 
and 2) the next available unit of comparable or smaller size in the same building is rented to a 
low-income family
40
. This is called as “the Next Available Unit Rule (NAUR)” or 140% Rule
41
. 
Another issue regarding LIHTC is Income averaging (IA), which is a new occupancy 
set-aside option set by the Consolidated Appropriations Act in 2018. With IA, developers can 
have more options to allocate housing units. At least 40 percent of the units must be LIHTC with 
60 percent of AMI, and the designated imputed income limitations should be in 10 percent 
increments from 20 percent to 80 percent. It means that under this new rule, affordable units can 
be rented to tenants with 80 percent or less of AMI, and the actual income of tenants is not 
tracked and averaged annually for the IA test if collective average income meets the 60 percent 
of AMI standard. IA can provide developers with a better opportunity for offsetting rents of 
higher AMI with that of extremely low-income residents, which means that higher rent units for 
the tenants with higher AMI can have a cross-subsidizing effect for very lower-income 
households through IA mechanism. IA could be efficient in that it could benefit poorer 
households with the same tax credits, and at the same time, it could lead to mixed-income 
development with a broader income spectrum. However, there remains a criticism that it is not 
desirable to provide a subsidy to higher-income households. Now it is permitted that median-
income households with 80 percent of AMI can live in affordable housing. 
                                           
40
 Michigan LIHTC Compliance Manual, Chapter 8 (April 2013). 
 
41
 When a building is restricted to 100% Housing Credit, this rule does not typically affect the building of 100% 
Housing Credits, and it is possible to avoid via bifurcation. 
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Private Activity Bonds (Municipal Bonds) 
State and local governments have a lot of diverse and capital projects for the commonwealth of 
the public such as roads, sewer systems, schools, and other public works. But the problem is 
always money. The primary funding source for the municipalities to finance public projects is 
through the issuance of municipal bonds. Municipal bonds, known as “Munis” are debt securities 
issued by states, cities, counties, and other governmental entities for financing capital projects 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). The significant benefit of munis to bond investors 
is the interests earned from the municipal bonds are tax-exempt from the federal income tax, and 
local residents in the state where the bond is issued may have tax exemption from state and local 
taxes too. The demand for municipal bonds is generally high despite the relatively lower interest 
rates because of this tax benefit. According to SEC, as of 2019, about two-thirds of the 
approximately $2.8 trillion of U.S municipal bonds outstanding are owned by individual 
investors either directly or indirectly through mutual funds and other investments.  
Municipal bonds have two kinds of types: General Obligation bond and Revenue bonds. 
General obligation bonds are backed by the “full faith and credit
42
” of the municipality as an 
issuer, which is a taxing power to pay the debt without collateral assets or mortgage. Revenue 
bonds are secured by the revenues from a specific project such as highway tolls or lease fees, and 
certain taxes such as sales tax and hotel occupancy taxes. Revenue bonds usually are non-
recourse, meaning that if the revenue stream dries up, the bondholders do not have a claim on the 
underlying revenue source (SEC). State and local governments are also able to issue revenue 
bonds in which the proceeds can be loaned to a private entity such as non-profit college. 
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  By the way, the federal tax code also allows the state and local government entities to 
issue tax-exempt bonds for the qualified private activities that are conducted by the private entity. 
The federal tax code classifies municipal bonds as either government bonds or private activity 
bonds. Aside from government bonds, qualified private bonds can also have tax exemption 
benefits under federal tax law
43
. The principal reason why the government began to utilize the 
tax incentive is that tax exemption benefits can slash borrowing costs for the eligible projects. 
Private activity bonds, as a form of conduit bond, are used for non-government projects; 
therefore, Congress limited the volume of tax-exempt bonds with the concerns
44
. Primary 
concerns were: 1) bonds facilitate an inefficient allocation of capital, 2) mount the cost of 
financing traditional governmental activities, 2) provide higher-income persons with tax 
avoidance employing tax-exempt investments, 4) to contribute to increase federal revenue losses 
(Maguire et al., 2018).  
In response to the worries and criticisms, the federal government set the cap on the 
issuance volume of private activity bonds. The federal authority put an annual state volume cap 
on 14 qualified private activities among 27 activities
45
. The volume cap is determined as a form 
of dollars per capita based on a state’s population size and adjusted for inflation every year. The 
current annual state volume cap is the greater of $105 per capita or $311.38 million each 
calendar year, which is an apparatus to ensure the minimum volume for small states. According 
to IRS, New York’s volume cap in 2020 is around $2 billion. Typically, each state has its various 
pools for the allocation of volumes, and the volume capacity is distributed at each state’s 
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discretion based on the state’s preference. The PAB volume cap is not permanent and generally 
has to be issued during the year of an endowment. If the cap is not used during the year that cap 
is given, municipalities have an option to carry forward the unused cap for up to coming three 
years. In this case, a special filing with the IRS is necessary. Unless issuers do carry forward or 
assign the remained issuing capacity to other eligible issuers, the unused bond capacity expires. 
Second, in general, private activity bonds are included in the Alternative Minimum Tax 
(AMT), which is an income tax scheme that is intended to make sure that taxpayers pay a 
minimum income in taxes. If a taxpayer is subject to the AMT, then certain deductions are no 
longer permitted. Qualified private activities are strictly controlled by the federal government 
because of its federal tax-exemption benefits. As of 2019, Federal authority made the list of 27 
qualified activities that can acquire the supports of the program. At the same time, to meet the 
eligibility, at least 95 percent of the net bond should be used for qualified purposes (Maguire et 
al., 2018). However, the tax-exempt interest on housing bonds was exempted from AMT in 2008 
through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. But, the exemption can apply to 
interest on refunding bonds only if the interest on the refunded bonds was a tax preference item. 
Aside from that, there are several minor guidelines to regulate the issuance of the bonds; 
1) The maturity of the bonds must be at or below 120 percent of the economic life of the asset 
purchased with the bonds; 2) Less than 25 percent of the bond proceeds can be used to acquire 
land (except for qualified first-time farmers); 3) Proceeds of the bond issue cannot be used to 
purchase existing property unless greater than 15 percent of the cost of acquiring the property is 
spent on rehabilitating the property; 4) Public approval of bonds, either through public hearing 
and notice or voter referendum, is required for private activity bonds; 5) Issuance costs cannot be 
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any greater than 2 percent of the bond proceeds (3.5 percent for mortgage bond issues of less 
than $20 million), and 6) Private activity bonds are prevented from advance refunding
46
 (refers 
to the issuance of new bonds for longer than 90 days prior to the maturity of old bonds). IRS 
monitors the tax-exempt status of outstanding bonds for qualified private activities, and if the 
eligibility expired, tax benefits provided must be recaptured by the Treasury. 
 
Local-Level Mixed-Income Housing Finance Tools 
Primary housing support programs such as LIHTC, RAD, Public housing, and Section 8 Housing 
Voucher are representative federal-level subsidy tools in the U.S. However, those are not all. 
New York State and New York City have their own affordable housing programs as well. The 
New York State runs the Mitchell-Lama program to support affordable housing for the middle-
income class from 1955. Besides, the State of New York Mortgage Agency 
(SONYMA) provides low and moderate-income residents with loans to help expand access to 
affordable homeownership. The Affordable Housing Corporation (AHC) also supplies grants to 
local governmental, not-for-profit organizations for the promotion of homeownership of low and 
medium-income households. The New York State’s Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) program provides financial assistance to eligible cities and counties to support 
economic development including affordable housing development. 
New York City also runs its own various city-level strong subsidy programs as well. 
Representative housing support programs are tax incentive programs such as J-51 Tax Incentive, 
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420-a Tax Incentive, 420-c Tax Incentive, and 421-a Tax incentive. Those tax abatement 
programs assist residential rehabilitation or conversion to multi-family housing as well as new 
construction of affordable rental units. The specific details are summarized below. 
 
< Table 6. Local-level affordable housing programs > 
Program Program explanation Units (2017) 
J-51 Tax 
Incentive 
An as-of-right real estate tax exemption and 
abatement for residential rehabilitation or 




A complete real estate tax exemption for 
properties owned by Housing Development 
Fund Corporations (HDFCs), which is subject 
to an agreement requiring use as low-income 
housing and units for homelessness and people 




A complete or partial property tax exemption 
for a term of up to 60 years for low-income 
housing owned by HDFCs. The program can 
only be used in properties currently or formerly 





Provide partial property tax exemption for new 
multifamily housing construction in exchange 
for 25 or 30% of affordable rentals units. 




Source: NYU Furman center (Dictionary of NYC housing programs & Core Data) 
Other than that, NYC HPD has a unique program to dispossess tax-foreclosed, or in-rem 
buildings and turn illegal squatters into legal homesteaders: the Mutual Housing Association of 
New York (MHANY). MHANY receives land titles to existing sites that squatters occupied from 
the city and can transfer ownership to homesteaders that had worked on the rehabilitation of 
buildings they occupied (NYC HPD). Also, NYC HDC operates the Affordable Housing 
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Permanent Loan Program (AHPLP) from 1991, which provides small, permanent, below-market-
rate first mortgage loans on projects primarily developed under programs sponsored by HPD 
from a pool of Housing Development Corporation (HDC) funds. In 2014, HDC launched a new 
Mixed Middle-Income program, known as “M2”, which is a financing program for the new 
construction of multi-family rental housing for low- and medium-income households with 
incomes of up to 165 percent of AMI. M2 is the latest version of the HDCP’s various mixed-
income programs. 
Mixed-income housing is one of the important policy pillars of the current U.S. housing 
policy. This policy aims to eliminate the long-term problems of U.S. history: concentration of 
poverty and residential segregation, which derived from the aching lessons of the public housing 
program. The city pursues to build an income-inclusive community that diverse income groups 
can live side by side together. The mixed-income housing development is set as a goal of federal 
government policy, and states and city-level governments also follow the same initiative. New 
York City’s M2 program was also born based on these policy needs. Producing affordable 
housing programs for low -income New Yorkers is an essential job of the city government given 
that New York City is infamous for expensive housing prices. However, the city’s budget and 
financial capacity are limited, so most of the affordable and mixed-income projects utilize both 
federal sources and city sources at the same time all together. 
M2 program subsidizes the development of new construction, renovation, and 
conversion of non-residential buildings on an as-of-right basis. A minimum of 100 residential 
units must be built, smaller developments with 50 units and more may be considered on a case-
by-case basis. M2 is a 50/30/20 model that requires a specific allocation of units based on 
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income levels. According to NYC HDC, 20 percent of the units should be sent to families with 
incomes at or below 50 percent of AMI, or alternatively, 25 percent of the units must be 
affordable to households earning up to 60 percent AMI. A minimum of 30 percent of the units 
must be affordable to moderate-income households earning between 80 percent and 130 percent 
AMI, and a maximum of 50 percent of units must go to middle-income households earning at or 
lower 165 percent AMI. If rents are above 130 percent of the market rent will not receive a 
subsidy (NYC HDC). 
M2 program consists of three mortgage loans; a first mortgage is funded with proceeds 
from the sale of tax-exempt bonds (Municipal bonds), a second mortgage is funded by NYC 
HDC corporate reserves, and the third mortgage is a subsidy loan from NYC HPD. HDC and 
HPD’s subsidy loans support the project as well, but the contribution levels differ from 
affordability levels, land costs, and services. Various municipal government subsidy programs 
are applied for the program. The tax-exempt first mortgage is generally financed with both 
private activity bonds and recycled bonds. Private activity bond is qualified with as-of-right 4 
percent LIHTC for the low-income units, and recycled bods provide a tax-exempt rate for the 
moderate and middle-income units. In practice, NYC HDC requires pass 50% test on the low-
income units first, and then the remainder may be financed with recycled bonds (NYC HDC). 
During construction, tax-exempt bonds may be available for up to 50 percent of the aggregate 
basis of the project’s low-income portion, and permanent first mortgage loan amount can be 
decided on HDC’s specific underwriting rules. For instance, Loan To Value (LTV) must be 
within 85 percent, loans have 30-year permanent terms with 30-year amortization schedule, and 
interest rates can be permanent fixed-rate or weekly tax-exempt variable rate (Ibid.). 
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According to NYC HDC, as for the second mortgage, NYC HDC will provide a 
subordinated loan of $85,000 to $95,000 per affordable unit, capped at $15 million per project; 1) 
Up to $85,000 per affordable dwelling unit without rental subsidy; this requires moderate-
income units to be underwritten at or below 100 percent AMI. Any units with Project-Based 
Section 8 or another rental subsidy will receive $75,000 per unit. Or 2) Up to $95,000 per 
affordable dwelling unit without rental subsidy; this requires moderate-income units to be 
underwritten at or below 80 percent AMI. Any units with Project-Based Section 8 or other rental 
subsidies will receive $85,000 per unit. The second mortgage has also 30-year permanent term or 
same term with the first mortgage with a simple interest rate of the Applicable Federal Rate. 
  As for credit enhancement, in the case of open resolution transactions, a standby letter 
of credit (LOC) for the bonds is necessary during the construction period, and mortgage 
insurance ensued during the permanent mortgage period. The general mortgage insurers include 
REMIC, SONYMA, or HUD. Besides, there are some overall restrictions; the overall LTV of 
combined first and second mortgage must be within 95 percent; Loan to Cost may not exceed 90 
percent; Debt Service Coverage Ratio: 1.15 times overall; and Income to Expense Ratio: 1.05 to 
1.00 or greater on all financing. The developers must maintain a minimum of 30 year occupancy 
period (Ibid.). Moreover, in circumstances that are subject to the Mandatory or Voluntary 
Inclusionary Program, they might be required to maintain permanent affordability. Also, to 
increase rents for any income-level tenants, developers are required to get approval from HDC. 
As for a developer’s fee, developers can enjoy the fee when tax credits are utilized or 
funds are combined with public subsidy programs permitting such fees. Under the HPD 
Qualified Action Plan (QAP), 15 percent of improvement costs are the maximum developer fee, 
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and 10 percent of acquisition costs for tax credit projects. When calculating improvement costs, 
developer fees, reserves, and syndication and partnership expenses are not included. Also, HDC 
puts limits on the payment of the developer fee. Up to 10 percent of the paid fee of developers 
can be paid at closing. At the same time, developers cannot withdraw unpaid developer fees, 
which must be deferred during construction and covered by cash flow from the project. Lastly, 
HPD and HDC also impose some design guidelines, building green community standards, and 
marketing guidelines that eligible developers must comply with. In order to see how the program 
works in real projects, I will introduce two development cases From here. 
Case study 1: Hunts Point South (HPS) - North Tower and South Tower 
According to HDC, the agency financed 25 housing developments and subsidized 7,730 
residential units via the M2 program since 2018. Here, I will introduce one representative 
development project under the M2 program: Hunts Point South (HPS), whose site is located in 
Long Island City in Queens. The two newly constructed buildings are mixed-use, mixed-income 
towers with 1,194 mixed-income affordable and market-rate rental apartments. 100 units are 
used for Affordable Independent Residences for Seniors (AIRS). The 719 permanently 
affordable apartments will serve very low- to middle-income households. The development 
includes retail space, a community facility, parking, and public open space. The project is built 
on the vacant land owned by the City of New York and was a formerly industrial district in 
Queens. 30 units affordable to very low-income households earning up to 40 percent of AMI, 
210 units affordable to low-income households earning up to 50 percent of AMI, 130 middle-
income units for households earning up to 130% of AMI, 349 middle-income units for 
households earning up to 165 percent of AMI, and 473 market rent units (NYC HDC). 
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South Tower’s total development cost was $237,336,935. Specifically, it was funded by 
a participation loan from JPM Chase, a $59 million HDC loan through recycled bonds, a $14.415 
million HDC loan via new issue volume cap bonds, a $33.3 million HPD loan via City Capital 
funds, LIHTC equity in an amount of $18.051 million, and $69.984 million developer equity. As 
for North Tower, diverse funding sources are used: a participation loan from Wells Fargo, a 
$103.805 million HDC loan, a $125 million HDC loan via recycled bonds, a $32.795 million 
HDC loan via new issue volume cap bonds, an HPD loan in an amount of $96.120 million 
financed via City Capital funds, $22.192 million LIHTC equity, and $93.562 million of 
developer equity. The total cost for the north tower development was $469,333,549 (NYC HDC).  
 
< Figure 23: Hunts Point South (HPS) > 
 






Case study 2: One East Harlem 
One East Harlem development is 19-story, 404 units of mixed-use, mixed-income new 
construction. 295 units are assigned to be permanently affordable. 49 units affordable to very 
low-income households earning at and below 40 percent of AMI, 52 units affordable to very 
low-income households earning up to 50 percent of AMI. Instead, 101 units are distributed to 
moderate-income households earning up to 100 percent of AMI, and 66 units for households 
earning up to 130 percent of AMI. One East Harlem includes approximately 62,000 square feet 
of retail space such as a new supermarket (NYC HDC). 
As for financing for One East Harlem, the city provides a $63.5 million taxable 
participation loan. NYC HDC supports roughly $74 million in tax-exempt bonds and another $15 
million in corporate reserves. HPD contributes $33 million in subsidy. The project also benefits 
from Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) totaling $16.7 million in tax credit equity. 
 
< Figure 24: One East Harlem > 
 




The potential benefits of mixed-income housing programs are grandiose. First, it is 
possible to cross-subsidize between low-income households and medium-income earners. The 
wealthier income tenants who pay more rents can allow including poorer and more very poor 
residents in the project. Second, it can provide better incentives for the maintenance of affordable 
housing. It is because proper upkeep is inevitable to attract medium-income families. Third, via 
mixed-income housing, lower-income households can have access to better social services and 
amenities. Lastly, a more important upside is that mixed-income housing can facilitate 
interaction between different income groups. Given these benefits of mixed-income housing 
development, NYC HDC’s M2 program can be a frontier to prompt affordable housing supply as 
well as increasing social cohesion among diverse income classes. Furthermore, the M2 program 
utilizes diverse funding sources from the federal, state, and city government as well as private 
investors. But, there exists a possibility to bring about criticism to say that it could not be 
appropriate to support medium-income housing units with public resources. However, it is a 
matter of value decision and everything has a trade-off. Considering the failure of the public 
housing program and the lack of section 8 housing voucher program budgets, the economic 
aspect and efficiency of housing finance program also cannot be underestimated. That can justify 
the mixed- usage of financing sources as well as a public-private partnership.  
On the other hand, there are small concerns about the M2 program as well. The first one 
is that majority of affordable units are assigned for middle-income households. When it comes to 
the Hunts Point South case, among 1,194 rental apartments, 100 units are used as affordable 
units for seniors, and 719 permanently affordable apartments are assigned for very low- to 
middle-income households. Around 68 percent of total housing units developed are used in low- 
and middle-income classes. However, specifically, only 30 units are assigned for very low-
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income people with up to 40 percent AMI, and 210 units are leased for low-income tenants with 
at or below 50 percent AMI. The rest goes to middle-income families. One East Harlem project 
shows steeper skewness toward to medium-income households. Only 101 units among the total 
404 units are built for very low-income households. Approximately three-thirds of the total units 
are assigned to households earning up to 130 percent of AMI. 
However, given that around 60 percent of the total financing sources were from 
government expenditures, it seems necessary to increase the M2 program’s contribution to very 
low- and low-income renters more significantly. To some extent, it is understandable to consider 
the developers’ risks and efforts for the developments as well as their minimum profits; however, 
I still wonder whether the developer profits are at appropriate levels. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN SEOUL 
 
A. History, Backgrounds, and Orientation 
South Korea is the world's 11
th
 largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $1.53 
trillion (IMF, 2019). Korea has received a good appraisal of miracle-like rapid economic 
development from other countries, because Korea’s economy has grown fast over the just past 70 
years since the liberation from Japan (1945) and Korean War (1950~1953). Seoul, the capital of 
South Korea is a big city with a population of 9.6 million as of 2017. This rapid growth also 
caused the negative externalities in Korean; corruption, income inequality, and housing 
unaffordability. One of the serious social and economic issues in Seoul has been and will be the 
lack of affordable housing. 
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After the liberation from the colonization, a large group of refugees from North Korea 
and adjacent countries, especially China, had returned and informally settled down in South 
Korea, and most of them moved into Seoul in chaotic times. They just occupied open lands and 
constructed their shelters without approval. From the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Korean 
government started to address this illegal informal settlement by relocating them into the nearby 
outskirt of the Seoul area, but it failed to accommodate them because of the inefficient 
infrastructure built and the lack of workplaces. Unprecedented industrialization and economic 
development during the 1960s and 1970s caused rural people’s wave of migration into the urban 
big cities. The percentage of the urban population living in a slum and squatting settlements was 
estimated 20 to 30 percent between the 1960s and 1970s in Korea (Ha, 1994). And then since the 
early 1970s, the Korean government changed its strategy to demolish informal settlement and 
rebuild new high-rise, high-density multi-family housing for low-incomers. The Korean 
government tended to focus on medium-income households’ homeownership rather than 
affordable rental housing for low-income class. Seoul’s situation was worse, the population of 
Seoul quadrupled from 2.4 million in 1960 to 9.6 million in 1985 (Park, 2015). The 1988 Seoul 
Olympic fueled rapid economic development, which acted as a trigger to push up housing prices 
rapidly. In response to the ruling party’s failure in the national assembly election in 1988, the 
national government put a new 2 million housing supply plan including public housing on the 
table to soothe citizens.  
Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC), which was established in 1961, took the 
initiative to supply apartments for low and medium-income families, and from 1962 to 1989, 
KHNC constructed 536,755 housing units, 65 percent of which were subsidized housing for sale, 
and long term and permanent housing were just 6.5 percent (35,026 units) (Ha, 1994). Since the 
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1960s, housing and land price began to skyrocket unprecedentedly due to land development, 
housing shortage, the influx of new people, and rapid economic expansion. According to the 
Korea Appraisal office, the land price index soared from 100 in May 1963 to 225 in June 1965; 
the Land price had doubled just over 2 years, which led to serious speculations on housing and 
land market (HF, 2016). Faced with the issue, the Korean government implemented a new tax 
reform in 1967 to levy 50 percent of heavy taxes on sales profits from housing and land. The 
speculation curb tax was transformed into the sales capital gain tax later in 1974, which became 
the prototype of the current real estate tax system in Korea (Ibid.). Since the 1970s, the nuclear 
family and the concentration of population became pandemic, which prompted housing shortage 




The housing shortage caused other housing and public health issues in Seoul. Low-class 
workers who moved into Seoul and could not afford housing costs occupied empty space below 
bridge and hillsides, and eventually formed informal settlements by using found materials. At the 
time, this kind of informal settlement accounted for approximately 20 to 30 percent of total 
housing units in Seoul (Ibid.). However, Seoul City and the national government eradicated 
informal settlements in inner-city for the urban renewal and relocated around 300,000 squatters 
to the outskirt of the city from 1958 through 1972. As a method, the city chose the formalization 
of the informality as a solution. The city distributed small parcels of land for free, subsidizing the 
moving cost, and built citizen apartment for squatters with cheap construction material in cheap 
land. But that was not enough to address the issue.  
                                           
48 The official statistics on housing price released from 1986, so no housing price change in 1970s is available. 
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Finally in 1980, the national government acknowledged the ownership of the squatters 
on the illegal housing units and occupied lands, which ignited another social issue between new 
landlords and their tenants (Ibid.). Since the 1970s, the government strengthened the regulation 
on real estate speculations. In 1978, the national government announced the comprehensive 
countermeasure for cubing real estate speculations and stabilizing land prices. Under the policy, 
capital gain tax on housing and land transaction was raise to 50 percent, additional taxes were 
levied on the short sales within 2 years from buying properties, and 100 percent tax was imposed 
to the unreported transactions (Ibid.). The housing construction facilitation law of 1972 set up a 
new platform for systemic policy intervention to galvanize non-homeowners and the 
construction industry. In 1977, price regulation for newly–built housing allowed the government 
to intervene in the housing market. 
 From the perspective of housing finance, since 1969, Korea Housing Bank (KHB) 
played an important role in providing financial support by lending money and providing credit 
guarantee to housing construction projects. KHB collaborated with KNHC by providing long-
term mortgage loans with a maturity of 20 years at the below-market rate for the first-time home 
buyers of KNHC housing. These two institutions worked as two pivotal pillars to support low-
income housing policy for several decades in Korea. KHB’s main role was to manage the 
National Housing Fund (NHF), which was funded by three main sources: national housing pre-
emption subscription deposits, national housing bonds, and housing lottery. NHF is earmarked 
for the contributors and subscribers who are eligible for the purchase of government-subsidized 
housing units. Despite the intensive supports, housing affordability was not addressed. The 
government recommitted to permanent public housing program from the late 1980s (Ha, 1994). 
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After the 1997 IMF bailout, Korea has changed the housing market and housing finance 
system thoroughly; according to the Neo-liberal IMF’s diktat, the Korean government opened its 
financial market to global investors. The first thing was to privatize KHB and to outsource the 
management of KHF to commercial banks. The housing market was restructured into a private 
bank’s dominant-market with minimum government intervention. In 2015, KHF was reformed 
into National Housing and Urban Fund (NHUF) and diversified its role including credit 
guarantee and equity investment on housing and urban redevelopment project; the management 
was transferred to Korea Housing & Urban Guarantee Corporation (HUG). As of 2017, the total 
asset of NHUF was $163.3 billion. Second, the Korean government-employed new cutting-edge 
housing finance system such as Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) in 1999, Real Estate 
Investment Trust (REITs) in 2001, and Project Finance in 2007 (KHFC, 2016). In 2004, Korea 
Housing Finance Corporation (HF) was established and led the secondary mortgage market. HF 
provides subsidized mortgage to low-income households and supports the prime long-term fixed-
rate mortgage loans for the homeownership increase of moderate-income families as well. HF 
also supplies credit guarantee for “Jeonse” loan with below-market rates for low-income 
households as well as for home equity conversion mortgage for the retired seniors with the age of 
more than 65 years old to counter the imminent aging issue. 
 
B. Principal Affordable Housing Programs 
Seoul’s affordable housing policy has relatively a short history compared with New York. But 
Korea confronted a lot of challenges while experiencing rapid economic expansion as negative 
externalities and side effects. Most of the affordable housing programs are national programs like 
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New York City, but these policies were mostly utilized and experimented in Seoul, so here the 
analyses will be conducted primarily from the aspect of Seoul. Also, Seoul has very diverse and 
complex programs, so it is not possible to sift through all programs here; therefore, only some 
representative affordable housing policies will be examined. 
 
Public Housing 
In response to the housing price increase and the exponential explosion of citizens derived by 
rapid economic development in the 1980s, Seoul City broke ground the first permanent public 
rental housing in 1989.
49
 In the beginning, under the city’s housing improvement & 
redevelopment program, the city constructed a new public housing on city-owned land via the 
contracted construction companies, which passed over the property to Seoul Housing & 
Community Corporation. By the late 1990s, the city began to notice increasing construction and 
maintenance costs. As a response, the city relied on private partnerships via tax incentives and 
subsidy as well as reducing supports. In 1993, Seoul put out the 50-year public housing program, 
which reduced the city’s burden. At the time, 50-year rental housing was financed by the mixed 
sources; Seoul City (50 percent), the tenants (30 percent), and the National housing fund (20 
percent). As the city’s financial burden got worse, the lease term of public rental housing also 
decreased step by step. By 1998, the aftermath of the financial crisis occurred in 1997, 10-year 
and 20-year lease public housing projects came out instead. And after the recovery from the 
crisis, 30-year term rental public housing started in 2002, and the government burden was 
alleviated to 10 to 40 percent of total costs (Park, 2015). Another challenge was the shortage of 
                                           
49
 The national first public housing project was constructed in Mapo-gu, Seoul in 1962  
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empty lands to build public housing, so the city turned to the existing housing market. In 2002, 
the city initiated the purchasing public housing program to acquire existing homes and renovate 
for rental purposes.  
Seoul’s public rental housing, which was constructed or serviced via government subsidy, 
amounted to 284,257 units as of 2018. Public rental housing consisted of approximately 40 
percent of Seoul’s total rental housing inventory (714,853 units) (MOLIT, 2019). Korea has 
several types of public housings, which differ based on the policy targets and rent periods. As 
aforementioned, the Korean rental market is dominated by a lump sum money deposit called 
Jeonse, so rental assistances also focus on the mixture of monthly rents and Jeonse. Long-term 
rental assistance with a maturity of more than 30 years still consists of 58 percent of the total.  
 
< Table 7. Public rental housing inventory in Seoul (as of 2018) > 
Public Housing Type Program Summary Units 
Permanent rental housing Since ’89, 85% of cost subsidized 46,782 
50yrs Public rental housing Since ’92, 50% budget, 20% NHF subsidized 85,043 
National rental housing (30yrs) Since ’98, 10 ~ 40% subsidized 23,600 
10yrs Public rental housing Subsidized by NHF or built on public lands 2,260 
5yrs Public rental housing Subsidized by NHF or built on public lands - 
Long-term “Jeonse” housing Up to 20yrs rent with “Jeonse” deposit 30,945 
“Jeonse” sublease housing 
Government, Seoul City, and LH rent existing 
private housing and sublet to low-incomers 
56,013 
Purchasing rental housing 
Government, Seoul City, and LH acquire existing 
housing and rent 
30,738 
Happy housing 
Lower rent small housing for Newlyweds, 
students, inductees, young workers, and seniors 
8,876 




However, LH stopped providing permanent rental housing after 2014, when only 92 
permanent housing units were newly sanctioned. Instead, because of the skyrocketing land 
property values and construction costs, the Korean government authorities has increased the 
dependence on shorter-term public housing projects that required less subsidy as well as a buying 
and leasing program, which purchases the existing residential property and rents it to a low-
income family. Public housing construction approval has been stabilized over the last 8 years 
despite increasing demand for affordable housing. It could be one factor of an affordable housing 
shortage. 
< Figure 25. Public rental housing construction approval (Nationwide) > 
 
Source: Index Korea, MOLIT 
 
  Seoul City provides diverse types of public housing with different lease terms, eligible 
home sizes, and income levels, etc. Public rental housing for low-income families can be 
classified into four types: Permanent rental housing, Public rental housing, National rental 
housing, and purchased rental housing. 
  First, Permanent rental housing was launched in 1989 as the first de jure public rental 
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m² to 42.68 m². Maximum 85 percent of costs are supported by the central government, and the 
rest is covered by tenants’ rents. Between 1989 and 1993, around 190,000 units were supplied; 
140,000 by the national government (via LH) and 50,000 by municipalities, and 47,000 among 
them were built in Seoul (Park, 2015). This program focuses on the poorest class, and rents are 
limited to a maximum of 30 percent of market rents. The priority is given to the extremely low-
income class, known as “National Basic Livelihood Security Benefit recipients.” 10 percent of 
the total rental supply is exclusively allocated to recipients of National Basic Livelihood Security 
Benefit voucher with less than 5 years’ marital status and at least one child. The second tier 
groups are poor single-parented families, the persons of national merit, refugees from North 
Korea, the disabled persons, and non-home owners with less than 50 percent of the average 
monthly income for urban workers in the previous year. Rents are determined based on regional 
standard rents. 
The Permanent rental housing had typical problems of public housing projects: remote 
location from the city center, the lack of infrastructure, and too small-unit size not enough to 
accommodate large families. Also most of the permanent rental housing projects were 
constructed in the periphery of the city. Seoul’s public housing properties have some similarities 
and disparities at the same time with New York City projects. The main differences are that 
NYCHA units are on the large side and have more family-sized units. Additionally, many of the 
properties are located in the inner city and nearby public transportation hubs. It was because 
many of them were built a long time ago; 84 developments are more than 60 years old. That's 
some reason why it would be hard to replace them. 
To address the issues of Seoul’s public housing properties, permanent rental housing 
 
 84 
also leased commercial space within the apartment complex, and the revenues from it are used 
for the maintenance of the affiliated public housing, which could reduce the tenants’ rent burdens 
and keep affordability to some extent. Besides that, LH provided some beneficiary facilities such 
as job information centers, workplaces for females, pollution-free apartment type-factories for 
residents to help to find jobs and income sources (Ibid.). But this program was suspended in 
1993 because of the funding problem. Later in 2008 it began to resume, but the supply of new 
lease units is currently very limited. Unfortunately, the engine of the permanent rental program 
for extremely low-income households in Seoul was de facto, if not de jure turned off. 
  Second, Public rental housing has three types according to the lease term: 5-year / 10-year 
lease, monthly payment lease, and 50-year lease. The 5/10 year public lease and monthly 
payment lease are designed to be sold to tenants after the lease term expires. The qualifications 
for the programs are loose: as of 2019, anyone who does not own homes with real estate assets 
valued below around KRW 215.5 million ($180,000) and cars valued less than KRW 27.99 
million ($23,000) can apply for this public housing; there is no income limit. The winners are 
determined by the lottery system among applicants. The unit area sizes are limited to 85 m2, and 
the rents are decided at 90 percent of market rents. One controversial point is that the sale price 
after the termination of the lease term is determined differently according to the program contract. 
5-year lease’s sale price is calculated as (construction cost + appraisal value)/2, but a 10-year 
lease’s sale price is decided at the appraisal value at the time of the transaction, which was an 
apparatus to hedge developer’ long-term risk regarding housing price fluctuation in the future. 
However, as a result, this big difference made the 10-year program tenants angry because 
housing prices dramatically soared over the last 10 years. The tenants could not afford the recent 
housing prices levels unless the purchase prices were not adjusted to half of the market price. 
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Instead, a 50-year lease is not for sale, which was introduced to replace the permanent 
rental program in 1992. Unit sizes are limited to 50 m2, but there existed no limits on income and 
assets; only homeownership of the applicants was checked. It means that anyone without home 
under their names can be qualified for this public housing. In the beginning, the program was 
primarily funded by the national government (50 percent); national housing fund supported 20 
percent, the program entity (LH) 10 percent, and the tenants for 20 percent. But later from 1994, 
the government changed the needle to the private market and stopped funding. For this reason, 
NHF supported up to 70 percent of costs. But LH suspended a 50-year public housing program 
after the completion of 39,000 units in 1995. After that, Seoul City keeps providing its 50-year 
public housing through the city’s housing redevelopment program. But this program targeted 
mostly the evicted tenants from the redevelopment projects regardless of income levels. Later in 
2003, Seoul City changed the eligibility to embrace the qualified applicants on the permanent 
rental housing waitlist and 50-year public housing waitlist. Currently, the city government has no 
plan for additional supply for 50-year lease housing (Park, 2015).  
Third, the National rental housing program was launched in 1998 to promote the dwelling 
welfare of low-income households who are in the bottom quartile of income. The eligible tenants 
must satisfy the conditions: non-homeowners whose earning is up to 70 percent of the average 
monthly income for urban workers in the previous year, which is approximately $3,600 for a 
family of four as of 2018. At the same time, the net asset value owned must not be greater than 
$233,000 and car values owned must be below $21,000. The maximum net area is limited to 60 
m², and the rent price is determined at the level of 60 ~ 80 percent of the market rate (LH). The 
National Lease Housing Program can be financed via several participants; government (30 
percent), NHF (40 percent), tenants (20 percent), and the program entity (10 percent) (Ibid.). 
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Finally, Purchased rental housing is the program that was initiated by Seoul City in 
2001. The mechanism is that the city-owned local housing authority, known as SH Corporation, 
buys the disinvested housing units from the private market and leases them after renovation to 
citizens at a below-market rate, but the difficulty of financial and management suspended this 
program soon. Later in 2004, the central government adopted this model and conducted a pilot 
project. LH and the local government can also purchase and lease multi-units housing, unsold 
apartments, and houses owned by bankrupted entities. There are many kinds of housings 
according to apartment type and target class: lease for young people, lease for newlyweds, 
orphans without parents, and underserved people such as persons who lived in inns and container 
boxes, etc. Income and asset limits exist as eligibility requirements; income limits range from 50 
to 70 percent of the average monthly income for the urban dwellers. The leasing period ranges 
from 10 to 30 years. Rents are usually at a maximum of 30 percent of the market rate.  
Seoul City programs support the leasing up to 10 years with every 2 years renewal. The 
types of housing by Seoul City include multi-household (for households), studio (for singles), 
and “Hope housing” (for students). Multi-household housing primarily focuses on an extremely 
low-income class such as the recipients of the National Basic Livelihood Security Benefit and 
single-parent families. Households with up to 50 percent of the average monthly income for 
urban dwellers can have the second priority. The studio is designed for singles in Seoul with 
income levels up to 70 percent of the average monthly income for urban dwellers. Hope housing 
is provided for college students from low-income households such as the recipients of the 
National Basic Livelihood Security Benefit, children whose parents’ incomes are in the lowest 
income percentile, and children whose families earn no greater than 50 percent of the average 
monthly income for urban dwellers (Park, 2015). This program’s other big issue is high 
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maintenance costs because of the regional dispersion of the properties. A large complex is more 
efficient in terms of the costs due to the economies of scale. Initially, public housing programs 
focused on the informal settlers and extremely low-income households, but now the programs 
tend to try to cover young workers, newlyweds, and people of low socioeconomic status as well 
as seniors. It must be a good approach from the perspective of Utilitarianism to maximize more 
people’s happiness and well-being, but it could not be effective and efficient. 
 
Rental Assistance with a Partnership with Private Sector 
In 2017, the Korean government announced the new rental market stabilization program to 
vitalize the rental market by providing registered individuals and corporate landlords with tax 
incentives. The tax abatements comprehensively include purchase tax, property tax, rental 
income tax, capital gain tax, and comprehensive real estate holding tax as well as national 
insurance premiums. For instance, if landlords can meet the requirements described below, they 
can enjoy up to 70% capital gain tax deduction (MOLIT). 
1) Registered as a long-term lease housing for at least 8 years 
2) Leased period must be more than 10 years after registration 
3) Maximum monthly rents increases are restricted to 5% when renewing the contract. 
4) Housing property prices must be no greater than KRW 600million ($500,000) within 





< Table 8. Tax incentives for a rental business (as of Feb 2020) > 
Tax types Tax benefits are given Conditions 
Purchase tax -Area size <= 60m2: 100% exemption up to 
KRW 2 MN, 85% for above KRW 2 MN 
-Area size 60~85m2: 50% exemption 
-When acquired newly 
built housing. 
Property tax -Short-term & Area size <= 60m2: 50% exempt, 
-Short-term & Area size 60~85m2:75% exempt, 
-Long-term/public: up to 50% exemption 
-Differ based on lease 
term and area size 
Rental 
income tax 
-Short-term: 30% exemption 
-Long-term/public: 75% exemption 
-Housing price must be 
below KRW 600 MN 
-less than 85 m2 in Seoul 
Capital 
gain tax 
-Non-registered: up to 30% deduction 
-Short-term: up to 40% deduction 
-Long-term/public: up to 70% deduction 
-Differ based on 
ownership period 
(maximum 10 yrs) 
Comprehensive 
property tax 
-Excluded in the tax calculation - When certain area size, 
property value, and 
lease term limits meet 
Source: https://www.renthome.go.kr/webportal/cont/rgstBenefitGdncView.open 
 
These rental tax benefits for landlords can be very controversial because originally, there 
is no regulation on the beginning rent, which means that landlords can lease their homes at or 
above market rates. The program is also perceived as a trigger to the recent steep housing price 
increase; a lot of real estate agents and investors bought out a bunch of housing units and leased 
the properties at market rates with the help of government subsidy. The program is under 
stricture on the ground that it was used as a conduit for speculation. 
 In 2015, in response to the lack of Jeonse rental units, the central government introduced 
another new policy, called a” New Stay” for providing more monthly rental housing as a public-
private partnership program. There were several kinds of business structures: private developers’ 
business suggestions and LH’s public offering, etc. In the beginning, the New Stay program was 
initiated by private developers’ suggestions for housing development projects. The government 
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via HUG and NHUF participated in as a partnership by way of contributing land and providing 
low-interest loans as an investor as well. This program was designed to utilize the private money 
for the supply of rental housing because historically private real estate companies mainly focused 
on home sales and office lease rather than the rental housing market. Developers are allowed to 
raise rents only up to 5 percent per year and have to lease the property at least 8 years; but this 
program does not have any regulations and limits on tenants such as income and equity. In terms 
of program structure, this program incorporated the REITs structure. 
LH’s public offering model is as followed. NHUF and private developers jointly form 
REITs. The REITs buy out the land for development from LH, construct housing complex on the 
land, and lease rental units to the tenants for more than 8 years. LH is responsible for the RFP 
and developer selection process, NHUF participates in the project as a financial investor, and 
HUG provides credit guarantee for the private loans. Private investors typically are a consortium 
of a construction company, asset management company (AMC), and final investors. 
 
< Figure 26. New Stay business structure (LH public offering model) > 
 
Source: MOLIT & Lee, et al. (2016)  
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New Stay program provides sturdy tax incentives and subsidy to the private investors 
and developers to attract private sector involvement. In 2015, the central government increased 
the loan amount and lowered the interest rate of loans from NHUF for developers. Acquisition 
tax, capital gain tax and income, corporate income tax for the New Stay project were also 
alleviated. In 2017, MOLIT announced a new model, called a private proposal project. It aimed 
to look for the project that immediate development is possible without modification of the city 
planning such as zoning ordinance. However, the New Stay program was under harsh fire in that 
the program benefited private developers too much than the developers’ contribution to the 
housing affordability. To make the business lucrative, the city purveyed publicly-owned lands 
that were located in marketable areas of the city center at a lower price to REITs, and private 
developers earned a huge amount of profits with the recent real estate market frenzy.  
 
Housing Voucher Subsidy Program 
In 2002, the city of Seoul first introduced a housing voucher program, known as “Monthly rent 
aid” aiming to fill the financing gap of the low-income family’ funding sources for monthly rents. 
That was a political response to the housing price increase and the lack of affordable Jeonse 
housing units since the 2000s. The program was funded by Seoul City’s own budget account, 
called “housing assistance account of the social welfare fund” (Park, 2017). Seoul housing 
voucher program targets only those households whose incomes are within the bottom 20 percent 
of the income bracket (within 150 percent of the criteria for selecting beneficiaries under the 
"National Basic Living Security Act") while residing in private rental houses and paying monthly 
rents. Household’s annual income must be below 60 percent of the median income.  
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But, the subsidy recipients under the "National Basic Living Security Act" and 
households whose current rent value (when the rent is converted to the value of lump-sum 
deposit) exceeds KRW 95 million ($80,000) cannot receive the housing voucher. Seoul’s housing 
voucher program provides qualified tenants with a fixed amount of subsidy without issuing a 
voucher. The subsidy can differ according to the family size; as of 2020, KRW 80,000 ($67) for 
a one-person household with KRW 5,000 ($4) incremental per person up to KRW 105,000 ($88) 
for a six-person household. The subsidy directly is passed through to the lessor’s account to 
prevent the inappropriate use of subsidy. Over the last 3 years, the city spent around KRW 16 
billion ($13.3 million) to support 22,600 households’ stable dwelling. The amounts of vouchers 
and the number of beneficiaries were a pittance given the size of the city population and average 
income levels. 
< Table 9. Seoul housing voucher assistance over the last 3 years > 
Year 2017 2018 2019 
 Beneficiary households 10,270 6,975 5,355 
Subsidy amounts KRW 6.642 billion 
($5.5 million) 
KRW 6.564 billion 
($5.5 million) 
KRW 3.042 billion 
($2.5 million) 
Source: Seoul City, housing voucher subsidy (2020)  
 
In 2019, Seoul City announced a new monthly rental subsidy for the young millennials. 
The city promises to support KRW 200,000 ($167) per month for up to 10 months with a plan to 
help 5,000 persons in 2020 and a total of 45,000 persons by 2022. According to the statistics 
released by Seoul City, the number of single households in Seoul reached 580,000, 63.7 percent 
of whom live in monthly rental housing. Young residents under the age of 29 years old in Seoul 
earn around KRW 2 million ($1,670,000) per month, and pay KRW 492,000 ($410,000) for rents, 
Rent to Income ratio can be calculated around 25 percent. Rent subsidy idea for young 
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unemployed was brought up with this background. Specific eligible applicants for the subsidy 
are singe households whose income represented less than 120 percent of the median income
50
 
with an age range of 19 to 39 years old. Besides, the city assists low-interest Jeonse deposit loan 
up to KRW 70 million ($58,000) and subsidizes up to 90 percent of interest on Jeonse loans to 
the young working class, whose annual income is below KRW 40 million ($33,000) and their 
parents earn less than KRW 70 million ($58,000) a year (Seoul City). 
Besides that, the central government offers the income tax deduction for monthly rent 
payments when the income earners meet some conditions: unit area size less than 85m2, non-
homeowners, annual income less than KRW 70million, and registered to live at the address of 
rental units. For the convenience of tenants, the landlord’s consent is not required. With growing 
concerns from housing market change and housing affordability crisis, the government tries to 
implement diverse preemptive countermeasures, and this approach must be appraised; however, 
it looks like spontaneous. It is recommended to examine New York City’s more systematic rental 
assistance tools, which are generally federal tools before the experimentation of various options 
in the real world. 
 
Rental Housing Market Regulation 
In Jan 2020, the Korean government announced a new regulation in the housing market; no 
longer can the tenants whose rental housing values are above KRW 0.9 billion borrow the money 
for Jeonse deposit from the banks. Moreover, when the borrowers currently using rental deposit 
                                           
50
 This is the government’s income standard to decide subsidy recipients. Say total population is 100, median 
income mean 50
th
 largest income among the whole income distribution. 
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loans want to purchase housing, the existing Jeonse loan must be paid back immediately; the 
government prohibited the credit guarantee service for expensive luxury housing. It was because 
the criticism that Jeonse loans were utilized as a catalyst to the housing speculation was 
suggested. In Korea, Jeonse loans are guaranteed with 100 percent coverage by two government 
agencies: HF and HUG, and a private insurer, Seoul Guarantee Insurance (SGI). The credit 
guarantee is used as a primary credit enhancement tool for private banks to cover the relatively 
higher default risk of Jeonse loan borrowers, whose income and credit scores are very low. At 
the same time, the guarantee can lower the interest rates of housing loans of low-income 
borrowers. But, in years, Jeonse loans, which have lower interest rates owing to the credit 
enhancement by agencies, are alleged to have been used for the speculation purpose, so-called 
“gap investment”, which can occur when the disparity between housing price and Jeonse deposit 
is narrow enough. Say, when the housing value of an apartment is $1,000, and Jeonse deposit is 
$700, then an investor can purchase the housing with just $300 equity. In that case, the landlords 
should reimburse the deposit when the tenant moves out. Typically investors utilize the Jeonse 
scheme when housing prices are expected to appreciate and get a capital gain through leveraging.  
Like the case above, in order to curb the housing price increase and stabilize the rental 
market, the Korean government typically has utilized diverse regulations, particularly through 
strict and frequent constraints on housing finance tools. Currently the Korean government does 
not employ rent regulations on private properties and owners except for public housing and 
subsidized housing. Instead, the national government regulates private banks’ loans for Jeonse 
and mortgage loans to discourage the speculation on the housing market and to prevent overheats 
of the market. In 2019, the government strengthened the financial regulations on the housing 
lending market. The government, for instance prohibited new mortgage loans underwriting for 
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the expensive luxury apartments. Simultaneously, the authority tightened Loan To Value ratio 
(LTV) for the housing units with the values of more than KRW 0.9 billion ($ 750,000) and put a 
limit on Rent to Income Ratio (RIR) for an individual rental business entity, etc. 
 
Direct Subsidized Loans for Private Entities 
The national government provides the two tracks of financing: for individuals and private 
construction companies. The main tools are direct subsidized loans through the government fund 
and credit guarantee service for private low-income class and housing constructors. Major game 
markers in the program are NHUF, KHFC, and HUG. Among them, the primary source of 
funding for housing affordability enhancement is the government fund, or National Housing & 
Urban Fund (NHUF), which is the former National Housing Fund. The fund is primarily used to 
enhance the homeownership of medium-income households and provide subsidy to fill the 
finance gap between rent and income of low-income households as well as underserved people. 
First of all, it is necessary to overview NHUF briefly before looking into the specific programs. 
 In 2015, the national government enacted the new law, called the “National Housing and 
Urban Fund Act”, which reformed the formerly existing the National Housing Fund. The 
primary points of restructuring the fund were 1) the expansion of fund’s scope from housing to 
city revitalization, 2) the diversification of support programs from direct loans to the 
combination of loans, investment, finance, and guarantee, and 3) the designation of the fund 
operator or HUG. The fund consists of two accounts: Housing account and City account. 
Housing account is used for providing a subsidy for the improvement of housing conditions and 
inventory increase for low- and medium-income families. City account, whereas it is to support 
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urban regeneration and revitalization. The principal funding sources for the fund are national 
housing bonds, the national lottery fund, housing subscription savings accounts
51
 , and so forth. 
NHUF historically contributed a lot to the increase of homeownership and the improvement of 
housing affordability in Korean society since its installment in 1981. 
< Table 10. Resources and usage of the NHUF > 
Accounts Resources Usage 
Housing 
Account 
- National Housing Bond 
 
- Housing subscription savings accounts 
 
- Self-raised Finance 
 (Recover finances, investment, loans, asset   
securitization, interest revenue on loans) 
 
- Money transferred from the general account  
 (National lottery fund, etc.) 
- Rental housing construction loan 
 
- Pre-sale housing construction loan 
 
- Housing purchase loan 
 
- Jeonse deposit loan 
 
- Housing remodeling loan 
 
- Finance for rental housing  
City  
Account 
- Money transferred/borrowed from housing 
account 
 
- Self-raised Finance  
 (Recover finances, investment, loans, asset   
securitization, interest revenue on loans) 
 
- Money transferred / Borrowed from 
regional development special account, etc. 
- Urban renewal project loan 
 
- [Economic Base Type] 
 Rehabilitation, industrial complex,   
ports, station areas developments  
 
- [Community Regeneration Type] 
Redevelop run-down commercial 
areas and residential areas 
Source: HUG 
 
As of 2018, NHUF had KRW 171.31 trillion ($143 billion) of assets, which were 
composed of KRW 20.8 trillion ($17.5 billion) of equity and KRW 150.5 trillion ($125.5 billion) 
of debt. The asset size has unceasingly increased while debts have soared by around 50 percent 
                                           
51
 In Korea, only qualified individuals can apply for purchasing a newly built apartment, and through lottery system, 
the owners are selected. Applicants must meet some conditions: 1) all household members are non-home owners, 2) 
an applicant should open a “housing subscription savings account” and maintain deposit balance in a bank. 
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over the last 5 years. The biggest change came from the growing issuance of nation housing 
bonds and the increase in the number of housing subscription savings accounts. 
< Table 11. The financial status of NHUF (KRW trillion) > 
Type 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Assets 117.38 136.22 148.87 163.34 171.31 
Debts 102.31 120.90 132.42 143.38 150.50 
Equity 15.07 15.32 16.45 19.96 20.81 
Source: HUG 
 
NHUF serves many diverse programs to cover a wide range of income spectrums from 
the extremely low-income to medium-income earners. One difference from the New York case 
might be a rental subsidy for newlyweds and young employees working in small- and medium-
sized- companies. This is the reflection of social problems in Korean society. As described 
earlier, Korea has been suffering from rapid aging and the record-low birth rate due to late 
marriage and no children sentiment among the young generation. The young generation began to 
feel the burdens to run marital status and rear babies owing to the widening income disparity and 
the increasing costs of child care. Based on the perception, the Korean government began to 
provide incentives
52
 to galvanize more marriage and baby pregnancy. Most of the rental 
assistance is Jeonse support programs because people prefer this, and interest rates range from 
1.2 to 2.7 percent per year based on the loan period and income level. 
 
                                           
52
 Some small cities with serious population loss provide approximately KRW 18,000,000 ($15,000) to parents with 
more than 3 children as a grateful gift. 
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< Table 12. Rent supportive direct loans for individuals in Korea (as of Feb 2020)
53
 > 
Program Eligibility Loans 
Rental deposit loan 
for young 
employees of small 
companies 
-Annual income less than KRW 50 MN 
-Employees of Small and medium-sized company 
-Aged from 19 to 34 years old 
-The interest rate of 1.2% 
-Max. KRW 100 MN 
-Up to 10 years 
Guaranteed 
monthly rent loan 
for young people 
-Annual income less than KRW 20 MN 
-Net assets below KRW 288 MN 
-Aged from 19 to 34 years old 
-Deposit 1.5%, Rent 1.8% 
-Deposit KRW 35 MN,     
Rent KRW 9.6 MN 
-Up to 10 years 
Supportive 
Jeonse loan for 
young people 
-Annual income less than KRW 50 MN 
-Net assets below KRW 288 MN 
-Aged from 19 to 25 years old 
-The interest rate of 2.3 ~2.7% 
-Max. KRW 35 MN (to 80%) 
-Up to 10 years 
Monthly rent loan 
for stable dwelling 
-Special type) low-income voucher recipients, 
newly recruited young people, etc. 
-General type) Annual income less than KRW 50 
MN / Net assets below 288 MN 
-Special 1.5%, General 2.5% 
-Max. KRW 9.6 MN 
- Up to 10 years 
Jeonse loan for 
newlyweds 
-Annual income less than KRW 60 MN 
-Net assets below KRW 288 MN 
-Within 7 years after marriage 
-The interest rate of 2.3 ~2.7% 
-Max. (up to 80%): Seoul 
Metro regions KRW 200 MN, 
Others 160 MN 
-Up to 10 years 
Supportive  
Jeonse loan 
-Annual income less than KRW 50 MN 
-Net assets below KRW 288 MN 
-The interest rate of 2.3 ~2.9% 
-Seoul Metro regions KRW 
120 MN, Others KRW 80 MN 
-Up to 10 years 
Source: NHUF 
 
NHUF also provides an assortment of financial tools to support private institutions to 
further the supply of small-size rental housing units for low- and medium-income families. Most 
of the rental housing programs put limits on the area size and the maximum loan amounts as well 
as the lease terms. The direct loans typically have below-market interest rates, which are very 
attractive to construction companies and real estate developers. 
                                           
53
 Mortgage loans to support home ownership of medium income families are excluded. 
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< Table 13. Rent supportive direct loans for private companies in Korea (as of Feb 2020)
54
 > 




-Registered constructors, landowners, etc 
-Areas size less than 85 m2 
-Floating rate by the fun operation plan 
-Require guarantee by HF/HUG as a 
collateral 
-At least 5 years of the Rent period 
- Areas size <=60 m
2
: interest rate 2.3%
 
 Loan less than KRW 5,500 per unit 
- Areas size > 60 m
2
: interest rate 2.8%
 
 Loan less than KRW 5,500 per unit  
-Loan maturity 30 years 





-Registered rent business entity 
-Areas size less than 85 m
2 
-At least 4 years of the Rent period 
-Maximum loan amount: KRW 
50MN to 100 MN (on area size) 
-Interest rate: 2~4% 
-Loan term: 6 or 12 years 




-Rent business entity 
-Areas size less than 85 m
2 
-At least 4 or 8 years of the rental period 
-Maximum loan amount: KRW 
50 MN to 100 MN (on area size) 
-Interest rate: 2~4% 
-Loan term: 4 or 8 years 





-Areas size less than 85 m
2 
-At least 15 years of the rental period 
-Lease at below-market rents 
-Maximum loan amount: KRW 100 MN 
-Interest rate: 2~2.8% 





-Areas size less than 85 m
2 
-At least 15 years of the rental period 
-Lease at below-market rents 
-Maximum loan amount: KRW 100MN 
-Interest rate: 2~2.8% 
-Loan term: 8, 16, 20 years 
Source: NHUF 
 
NHUF also provides direct loans for sales purpose housing construction to private 
builders. The typical interest rates for the loans range from 3.6 to 4.6 percent based on the entity, 
which means that it differs based on public vs. private and the area size of housing units, etc. A 
detailed explanation of financial support programs for sales-purpose housing development 
projects is omitted here because those programs are only for medium-income households. 
                                           
54
 Mortgage loans to support home ownership of medium income families are excluded. 
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Housing Credit Guarantee Program 
Another prominent housing finance program for low-income families is the housing finance 
credit guarantee. The representative national credit guarantee program is supported by the 
“Housing Finance Credit Guarantee Fund”, which is managed and operated by Korea Housing 
Finance Corporation (HF). Since the installation in 1988
55
, the fund serviced KRW 343.87 
trillion ($286.6 billion) guarantees to 10.74 million low-income families. Approximately 48 
percent of the beneficiaries have annual incomes of no greater than KRW 30 million ($25,000). 
In 2017, the fund totaled KRW 36.67 trillion ($30 billion) housing finance guarantee balance, 94 
percent of which was provided to individuals. 
< Table 14. Annual performance of credit guarantee fund > 
 
Source: Korea Housing Finance Corporation (HF) 
 
Housing Finance Credit Guarantee program also covers a wide range of customers from 
extremely low-income households to medium-income families. HF’s housing finance credit 
guarantee program can be classified into guarantees for individuals and housing builders. 
Guarantee for individuals comprises of various guarantee programs such as Jeonse assistance, 
Special Jeonse assistance for the underprivileged class, Monthly rental assistance, Housing 
retrofitting assistance, Intermediate payment assistance, and Mortgage credit guarantee. Among 
                                           
55 Korea Housing credit guarantee fund was transfer to under the management of Korea Housing Finance 
Corporation in 2004, when the corporation was established. 
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them, Special Jeonse guarantee for the underprivileged class and Monthly rent guarantee 
program specifically targeted the low-income households as defined below in table 16. 
According to HF, as of 2017, 68.9 percent of guarantee for individuals were Jeonse deposit 
guarantee, and 25.7 percent of them served Intermediate payment guarantee, which ensures the 
interim amortized payments of home purchasing debts. Here I would like to introduce the 
guarantee programs that target only low-income households excluding the programs with a focus 
on the medium-income earners. The general Jeonse guarantee program’s eligibility is so broad 
that even homeowners with housing with a value up to $750,000 can apply for the rental deposit 
subsidy program. It is a controversial issue to allow homeowners to use public finance subsidy. 
< Table 15. Housing Finance Credit Guarantee balance by the products (KRW 100 MN) >  
Division Types 2017 Ratio (%) 
Guarantee for Individuals Financing for home purchases 18,215 5.3% 
  Intermediate payments 88,451 25.7% 
  Jeonse deposits 237,258 68.9% 
 
Others 675 0.2% 
  Sub-total 344,599 100.0% 
Guarantee for Builders Financing for home construction 11,843 53.6% 
  Project Financing 9954 45.1% 
  Purchased rental 280 1.3% 
  Sub-total 22,077 100.0% 
Total   366,676   
Source: HF, the annual report (2017) 
 
Special Jeonse guarantee program for the underprivileged class provides beneficiary 
credit enhancements to the class who need the most social care to make them afford rental 
housing at below-market rates. The class includes young working class who are earning low 
income, housing with a severely-disabled family member, North Korea refugees, permanent 
public rental housing tenants, the recipients of the National Basic Livelihood Security Benefit, 
children head of households, a person who is repaying debts after credit default. 
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< Table 16. Representative Housing Credit Guarantee for low-income individuals > 
Program Eligibility Guarantee  
General Jeonse 
guarantee 
-Rental deposit: up to KRW 500 MN ($400,000) in 
Seoul, other regions are allowed up to KRW 300 MN 
-Non-home owners or one homeowner with housing 
value less than KRW 900 MN ($750,000) 
-No more than KRW 100 MN ($83,300) of annual 
household income 
-Up to 200 KRW MN ($58,300) 
 
-0.05 ~ 0.30% guarantee fee for 
a year depending based on 
deposit size and special 
preferential class. 
Jeonse guarantee 
for a young 
generation 
-Age: at or less than 34 years old 
-Rental deposit: up to KRW 500 MN ($400,000) in 
Seoul, other regions up to 300 MN 
-No more than 70 KRW ($58,300) of Annual 
household income 
-Up to 70 % of the total deposit  
 






-Mixed-ethnic family, a household with retired senior 
parents, housing with a severely-disabled family 
member, North Korean refugees, permanent public 
rental housing tenants, National Basic Livelihood 
Security Benefit recipients, children head of 
household, etc. 
-Rental deposit: up to KRW 500 MN ($400,000) in 
Seoul, other regions are for 300 MN 
-Non-home owners or one homeowner with housing 
value less than KRW 900 MN ($750,000) 
-No more than KRW 100 MN ($83,300) of annual 
household income 
-Up to 100 % of the total deposit 
  
-Up to KRW 45 MN ($37,500) 
when a deposit is provided as 





recovering class  
-Persons recovering credit by repaying debts after 
credit default 
-Rental deposit: up to 500 million ($400,000) in Seoul, 
other regions are for 300 million 
-Non-home owners and one homeowner with housing 
value less than KRW 900 million or $750,000 
-No more than 100million ($83,300) of annual 
household income 
-Up to 80 % of the total deposit 
 
-Up to KRW 45 MN ($37,500) 
when a deposit is provided as 





-Persons who are using Jeonse loan from non-
monetary institutions  
-Rental deposit: up to 500 million ($400,000) in Seoul, 
other regions are for 300 million 
-Non-home owners and one homeowner with housing 
value less than KRW 900 million or $750,000 
- Less than or equal to 70million ($58,300) of annual 
household income 
-Up to KRW 150 MN 
($125,000) 
 
-Up to 80 % of the total deposit 
 
-0.05 % guarantee fee for a year 
 
Credit guarantee 
on monthly rents 
for young 
workers 
-Aged less than 34 years old 
-Contracted deposit is less than or equal to KRW 100 
MN, and monthly rent is less than or equal to KRW  
700,000 ($583) 
-Less than or equal to KRW 70 MN ($58,300) of 
annual household income 
-Up to KRW 12 MN ($10,000) 
 
-Up to 13 years guarantee; 8 
years of a grace period, 
amortized over 5 years 
 




CHAPTER 6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. Cross-sectional Comparison between Two Cities 
 
So far, I have portrayed the trajectory of housing policy in New York City and Seoul. Both have 
their own set of diverse housing tools, which were developed based on their idiosyncratic socio-
economic traits and historical backgrounds. For example, New York City is a representative 
melting-pot city of diverse races and ethnicities as well as an epitome of free market and 
autonomy. Under the social and political background, New York City’s affordable housing 
policy has been selected for addressing specific issues; the current housing policies are the 
combined results of the efforts to address the housing crisis and to adapt to the city’s urban 
environment changes. New York City focused on resolving income disparity based on the socio-
economic status (SES) and housing inequality for minorities, particularly Black people, while 
minimizing market distortion by government interventions, and efficiently utilizing private 
funding sources; the laissez-faire approach and increasing costs issue must be critical reasons 
why policy orientation in New York has shifted to a primarily indirect conduit role and facilitator 
rather than a direct participant in the housing and financial market. Most supports are federal in 
both NYC and Seoul. New York City efforts are additive. The Federal government plays a 
primary role in providing rental assistance and homeowner tax subsidies and finance tools. 
In contrast, Seoul, a single-ethnicity city has walked a different path. Since 1953, when 
the Korean War ended, Korea has rapidly developed economically over the past 70 years, led by 
its government. Now, Korea is applauded for its successful development model. Based on this 
experience, Korean society has a deeper reliance on and expectations for the public sector’s 
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intervention and the government's role rather than market autonomy. The Korean government’s 
comprehensive top-down development strategy was successful in terms of economic vitalization, 
but negative externalities such as income disparity and speculation on the housing market 
became serious domestic issues. In the past, because the city's economic infrastructure was not 
self-sufficient, the government tried to manage the whole market and system as a “visible hand”. 
The government-controlled the housing supply through zoning and construction permits while 
curbing demands by imposing restrictions on the mortgage lending market. The distinctive 
differences in history and socioeconomic background made the big difference between the two 
cities’ housing policies even if there also have existed some overlaps and similarities. The two 
cities have adopted different approaches to their similar housing affordability problems in 
finding solutions and filling the housing finance gap. 
I humbly admit that there are a number of issues limiting the comparison of data, which 
makes it very hard to operationalize and characterize the main traits of each city’s housing 
support programs. However, based on the knowledge from the prior chapters, I would try to 
schematize and generalize the two cities’ affordable housing programs. 






















New York City’s housing policy can be summarized by the role of a conduit, market 
autonomy, efficiency, racial equality, Public-Private Partnership, community engagement, and 
multi-scales. New York City primarily pursues the operational smoothness with a strong reliance 
on private money and market efficiency while minimizing the direct involvement in the market. 
The U.S has a big trauma in racial discrimination historically; therefore, New York City’s 
housing policies also have a relatively vigorous preference for addressing racial equality and the 
concentration of poverty. Their policymaking process is more democratic and participatory. Rent 
decisions and recertification processes are quite a bit transparent. Rent Guideline boards 
described earlier in detail could be a good example of this. Another big discrepancy is the 
governing structure. The U.S. has a federal system and a broader territory, so it could be very 
hard to manage and control the whole nation with one size fit all policy tools, which led to the 
multi-scaled housing policy and its diversity in detail. At the same time, a part of the relevant 
challenge is distinguishing between NYC initiatives and using Federal tools. New York’s policy 
is relatively simple and constant. Once a rule is set, it has not changed frequently but lasted for a 
long time. For example, 30 percent of the tenants’ contribution ratio is applied to every 
affordable housing unit including public housing, and the figure remains the same since 1981. 
LIHTC has almost 35 years’ long history without a big change in its program structure. 
In stark contrast, Seoul places more values on direct engagement, speed and 
effectiveness, development-orientation, public-initiatives, top-down comprehensiveness, 
national-level plan, and policy flexibility. Based on the experience of government-led fast 
economic development, the Korean government has had strong leadership in dealing with the 
affordable housing policy. The city of Seoul still focuses on the provision of direct financing 
programs for affordable housing development with mostly national resources: the ongoing 
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provision of public housing, direct below-market-rate loans from the government fund, 
and a housing credit guarantee program via agencies for housing developers and the socially-
disadvantaged class. It was not long ago that the Korean government began to enhance 
collaboration with private investors through tax subsidies. For example, “The New Stay” was 
installed in 2015, and a tax abatement program for registered private landlords was implemented 
around just several years ago, but it is still in the nascent phase compared with the U.S. Korea 
has small territory and its economic size is commensurate with New York State, so most of the 
housing programs are run by the national government and national agencies. Seoul City also 
operates its city level housing agencies, whose capacities and roles are limited because of the 
city’s lack of budget and sovereignty.  
Another trait is that Seoul’s rent decision process and mechanism for subsidized rental 
housing is not transparent enough. Even though government and agencies tried to reflect 
communities’ voices via hearing and more formal participation processes, the extent is not 
enough yet. Tenants and landlords have difficulty to have access to the raw data that is used for 
the rents decision. Some government officials decide the level of the appropriate rent according 
to their already-set rules and guidelines. The process, in particular lacks grassroots participation 
from the community and tenants. Lastly, the Korean housing policy is flexible. The versatility 
could be a good value sometimes on the ground that it is possible to change policy as quickly as 
the environment changes. But in terms of policy coherence, it must not be a bad aspect. If the 
government policy is too whimsical, the market can be exposed to more uncertainty, and at the 
same time, market participants do not trust the government announcements. That must be a 
critical reason why the Korean government’s powerful regulations have not worked well to 
control housing market fluctuations.  
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Given the complexity and mixture of housing policy tools in play, it is not easy to 
differentiate and generalize the main characteristics of the affordable housing finance 
policies of the two cities without proper tools. Based on the necessity, I tried to find some 
seminal aspects to be considered when developing housing policy from the background and 
history research in previous sections. I found the five major components to explain the current 
housing policy traits of the two cities, and made the model: SMART comparison principles. 
SMART stands for the combination of abbreviations of five comparative elements: Subject class, 
target Market, policy Approach, Regulation intensity, and policy Tools. The order 
of the components does not reflect the priority, and all factors have the same weights. Utilizing 
this model, I categorize each city’s current housing policy traits and elaborate on the differences 
of them more in detail one by one by the component respectively. 
 
< Figure 27. The SMART housing policy comparison principles > 
 
Source: Ju Hwa Jung (2020) 
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Under the comparison model, the distinguishable discrepancy between the two cities can 
be summarized below (see table 18). New York City’s affordable housing policy can be 
primarily characterized like this: more precisely targeted at low-income earners, mainly through 
mixed-income developments, in the monthly rental market, primarily as an indirect conduit 
role, in a more market-friendly way, and through tax abatements. On the other hand, Seoul 
principally covers a broader range of targets, in the money deposit market with more focus on 
homeownership, as a direct participant, with relatively strong market regulations, and though the 
direct loans and public housing. The details will be examined according to the five analysis 
components one by one from here. 
< Table 18. The comparisons of Primary housing policy by SMART > 
Categories New York City Evidence Seoul Evidence 










Primary Policy  
Target Market 
























Strong Curb on 
market 













First, from the perspective of the policy target subject, New York City more specifically 
targets low-income households. New York City mainly zeroes in on the low-income households 
with income at or below 60 percent AMI and minorities who live below the poverty line. Besides, 
the Small Area FMR, which fathoms the more accurate average market rate at the ZIP code scale, 
helped the policymakers to focus on the most vulnerable class in the city with the crystal clear 
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policy goals. The city put the amelioration of the poverty disparity as its first policy priority and 
spent its budget on it, which is a very efficient tactic in terms of resource allocation.  
At the same time, another notable point of New York City’s housing developments is 
that most of the affordable housing projects in the city are mixed-income developments. From 
the perspective of funding sources, new construction projects employ diverse subsidy tools 
including LIHTC, PABs, a subsidized mortgage from city agencies, and local property tax 
incentives such as 421-a. But, this approach is still controversial because the unneglectable 
amount of government tax expenditures are used for middle-income earners as well. 
New York City is also implementing the strongest rent stabilization policy in the U.S. 
even though rent regulation is a controversial topic across the country. I am saying that the New 
York City PHAs do not provide housing supports programs for middle-income households. The 
city also has run diverse programs such as mortgage interest rate deduction and mixed-income 
housing development as well as FHA insurance for first home buyers. However, the majority of 
the primary government resources are centered on helping extremely low- and low-income 
individuals. It also should be noted that there is no stated racial requirement for any housing 
programs; apparently, it's purely income. However, the majority of low-income people under the 
poverty line are Blacks and Hispanics; therefore, poverty affordable housing issues in the U.S. 
might be closely related to race even though it is not programmatic. 
New York also has very mighty tenant protection measures. According to the LIHTC 
compliance, for instance the owners cannot evict the existing tenants of any low-income units 
without good cause throughout the entire commitment period; the good cause excludes over 
income. Once the initial verification is finished and the Tenant Income Certification (TIC) is 
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signed by the applicant and the owner, no recertification process on income eligibility is 
followed, which means that the tenants who pass the initial income eligibility can reside in their 
affordable unit as long as they want regardless of their income increase. IRS Revenue Procedure 
requires the owners to certify that no tenants were evicted and a gross rent increase concerning 
low-income units did not occur. Public housing is the case too. NYCHA does not necessarily 
terminate the tenancy of low-income households even if their incomes are above the 
qualification limit.  
On the opposite side, as seen in the previous chapter, public housing programs in Seoul 
tend to concentrate more on medium income-households and other financially-struggling class as 
well as low-income classes. The policy support subjects include newlyweds, college students, 
and young rookies working for small-sized companies. This policy trend could be explained with 
contemporary social phenomena and issues in South Korea. In 2018, 1-person and 2-person 
households comprise 56.5 percent of the total households, and the portion has kept increasing 
from 34.6 percent in 2000 (Statistics Korea, 2018). Especially, the public housing programs that 
have been run by Seoul City seem to be designed for medium-income households like the social 
housing model of European countries. 
For example, the permanent rental housing, which is de facto an authentic public housing 
program, almost stopped new projects since 1993. 50-year lease public housing, which was 
launched to replace permanent rental housing, is not actively used these days either because of 
the increasing construction costs. Instead, the eligibility standards for public rental housing have 
become so generous that now non-home owners with other real estate assets valued up to 
$180,000 could live in some of the public rental housings regardless of their income levels. 
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Another example is “New Stay” rental housing. The program had not had any limits on the 
tenants’ eligibility including income and assets until 2017 when the program was reformed to 
“publicly support private rental housing.” Currently, the program enhanced requirement; the 
initial rents must be at a maximum of 90 ~ 95 percent of market rents for general tenants, and 70 
to 85 percent of market rates for young people and newlyweds. Also, the priority of the tenancy 
goes to non-homeowners, and income limits were adopted too. Granted that the alterations 
improved the “publicness” of this program, it is still not enough. Only 20 percent of total housing 
units are allocated to special care classes such as young singles, newlyweds, and seniors. 
Moreover, the income limit, which restricts tenants’ income within 120 percent of the average 
income of urban area workers, is applied only to the special care class. It means that 80 percent 
of the total tenants are still exempt from the income limit. The properties that were funded by 
this program are filled with medium-income households. 
Second, in terms of the policy target market, New York City puts more weight on the 
monthly rental market. Given the average income of policy target class and high level of housing 
prices, it might be natural for the city to focus on the rental market rather than the sales market. 
As I have already noted early, the majority of the housing market in the city is the monthly rental 
market. New York City’s severe income disparity and the high level of living costs made it 
almost impossible for low-income households to purchase their own homes in reality. Price to 
Income Ratio (PIR) in New York also keeps waxing. For this reason, New York City’s housing 
policy focused on filling the rent gap between incomes and monthly rents. The representative 
programs such as LIHTC, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher, PAB, its use of real property tax 
exemptions, and rent regulation are the measures to mitigate the tenants’ rents burden. 
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Seoul also concentrates on the rental market to alleviate the housing cost burden of low-
income households. But there is a big difference between the two cities, which came from the 
disparate rental housing market structure of the two cities. Aforementioned, Seoul’s housing 
market is different from New York. Approximately 61.4 percent of housing units are apartments; 
therefore, apartments do not be branded as s poverty in Seoul. The more distinguishable 
characteristic of the Seoul rental market is the lump-sum deposit lease market, called “Jeonse”. 
Seoul’s rental market is dominated by the money deposit market, so the government also 
primarily focuses on the money deposit lease market. The typical deposit rate is known as 70 
percent of the property’s market price in Seoul, which is a big burden to the low-income working 
class. So most of the low-income tenants have to borrow money from the banks in the case, but 
banks are reluctant to lend loans to low-income households because of their high risk of default.  
Under this circumstance, the government intervenes as a mediator by lending direct 
Jeonse loans with far lower interest rates from the government fund, or by providing credit 
guarantee service as a credit enhancement for the vulnerable class. The national government also 
focuses on the homeownership increase of low-income households by providing subsidized 
mortgage loans. As of March 2020, the typical interest rate of the subsidized mortgages ranges 
from 2 to 3 percent according to maturities and income brackets. In addition, the Korean 
government also provided public housing units for sales to low-income families; therefore, the 
tenants who saved enough seed money while living in public housing could purchase their homes 
after 5 years of initial move-in at around half of the market rate. The Korean policymakers 
believe that just subsidizing the rents cannot help them escape from poverty, and it is necessary 
to support them to have their own homes, which could function as a stepping stone to climb the 
social ladder even though it is a small property. Being homeowners might be magic because it 
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could be a dream to the urbanites in lower socioeconomic status. It could be a tough job for low-
income families to pay back monthly amortized mortgages; however, the interest is affordably 
low, and eventually they would accumulate the minimum wealth and secured shelter for their 
beloved families after 30 years. That is the reason why Seoul cannot be off the hook from the 
homeownership increase of low-income earners. 
Third, as for the policy approach, New York City has relied more on private investments 
and for-profit companies’ technology through the public-private partnership. New York City 
provides a lot of capital as a subsidy using more than 10% of the cap budget for affordable 
housing. Also, the city supports the supply of affordable housing through land use tools such as 
re inclusionary housing and real property tax tools such as article 11, J-51, and 421-a. But those 
are not direct tools, but indirect subsidies for private developers. The city stopped the direct 
involvement via public housing in the housing market, instead, the policy orientation skewed to 
the role of a finance conduit and supporter. This approach may be understandable given the 
history and background of the U.S. housing market and housing policy. Particularly public 
housing programs in the U.S. showed the typical trajectory of the demise of the direct housing 
finance tool; the federal government stopped new public housing. The public housing program 
has confronted serious criticisms and suffered from the severe lack of funding for maintaining 
the properties and running a business properly until its sunset in 1986. To get a budget funding 
from the federal government was the intricate political power dynamics; the government officials 
in municipalities had to have difficulties to negotiate and persuade the federal government, and 
the federal government also had to convince Congress to receive the budget sanction for the 
public housing program every year.  
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Another issue was the lack of public empty land parcels. In the early 20
th
 century, there 
were a lot of undeveloped parcels of lands that were owned by the government, so a large scale 
of public housing projects was possible at cheaper costs. The PHAs could conduct development 
projects on their lands without additional land costs. However, nowadays, the scarcity of empty 
lands required NYCHA to buy lands for housing developments from the private market. The 
increasing construction cost also became a burden to NYCHA. The soaring maintenance costs of 
existing public housing inventory also became a problem. What is worse, the federal government 
had cut the relevant public housing budget. As a result, public housing finally lost its ambition, 
and policymakers chose the alternative; it was the tax credit program. New York City 
relinquished its role as a direct participant in the affordable housing market. The government 
authority, de facto have stayed one step away from housing issues by abandoning de jure public 
housing program decades ago. Instead, the city government has tried to make up for the gap of 
public housing with other policy tools such as Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning ordinance and 
property tax subsidies to pair with private developers. 
Similarly, the federal government including HUD handed over the responsibility for the 
continuous supply and keep-up of affordable housing to the private sectors via diverse tax break 
schemes such as LIHTC and RAD. As we already scrutinized in an earlier chapter, the U.S. lost 
more than 250,000 units of the public housing inventory from the mid-1990s through 2017, and 
only a small percentage of the demolished units have been replaced with new housing units. 
Instead, since the mid-1990s, around 110,000 affordable housing stocks were constructed under 
the help of LIHTC each year, which more than 2 million units. Of course there still exist some 
direct subsidy programs including Section 8 Housing Vouchers, direct loans by city agencies for 
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private constructors, and rent regulation; however, the mainstream in affordable housing policy is 
the tax abatement program. 
Seoul also faced a similar impasse while following the same trajectory of New York City 
public housing. Seoul’s public housing program began in 1989 when it was three years after 
LIHTC’s launch. At the time Korean economic development was at its peak time owing to the 
1988 Seoul Olympic boom and government-led comprehensive expansion plan. In the beginning, 
the government-led housing development projects were such success that NHF and LH have 
expanded its capacity a lot to accommodate increasing demands on affordable housing. The 
Korean government also built a lot of public housing on publicly-owned empty lands in and out 
of the cities. But their efforts could not meet the ever-soaring demands due to skyrocketing land 
values and construction costs as well as the shortage of the brownfields.  
Even though Seoul city faced the same issues with New York, but chose the different 
pathway. In place of abandoning public housing programs, government authorities modified the 
program by reducing benefits; for example, the government shortened the tenancy period by 
introducing 50 years and 30 years of public housing while stopping new permanent public 
housing. At the same time, the Korean government began to utilize private sectors. But specific 
methodology was different from the U.S. Policymakers focused on direct subsidized loans and 
credit guarantee for construction companies and low-income individuals rather than tax 
abatements. Current National Housing and Urban Fund (NHUF) has been a major source to 
supply subsidized loans, and Housing Finance Credit Guarantee Fund (HFCGF) has been the 
major contributor.  
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In addition, since 2015, the central government set out to induce private investors 
including banks and construction companies to participate in the monthly rental market to 
expand the monthly rental market size. Through the “Publicly-support private rental housing” 
program, the former “New Stay,” the national agencies and NHUF participate in the rental 
housing projects as a financing equity partner. The government offered lucrative tax incentives. 
In 2017, the Korean government adopted a tax exemption program for the registered individual 
landlords and corporate entities. The tax abatements comprehensively include purchase tax, 
property tax, rental income tax, capital gain tax, and comprehensive real estate holding tax as 
well as a national insurance premium. The most distinguishable stark difference is that Seoul 
keeps providing public housing, although no permanent rental housing has been built recently. 
By the way, both cities also have shared common values. New York City and Seoul City are 
implementing a mixed approach including place-based and people-based approaches at the same 
time. LIHTC, RAD, and Munis are place-based subsidies, and Section 8 housing voucher is a 
representative people-based program. Seoul also runs public housing and direct low-interest rate 
loans from NHUF as a place-based approach, and simultaneously, the Jeonse credit guarantee 
and housing voucher program, and subsidized mortgages are available as a people-based one. 
Fourth, the two cities demonstrated the stark discrepancy in the intensity of regulation. 
The U.S. is one of the countries that admire the free market and the autonomy of market 
participants. Among cities in the U.S, New York City is the leading city as a financial hub of the 
country. New York City showed the inclination to minimize government interventions while 
acting as a facilitator by providing the least market regulation and subsidizing for the private 
actors. There is only one exception: rent regulation. Rent regulation is still a big controversial 
issue in the U.S, but New York boasts of the stubborn stance on it, and New York State made it 
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permanent last year by passing the Housing Stability & Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA). 
The new law also resolved some loopholes of rent stabilization that worked in tandem to displace 
low-income tenants; the vacancy bonus, Major Capital Improvements (MCI), Individual 
Apartment Improvements (IAIs), preferential rents, and vacancy decontrol have either been 
abolished or reformed. Except for this strong rent regulation, it is hard to find a meaningful 
substantial regulation on the housing market. Affordable housing programs including LIHTC, 
RAD, and Section 8 have the basic guideline for landlords and tenants, but most of the cases just 
delineate the fundamental frameworks and requirements of the programs. Besides that, the 
federal government and the city do not get involved in the private housing market. Despite that 
housing prices rocket up, no immediate policy reactions are enacted; policymakers just rely on 
the market while monitoring the market, looking for the Achilles heel, and implementing the 
countermeasure. The city’s housing policy lacks the elasticity to a sudden environmental change, 
but it could be more resilient intrinsically because of its less regulation on the market function. 
Conversely, Seoul has imposed strong comprehensive precepts on the housing market. 
The national government tried to get involved in the private market as a judge and gave a remedy 
for any symptoms found; the central government actively controlled the housing supply. The 
tools include frequent alteration of zoning, construction permit, setting a price ceiling on the 
newly built apartments for sales, levying heavier tax on multiple homeowners, and the 
manipulation of the maximum loan amounts of mortgage and mortgage interest rates through 
finance agencies such as HF; the underlying guidelines for a long-term fixed-rate mortgage and 
its interest rates are de facto determined by the central government. The Korean housing market 
is not fully nurtured; therefore it is more subjective to market volatility intrigued by re-echoed 
speculations. Policymakers think that the housing disparity is a sort of market failure, so the 
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policing power must intervene and correct it in a fast and effective way. But it is still under 
debate whether this enforced regulation functions well. Seoul’s regulation on the housing market 
is relatively so drastic and oftentimes whimsical that its effectiveness might be limited, and the 
side-effects of the stalwart directive could distort self-correcting resiliency of the free market. 
Last but the least, as for policy tools, New York City and Seoul have a similarity on the 
ground that both cities have adopted various mixed-tools including tax abatements, direct rent 
voucher, subsidized low-interest rate loans, and market regulation even if each city has the 
different extent and operational details. The two cities also have implemented both place-based 
tools and people-based tools at the same time. But when it comes to the primary tool and its 
availability, they diverged to the different paths; New York City mainly focused on tax credits 
program for the affordable housing finance tool, whereas, Seoul still adheres to direct subsidy 
programs such as public housing and credit guarantee program. That makes a meaningful chasm 
between the two cities. Some agencies including NYCHA indeed administer Section 8 housing 
voucher program as a direct subsidy, and over 20% of renters receive direct subsidy support in 
New York City. However, as of today, all section 8 programs are not open, and all the agencies 
do not have a plan yet on when they will reopen the program. It is an appraisable effort to keep 
providing existing low-income families with rent subsidies amid financial restrictions; however, 
it has been around 13 years since NYCHA’s Section 8 program was closed. 
New York has utilized LIHTC, RAD, PABs, and rent regulation as place-based tools. In 
terms of people-based tools, the city employed section 8 housing vouchers as well. The city 
agencies including NYC HDC and NYC HPD for instance, provide direct subsidized loans to 
qualified affordable housing developers through the issuance of municipal bonds while 
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subsidizing eligible low-income tenants with housing vouchers. But New York City primarily 
emphasizes tax saving schemes such as LIHTC, RAD, 420-a, and 420-c to mobilize private 
investors’ active participation in the affordable housing development market. As aforementioned, 
approximately 90 percent of the affordable housing developments were subsidized by the LIHTC 
program, and other tools are used as supportive tools. Besides, the dependence on LIHTC keeps 
increasing. Many developers and advocates for the tax credit program insist that without LIHTC, 
New York City cannot provide new affordable housing units even though the situation of New 
York City is better than other cities in terms of the availability of alternative housing tools and 
budgets; most housing units preserved within the city don't use LIHTC. 
They also argue that it is inevitable for Congress to eliminate the RAD cap, which limits 
the number of units that could be converted, to renovate the extant obsolete or deteriorating huge 
amounts of public housing units across the five boroughs. In an interview, Shola Olatoye, the 
former CEO of NYCHA and current director of Oakland's Housing and Community 
Development Department, confessed that NYCHA does not have the capacity to construct new 
housing property anymore, and tax incentive programs including LIHTC and RAD are de facto 
the only resort to the new construction of affordable housing. 
Seoul also has mixed tools about affordable housing policy. As for the place-based tools, 
the city adopted public housing, subsidized loans, housing finance credit guarantee for 
constructors, and tax exemption. Besides that, there are housing credit guarantee, monthly rent 
vouchers, tax exemption for first-time home buyers, and subsidized mortgage loans for low-
income individuals with regards to people-based tools. But the main tool of the Seoul case is 
direct subsidized loans from the nation’s biggest housing fund, known as NHUF. LH, the largest 
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national public housing constructor in Korea utilizes the fund in supplying new public housing 
units for low-income earners. So far, almost all of the affordable housing projects have been 
subsidized by the national fund. However, as the debt amount of the fund has increased 
persistently, the role of the fund seemed to diminish. So, to improve the financial soundness of 
the fund by slashing relevant credit risk, NHUF typically requires the developers to acquire a 
housing credit guarantee from the national financial agencies such as HF and HUG. 
Another major tool is the housing credit guarantee program with aims to support credit 
enhancement for poor individuals and private developers. Credit enhancement through the credit 
guarantee allows builders and individuals to get a collateralized loan that otherwise could not be 
sanctioned from banks, or to get lower interest rates with higher loan amounts from the banks. 
This credit guarantee program covers a wide spectrum of residential projects including public 
housing development, the construction of private rental housing, home mortgage loan, Jeonse 
deposit loan, and monthly rent assistance. South Korea has also endeavored to increase private 
rental housing by way of the public-private partnership by offering tax exemptions as an 
incentive. “New stay” program could be the evidence for the efforts; however, private 
participations have not been that active yet because of the market structure and regulation. 
 
B. Lessons and Suggestions for NYC 
 
Suggestion 1) Revisit public housing policy as the last resort for low-income households 
New York City housing authorities lost the lust for providing public housing for low-income 
housing since the 1980s, and then once in a blue moon, few new public housing projects were 
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built. According to the official NYCHA map 2019, the final new development project by 
NYCHA was the “Stanton Street” project, which was completed in December 2003 in Lower 
East Side of Manhattan. After the housing policy orientation in New York transitioned to the 
utilization of private sectors via tax abatement program, NYCHA focused on the maintenance of 
the existing public housing properties, which are 179,247 units as of Jan 2019. However, 
NYCHA has experienced a cumulative federal capital grant funding loss of $1.5 billion since 
2001, mainly because of the federal government’s budget cut and the steady increase of 
operating costs. Despite the deficiency of funding, direct or indirect funding to ease development 
costs and maintenance expenses must have been continued. So, as a solution, the federal 
government forged the strategic alliance with private developers and investors: the RAD. 
Nobody can deny that RAD is the epitome of the public-private partnership model. The 
federal government could get away with the annual political burdens to persuade Congress to get 
approval for new construction and maintenance budgets for public housing. At the same time, the 
government authorities passed the responsibility to manage residents’ pent-up waves of anger 
and address diverse maintenance issues to the private developers’ hands. Now the local PHAs do 
not need to worry about costs, complaints, and borrowing money. Currently the RAD program is 
also so popular that a lot of states are asking Congress to expand the unit limits and make the 
program permanent. When the RAD as a saver of the cash-strapped PHAs was first launched in 
2012, many states actively jumped in this program to rehabilitate the nation’s aging and 
disinvested housing stock. NYCHA that has been reluctant to join the program because of some 
related issues and concerns also joined the RAD by handing over the management 
responsibility for the Ocean Bay property to the private management company in 2016. The New 
York Times estimated that approximately 38 percent of the nation’s public housing stock will be 
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transferred into private firms. Nobody can debate that tax abatement programs such as LIHTC 
and RAD are one of the efficient tools for the continuous supply of affordable housing. But the 
policymakers might have too strong myths on the tax credit scheme even though the scheme has 
some controversial loopholes and limitations. 
First, the advent of the RAD program stands for de jure the end of the federal 
government’s public housing policy. It is a matter of time to change most of the existing public 
housing units into Section 8 housing vouchers under the ownership of private landlords. 
The federal government and PHAs are relinquishing the control of public housing properties by 
stopping public housing construction and its operation. However, it must be noted that the tax 
credit tools that utilize private partners as a booster might be “sustainable” in terms of efficiency, 
while they could be “unsustainable” from the perspective of its permanency. The LIHTC can 
only harness the private developers at a maximum of 30 years including an extended compliance 
period. After the required period, the developers will try to exit the program and realize the profit 
by raising rents to market rents and selling the properties at a good price. They are for-profit 
investors, so it is not possible to expect them to sustain affordable rents and keep the low-income 
tenants forever. Even if it might be possible, in exchange for their patience, the federal 
government should provide the private partners with more and more lucrative and attractive 
incentives such as zoning benefits, property tax abatements, and extra below market rate loans.  
Adam Weinstein, the CEO of Phipps houses, the oldest and largest not-for-profit 
affordable housing developer in New York City, suggested an agreement of a right of first refusal 
as a solution. It could help preserve the current affordable rental housing by conferring a priority 
consideration on mission-driven organizations such as tenant associations, local government 
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agencies, and nonprofit developers. However, even in the case, the non-for-profit new buyers 
might have to pay the high market values to acquire the properties. Other than that, Richard 
Froehlich, first Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of NYC HDC insisted that 
the use of city subsidy and requirement to pay back such loans with interest works as an anchor 
to maintain affordability. It could work; however, the private developers might ask for more 
sufficient compensation for the risks taken over the last 30 years of long-term investments. We 
should keep in mind that the solidarity of this strategic alliance between public sectors and 
private sectors is so weak that the cohesion could be terminated by either side anytime. 
Intrinsically, there exist no trusts between participants under the strategic alliance. 
Another concern is that private sectors could stop the affordable housing development 
projects at any time; particularly when the housing market declines or the economy enters a 
recession. Private money always pursues sufficient profits, which can only maneuver their 
actions. To clarify this issue, I tried to find the relevant data to check whether private developers 
using LIHTC had stopped new affordable housing projects or not during the prior economic 
recessions, but unfortunately I could not have access to the data. But private developers whom I 
interviewed for this paper mostly agreed that they could be likely to stop new development 
projects because of the uncertainty of economic condition and housing market. However, 
affordable housing must be supplied persistently regardless of the economic outlooks. Especially 
the pause of affordable housing supply when the economy is weak might be the same with the 
deprivation of umbrella when heavy rains are pouring. In the economic downturn, the 
economically fragile people need more helps to weather the turmoil than in normal and economic 
boom; many of the low-income classes could be furloughed and could not afford the rents. At the 
time, the private landlords could evict them when the rents are in arrears. It can be 
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understandable on the ground that the private developers also need amounts of cash to pay back 
loans, manage the property maintenance costs, and paying company overhead costs including 
employee salaries. Regulation on the eviction policy might be thought of as a solution, but I 
cannot be ensured that it could work given the policymakers and developers’ inclination toward 
the regulation-averse market-friendly attitude. I do not blame that their behaviors are merciless, 
but what I want to tell is that it is the fundamental and intrinsic limitation of private developers 
as a landlord.  
However, if affordable housing is put under the control of public sectors, it could be a 
different story. Generally, the governments do not halt the supply of public housing during the 
economic recession even if the government could temporarily reduce the development plan and 
business size because of the tight budgets. Also, the PHAs can be more flexible in terms of rent 
collection; typically the rent payment of the tenants living in public housing can be deferred 
during the economic turmoil or late fees are exempt. A private developer who is the current CEO 
of the largest private for-profit housing development firm advocated the LIHTC program by 
saying that the public sectors also should suspend all housing development projects during a 
recession, but he was wrong. According to the NYCHA Map (2019), despite the OPEC oil shock 
in 1973, the NYCHA never stopped the provision of new public housing construction. The 
magnitude of new supply diminished, but the city agency supplied 2,608 public housing units 
from 1975 through 1977. Also, in the middle of the Great Depression, the NYCHA added 9,189 





< Table 19. The NYHCA’s new public housing supply during recession > 
Big Crisis Occupancy completion year Properties Units 
OPEC Oil Shock 
(1973) 
1973 16 5,011 
1974 9 2,220 
1975 6 1,719 
1976 2 365 
1977 7 524 
Great Depression 
(1929-39) 
1937 1 574 
1938 2 3,255 
1939 N/A N/A 
1940 5 5,360 
Source: NYCHA, (2019 NYCHA Map) 
 
That is one of the primary reasons why other advanced economies including Seoul, 
London, and Tokyo do not abandon its public housing program even though they also have 
struggled with relevant difficulties including financial problems. It is without a doubt, an arduous 
work to keep the public housing projects afloat above the water given the increasing 
development and maintenance costs. That being said, as the last resort, the public housing 
program needs to be maintained at the minimum levels along with running the tax credit 
programs as a major tool. I suggest the dual-track approach to pursue two primary pillars: 
LIHTC and Public housing at the same time to sustain the housing affordability in New York 
City. Congress, the federal government, and the local government should get involved more in 





Suggestion 2) Conduct the feasibility study again on Tax abatements programs 
A lot of general people in the U.S. seem to be likely to perceive that the tax abatement 
programs such as LIHTC are free. Policymakers and Congress also can feel comfortable with 
this program because the LIHTC and RAD are not included in the official annual government 
budget balance book. I agree that they do look at the costs and benefits, and any modification is 
scored to see what the cost is for tax expenditures as well. But the tax expenditure could be less 
political and easier to reach an agreement among political parties rather than the annual direct 
budget spending. But it is necessary not to be forgotten that the tax credit program is not free. As 
of the fiscal year 2018, the federal budget deficit totaled $779 billion, which is 3.8 percent of the 
national GDP (COB, 2018). In 2018, $2.40 per resident or a minimum of nearly $3 million tax 
credits were given to private developers per state, and states will be endowed an additional 12.5 
percent in funding every year from 2018 through 2021 under the 2018 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act; the tax expenditure for the LIHTC would rise over time (ibid.). In response, 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that without the LIHTC, $49 billion tax 
revenues would be raised further from 2019 through 2028.  
Adam Weinstein, the CEO of Phipps houses and Adjunct professor of Columbia 
University explained that private developers could be more nimble to environmental change and 
efficient than public sectors in terms of the costs. In addition, the appropriate margins should 
cover the developers’ risks of future uncertainty and compensate for their contribution of 
knowledge and skill (refers to human resources). I thoroughly agree with the idea. That is a 
business and economy. However, if the effect of the tax subsidy might be lesser than expected, 
and a meaningful portion of tax expenditures could go to the developers’ pockets without going 
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to the bricks and tars of public housing, it could be a problem from the viewpoint of the efficient 
allocation of public resources. In this case, it is necessary to revisit the current level of subsidy. 
Overall, the empirical pieces of evidence on LIHTC’s effectiveness are surprisingly thin. 
Private developers’ return on investment might be too high for their contribution to affordable 
housing. Sullivan & Anderson (2017) revealed that the number of housing units provided under 
LIHTC has become fewer over the last 20 years, whereas taxpayers’ burdens in tax credits after 
inflation rose 66 percent more. National Council of State Housing Agencies showed that in 1997, 
more than 70,000 housing units were built by the program, but in 2014, were fewer than 59,000 
units were added. These could be partially explained with the assumption that construction and 
operating costs have risen much faster than inflation. But the excuse is not enough to assuage the 
relevant concerns and questions on the program’s efficiency. 
Also, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (1992) analyzed that the outlays of $3 
billion per year could support 555,000 households with vouchers program at 1992 levels. LIHTC, 
however, is unlikely to assist even half as many households with the same money. The report 
also insisted that section 8 housing vouchers, which act as a cash subsidy, directly benefit low-
income households, but the tax credit programs may allow private investors to take advantage of 
more benefits for themselves than their poor renters.  
The primary responsibility could go to the lack of federal oversight. Government 
Accountability Office (2015) reported that only seven audits of the 58 state and local housing 
agencies have been held since 1986 and most of the housing agencies across the country have 
never been properly examined. So, it is necessary to trace the tax credits of LIHTC properties 
upward to syndicators to ensure the profit structure and how much they have in their pockets 
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(Sullivan & Anderson, 2017). Developers’ returns are partly from the fees that developers and 
syndicators earn for their work. It is not possible to know exactly how much developers earn 
from the projects. The recommended maximum fees by the association of state agencies are up to 
15 percent, and syndicators earned more than $300 million in fees in 2016 (Ibid.). According to 
an NYC HDC, the total developer fee is not to exceed 15 percent of improvement costs and 10% 
percent of acquisition costs for tax credit projects. The improvement costs do not include 
developer fees, reserves, and syndication and partnership expenses. 10 percent of the developer 
fee, a “paid fee”, is allowed to be released at closing. It is apt to set a threshold on the fees to 
prevent excessive benefits to the private sectors. It could be still controversial whether 15 percent 
is appropriate. It is the time to check its suitability given affordable housing is a public good. 
Another critic of LIHTC is that the bigger developers can have more tax benefits: the 
concentration of benefits. Given the rising popularity of LIHTC and RAD, it is seminal to 
evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of these tax credit programs thoroughly from the zero bases 
again. There is a possibility that the new evaluation result might belie policymakers’ notion that 
LIHTC is the only hope to keep supplying affordable housing. Moreover, New York City could 
utilize existing homes inventory through housing vouchers or public housing programs by way 
of purchasing existing abandoned homes such as Zombie homes at cheaper prices from landlords 
in financial troubles, which could be more economical than the current tax credits. 
 
Suggestion 3) Preserve valuable NYCHA properties for future usage 
Under the RAD conversion, the ownership of public housing can be technically transferred to the 
hands of private developers and property managers. As soon as the program was installed, many 
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cities rushed to pass over the ownership of the public housing to private sector participants. It 
was because the cities have struggled a lot with the financial problems related to the maintenance 
of existing public housing. HUD and PHAs promise existing tenants’ right that we can come 
back and persistently reside in their current homes after the rehabilitation of the obsolete housing 
properties plagued with severe physical repair problems was completed. However, different 
stories were told from the current RAD conversion cases; unwonted evictions have happened and 
the reasons were diverse. Most of the cases were related to the violation of HUD guidelines and 
compliances by private property management. Some tenants were evicted because of their 
income increase, and others were forced to waive their rights to return to home and federal 
housing vouchers. It reminds us of the Déjà vu of HOPE VI program in the 1990s, in which 
around 30 percent of original tenants were displaced and never been returned to their homes with 
the mass rehabilitation process of public housing. The new program keeps pushing people in 
society’s margins out of their homes. 
 Another truth to be noted here is that private developers set their eyes on the land value 
of the existing public housing properties rather than income revenues from the tenants. Given 
that some of the NYCHA’s public housing properties are located in the city center including 
expensive areas near subway stations. Referring to the NYC (Open Data, 2019), public housing 
properties are located in diverse areas, some of which are sitting in neighborhoods with high 
investment values such as near the Central park or waterfront areas. More specifically, the 
apartment complex, known as “Douglass 1”, which consists of 1,302 rental apartments, is 




 St. just one block distance from the Central Park. On the opposite 




 St, just five-minute 
walking distance away from the park, and between them, luxury apartments, Museum of the City 
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of New York, and Sinai hospital and medicine schools are located. Some NYCHA apartments 
including “East River” in 102 St. that houses 1,156 residential units are located in the waterfronts 
area with better amenities and infrastructure such as chic restaurants and hospitals. Some 
apartments could be the properties that some private developers might have an eye on. Given the 
recent housing market boom and lack of empty spaces for lucrative developments, the developers 
might have more interest in the land values of the obsolete public housing properties rather than 
affordable housing rental business itself despite its not small tax breaks incentives. 
< Figure. 26. The geographical location of NYCHA developments in upper Manhattan > 
 
Source: NYC Open Data (as of July 2019) 
 
It should be kept in mind that private developers do not have any interest in public 
benefits; they pursue money, and they work only for maximizing their profits. To put that into 
perspective, RAD can be a good lucrative business opportunity for private investors. Sometimes 
they can sacrifice small short-term profits for the bigger profits in the future. When government 
subsidy ends or compliance period is terminated, the partners will exit the program freely and 
eventually raise rents or sell the properties at more expensive market prices, which can promise 






bind and detain the private developers within the program forever. From the perspective of 
property value, renovated buildings also can explode in value when the current real estate market 
boom continues. It must be a good investment to developers given the risk such as the 
uncertainty of future market conditions that the developers should take for exchange. 
Public housing properties should be remained under the ownership of local government 
and utilized entirely for the public welfares. Fortunately, New York City decided not to transfer 
the ownership of the properties to the private developers, which was a great policy decision. 
Instead, the city signs a 99-year lease contract with a private property managing company even 
though the NYCHA also participates in the RAD under the name of the PACT. However, the 
majority of other states endeavor to sell their burdensome housing properties to the market. On 
the flip side, it is understandable that the authorities have to deal with a lot of and diverse tenants’ 
complaints and the building workers they hired. Oftentimes the maintenance workers union 
became the impasse to the renovation of PHAs. One private developer confessed that the 
NYCHA has ever tried to reform their business structure and make the maintenance operation 
more efficient, but the attempt failed because of the strong resistance of building workers’ labor 
union, who denied changing their work schedules and additional workloads. He asserted that that 
is one reason why PHAs’ change is difficult. All component members in the public housing 
business must self-support each other and share the pains and responsibilities to help the agency 
cope with the current financial issues well. At the same time, Congress and HUD also have to 
restart provide the necessary minimum budget for the public housing projects. Or, instead, the 
federal government should let the hands-off from the local housing issues and give the local 
governments the leeway. Labor unions also without a doubt have to co-operate with the PHAs 
with regards to public housing renovations and organization restructuring. 
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Suggestion 4) Formalize the informal housing tool as a new affordable housing tool 
New York City has been suffering from a more serious affordable housing shortage than any 
other cities together with San Francisco in the U.S. However, increasing land value and 
construction costs have impeded the new supply of cheap dwelling rental units. Furthermore, 
policymakers have to pay attention to the demographic change: household composition. The 
share of one-person households has steadily increased in New York City. As of 2017, the single 
person households comprised of 32.4 percent (l 1,017,368 households) of total households, but 
the total number of studio and one-bed housing units was only 926,770 units: studio 186,718 
units and one-bedroom 740,053 units (ACS 2012-2017, 5years estimates). The figure accounted 
for 26.8 percent of the total housing units in New York City. Granted that it was relatively higher 
than other cities in the U.S, there still exists a big mismatch between the demand and the supply 
of small housing units. Based on these conditions and environments, I suggest facilitating the 
supply of the smaller-sized micro-housing units as a solution: Single Room Occupancy (SRO) 
and Accessary Dwelling Unit (ADU). Mathew Wambua, the former commissioner of NYC HPD, 
also agreed that Micro units and SRO could be a good alternative to address the supply lag over 
the larges demand on affordable housing for young singles in New York City, given the lack of 
empty parcel of lands and extremely high construction costs in the city. 
SRO indicates a room without a bathroom and a kitchen, or a bed without a room. It 
typically means a smaller sized-apartment room that is occupied by a single person while sharing 
other facilities with other residents. SRO has been a popular housing for industry workers, 
immigrants, and day workers. It also worked as a platform for immigrants’ social cohesion in 
New York City from the late 19
th
 century through the early 2000s. SRO was the last resort for 
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low-income workers and immigrants at the time. In particular, after the World WarⅡ, the 
demand for SRO dramatically increased because of the inflows of returning soldiers; the number 
of SRO in New York City reached to 200,000 units by the 1950s, which accounted for over 10 
percent of the city’s rental stock at the time (Aberg-Riger, 2018). 
Unfortunately, SRO followed the same trajectory of public housing. SRO started to be 
stigmatized as poor people’s housing. Finally, in 1955, New York City banned the new 
construction of SRO and made it illegal. The city instead, gave the landlords tax incentives to 
convert SROs to “normal” larger apartments. As a result, between the mid-1930s to 1990s, 
approximately one million SRO units were demolished nationwide. New York City also lost 60 
percent of its units between 1975 through 1981 (Ibid). Because of the city’s regulation, the 
supply of SRO units declined over the past two decades. In the earlier 20
th
 century, New York 
City alone had more than 100,000 SRO units, but now it is estimated as 30,000 units as of 2014 
(NYU Furman Center, 2018). 
 However, the prohibition and regulations on SRO cannot alleviate the demand on SRO at 
all. If anything, the legal constraint forces low-income tenants exposed to more severe public health 
and safety risks. SRO has independent access and independent lease contract, in which SRO can 
ensure tenants’ privacy and independence. That makes the big difference from traditional shared 
apartments, and that might be the driving force of strong demand for it. Increasing housing rents 
in New York City also kept forcing young single people to seek for cheaper living places: “illegal” 
SRO. Simultaneously, in response to the increasing demands on cheaper small dwelling units, 
some landlords illegally converted an apartment into several smaller rooms and lease them to 
low-income tenants. In August 2019, the NYC Department of Building caught two apartment 
owners who split the condos in half horizontally into 18 smaller rooms in Lower East Side of 
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Manhattan. The doors are half-sized, small stairs are attached, and ceilings are around 5 feet, which 
are low enough to kneel to enter the room. Each room size was 70 square feet and costs $600 per 
month (Chappell, 2019).  
 Accessory Dwelling Unit (ADU) can be another option to fulfill this strong affordable 
housing demand. According to the HUD, ADUs are defined as units added to existing residential 
buildings, which are also called in-law units, cottages, accessory apartments, or granny flats. 
ADU is an independent residence unit that has its kitchen and bathroom. AUD is not a new and 
complex idea; in the early 20
th
 century, ADU was a common feature in the U.S. Originally, ADU 
was popular because it could meet the social demand of families who want to live together across 
generations while maintaining independent space. But after the Second World War, the rapid 
suburbanization reinforced the high demand for lower-density development in inner-city, which 
ultimately led local jurisdictions to have banned ADU construction (HUD, 2008).  
By the way, the primary goal of contemporary ADU is to provide more affordable 
housing in the neighborhoods. Especially young single tenants can have benefits to live in the 
city where they work at lower rents. Homeowners also can earn supplementary incomes by 
developing and leasing ADU on underused or vacant lots with small costs. In September 2016, 
San Francisco passed legislation that enables the development of Accessory Dwelling Units. San 
Francisco is also confronting the most serious housing price increases and affordable housing 
shortage in the U.S. with a regional economic boom. So San Francisco Municipality accepted 
these demographical, social, and economic demands for the type of housing. San Francisco 
municipality legalized ADU to support the high housing needs of a certain specific class in the 
area: lower-income couples without kids, singles, the elderly, empty nesters, and new immigrants. 
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While permitting ADU, instead San Francisco City clarified the building code including safety 
requirements: rescue windows, noise insulation, light, ventilation, and seismic upgrade, etc.  
New York City also could allow building small residence units in the basement, on the 
top roof, in the garage, and adjacent to primary housing units if the developers’ or landlords’ 
construction plans meet fundamental requirements including safety standards and minimum 
density regulation. It is necessary to check and consider other frontier cities’ new normalcy on 
ADU such as Portland, Austin, Vancouver, and San Francisco already. Manhattan might not be 
appropriate for ADU addition given the urban fabric of the borough, but other boroughs 
including Staten Island could have room to accommodate the new affordable housing scheme. 
Considering the current housing affordability crisis and ever-soaring demands on smaller 
affordable housing, it is the right time to contemplate the legalization of the informal settlements 
including SRO as a solution to the current housing crisis. Through the formalization of the 
informality, the government can provide more affordable housing units conforming to 
demographic demand change. At the same time, an illegal conversion that could put people at 
physical risks can be prevented systemically. To incentivize the legalization process, the 
government should consider providing financial supports including zoning benefits and subsidies 
for restoration, renovation, and new construction of those types of micro-units. Of course, the 
subsidized SROs must be under the control of rent regulations for exchange for the benefits 
received. It is time to rethink about the discrepancy between illegality and informality. 
 
Suggestion 5) Strengthen the tenure maintenance rules of public housing 
New York City has a well-established public housing system that is commensurate with a long 
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history. Every year PHAs reexamine tenant families’ household composition and income. But 
this process seems meaningless to a point; there are no limitations on the occupant’s tenancy. 
The tenants can stay almost persistently as long as they wish despite that they come to “over-
income” while following basic rules and keeping paying rents. Theoretically, PHAs can vacate 
them if a family income surpasses the income qualification; however, in reality PHAs do not 
necessarily oust them. In other words, PHAs do not want to push their tenants out just because 
tenants work harder and earn more money as a result of their arduous economic effort. The 
displaced tenants, otherwise, could feel distressed for being exposed to other risks to look for 
new appropriate affordable housing commensurate with their increased income levels. 
Granting the above caring and solicitude for the existing tenants, that is a too strong 
protection measure for the tenants. It is, no doubt, necessary for PHAs to apply stricter eviction 
grounds such as sex offender and criminal conduct as NYCHA already applied. Not to mention it, 
the PHAs need to set more systemic eviction rules on tenants’ eligibility. If the tenants’ 
economic conditions become improved much better above the income thresholds of affordable 
housing, they are obliged to moving out voluntarily for other poorer workers on the waitlist. 
Another loophole is to allow the tenants and their families to live forever in the same homes. In 
some cases, the tenancy of public housing is inherited to offspring, which might be one reason 
why public housing is not opened to other people on the waitlist. It also can disincentivize and 
discourage tenants’ efforts to escape from confinement to poverty and abject living conditions. It 
is time to consider limits on tenure.  
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The waitlist for Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher is currently closed, and there is no 
reopen schedule yet; the last open was in May 2007
56
. According to NYCHA
57
, as of March 
2019, 181,090 households are on the waiting list for public housing, and 138,705 families are 
waiting for Section 8 vouchers. The turn-over rate for public housing units during the year 2018 
was just 2.5 percent. In New York City, there are decent well-organized affordable housing 
programs, but there are de facto no programs available. 
For reference, in Seoul, tenure restriction is much stronger than in New York. Housing 
agencies crosscheck their tenants’ annual incomes and assets every two years. It is a similar rule 
with New York City’s one, but Seoul’s recertification process is more systematic and done 
online through the national tax system. Tenants do not need to report their income and assets 
changes in papers. Government agencies are authorized to access to the government database and 
check the subject individuals’ tax data reported by their employers and individuals with prior 
consents as well as registered family compositions. Instead, tenants have the right to ask the 
agencies to identify and correct their information, if they find the wrong information. The point 
is that if tenants are proved to be overqualified or disqualified for eligibility, they have to leave 
homes within the given grace period. At the same time, some portion of subsidized housing is 
allocated for sales. The tenants who become could wealthier can exercise a privileged option to 
purchase their homes under the contracts with housing agencies at below-market rates. Some 
public housing programs confer the tenants with the right of first refusal. 
 





 NYCHA 2019 fact Sheet 
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Suggestion 6) Consider setting an asset limit as a component of LIHTC tenants’ eligibility 
When it comes to determining tenants’ income eligibility for LIHTC, income calculation 
methodology looks very specific and reasonable. Total cash values from family assets are also 
included for calculation as well as employment income. Also, if net family assets exceed $5,000, 
imputed income
58
 from assets is applied for income justice. For example, if an applicant has real 
estate property, to begin with, the net cash value of the property is calculated by subtracting 
selling cost from net market value and is multiplied by 0.02. Then, the greater of the imputed 
income from the asset or the actual income from the asset is included in annual income 
calculation (HUD Occupancy handbook). The income determination schemes of the LIHTC 
program are very delicate and well-organized enough not to dispute. 
That being said, one possible shortfall of income eligibility may be that there exist no 
asset limits for tenant qualifications. It means that the person who has multiple luxury condos in 
downtown Manhattan could be a LIHTC tenant if the person has a small amount of official 
income. Besides, 2 percent of the HUD passbook rate, which is set by HUD, might not be 
enough to properly reflect the real property value. Seoul had the same issues too until several 
years ago; there were no asset limits in tenant qualifications for some subsidized housings. 
Therefore, it was possible for retired seniors to own a luxury car and luxury commercial building 
to live in the subsidized affordable housing if they have very limited formal cash inflows. It was 
possible because the government rules only checked the formal income level while ignoring 
other assets. Could it be justifiable to allow for rich persons to live in government-funded 
housing? After receiving the heavy rebuke against the issue from the general public and the 
                                           
58
 Imputed income indicates the interest that the assets would earn when they were invested in savings account. 
 
 138 
media, the Korean national government strengthened the eligibility rules on every publicly 
subsidized property. New York also needs to revisit the tenants’ asset standards rules regarding 
affordable housing properties from the beginning. It should not be forgotten that the welfare of 
taxpayers can be justified only if they value the social benefits of policy more than their taxes. 
 
C. Lessons and Suggestions for SEOUL 
 
Suggestion 1) Enforce the “publicness” of housing support system 
Public rental housing units that were subsidized by the government regardless of the formats and 
the modus operandi of subsidies including tax abatement, direct loans, or credit guarantees 
should serve the public good. Individual projects that received benefits from the public fund 
must contribute to the society and the local community at any scale in exchange for the benefits 
that were given to them. However, some of the subsidized housings in Seoul do not have rent 
limits or have broader income brackets to embrace non-vulnerable classes. Medium or higher 
income earners also could occupy the units despite their wealth levels and wealth. It has been a 
long historical debate about whether the government should take care of medium-income 
households as well. In principle, it is acceptable and understandable to embrace up to the 
medium-income households, because the government intrinsically cares about politics and votes. 
But if a whole rental housing development project is designed for medium- and high-income 
households, it could not be justifiable in terms of both efficient and effective usage of limited 
government resources. Public resources should be carefully used for mainly addressing 
iniquitous housing and income disparity of our society as well as correcting the market failure. 
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To put that in perspective, subsidized housing projects including the “New Stay” program 
that have not had or had loose tenant's eligibility restriction cannot avoid rebukes. New Stay was 
also blamed as a program for corporate landlords and private developers. Despite the government 
subsidy provided, the rents were expensive and decided at the market rate. It was fortunate that 
the new administration reformed the program to reinforce the publicness. New Stay was 
rechristened as “Public subsidized private rental housing” in 2018; currently, the required rental 
period is extended to up to 8 years, unit size is limited to 85m2, and rents are restricted at 90-95 
percent of and 70-85 percent of market-rate rents for general tenants and special care class 
including young workers and newlyweds respectively. However, it is not substantial yet 
compared in New York City programs that require developers to provide 20 to 40 percent of 
units for 50 to 60 percent of AMI at below-market affordable rates.  
But not everyone agrees with the idea. Sang-won Yoon, a senior manager of LH, for 
example, advocated the program on the ground that "current Korean monthly rental housing 
market is too small for private investors to make enough profits; therefore, it is not easy to entice 
the investors into affordable housing if the program has stricter requirements.” It is true; the 
Korean rental housing market is dominated by its unique money deposit system, called Jeonse. 
But as noted earlier, given the skyrocketing housing price increase, the Jeonse market will reach 
its ceiling soon. Then the monthly rental market would become more vital, which could attract 
the private investors’ economic libido. At the same time, private investors have to contribute 
more than benefits from taxpayers. The government should make a mechanism and system to 
ensure that poor people can have more access to the monthly rental market and relieve the 
housing finance distress. 
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The alterations and the transition also can facilitate mixed-income housing development 
in the urban fabric of Seoul City. Not to mention it, direct loans and housing credit guarantee 
programs also must require the funding recipients to provide rental housing at below-market 
rents. At the same time, the lease term to maintain the affordable rents must be prolonged up to 
at least 10 years or more. However, some subsidy programs including public rental housing 
construction loan and private rental housing construction loan just obliged the construction 
companies to lease the property for 4 or 5 years in exchange for the subsidy. It means that 
developers or landlords can push the tenants out of the rental properties, and they can sell the 
properties at market rate to realize the profits. The lease terms of affordable housing are too short 
compared with New York’s 30 years of LIHTC.  
Moreover, originally, starting rents on subsidized housing in Seoul has not regulated 
efficiently, and there have been explicit restrictions only at the time of renewal of the lease 
contracts. It means that the property owners could charge above market-rate rents at the initial 
move-in. Besides that, HF’s housing finance credit programs also have a publicness issue. 
Stepping stone Jeonse guarantee is available to non-home owners and one-home owners with a 
housing value of less than KRW 900 million ($750,000). Hwajun Lee, a senior manager in HF, 
the housing finance agency in Korea explained that the reason why the credit guarantee program 
includes one-property owners is to cover the temporal demands on Jesonse loans. For instance, if 
a person who has a family living in Busan has no choice but to move to Seoul because of works, 
the person might need some deposit money to rent his home in Seoul. In that case, HF supports 
him to have a Jeonse loan from banks at below-market rates. But if the person of a case already 
has a housing with a value up to KRW 900 million ($750,000), the person is not the poor 
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anymore. That might be one case of manifest loopholes of current affordable housing systems. 
The limited resources must be used more efficiently with crystal clear targeting at the neediest. 
Fortunately, in 2018, the Korean government realigned the affordable housing programs 
to make it mandatory to put limits on every housing project that is subsidized by the public 
money in terms of tenants’ eligibility and rents. However, it is not the level of significance yet. 
Policymakers must check the fact that as of 2018, the Korean government invested 0.5 percent of 
GDP on support to social rental housing
59
, which was the highest among 14 OECD countries that 
responded to the survey including the U.S. (OECD, 2019). Although government authorities 
have kept investing a huge amount of budget on affordable housing, the meaningful amelioration 
of the housing affordability has yet to come. 
 
Suggestion 2) Consolidate similar and overlapped public housing programs 
As aforementioned, public housing programs in Seoul have overlapped in many ways. There are 
many reasons why this phenomenon happened. First, the subsidy programs do not have clear 
ultimate targets per se. Originally each program may have its own a clear target, but as time goes 
by, a lot of alterations were made to include various additional needs as the environment change. 
The result is the current status; target costumers or beneficiaries are similar and overlapped 
holistically. There are uncountable numbers of public housing programs and rental finance 
                                           
59 The data was based on the 2019 OECD Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing, The amount accounts 
for the total expenditures on social rental housing at the central governments level with the exceptions; Australia, 
Austria, and Korea included regional level funding. It included expenditures on direct provision of social rental 





assistance. Some programs even look similar in terms of target clients, program eligibility, and 
even program names.  
Another point is that affordable housing policy tools have been frequently used for 
political purposes, not for its original purposes. In every election season and the beginning of 
new administration, new generous beneficial policies were repeatedly and competitively came 
out. Politicians both strategically and tactically utilized housing policies as critical propaganda 
because people, particularly Seoul citizens were very sensitive to the housing issues.  
Lastly, competition between agencies facilitated current overlapping duplicities. 
Agencies typically set challenging corporate business goals and become enticed to ease the 
regulations of their programs. Each agency has the vision to expand its business size and broaden 
the business scope to increase its power in the market and governmental relationships. For this 
reason, some agencies sometimes intruded into other agencies’ business domains. It is a 
complicated and multidisciplinary issue as well as political. For instance, traditionally, HF has 
run the housing credit guarantee business for low-income individuals, and instead, HUG has 
focused on housing completion guarantee service for construction companies. But several years 
ago, HUG changed it’s the article of association and infringed the HF’s business domain, the 
credit guarantee service for individuals. It was because the agency had struggled with increasing 
the default rate of its corporate customers and suffered from accumulating losses. In the private 
market, the entrance barrier could be impasse to business development and market efficiency. 
But in public sectors, it is a waste of resources to have multiple players who have the same 
political roles. Imagine that NYCHA jumps in the housing finance market that NYC HDC is the 
major player because NYCHA has passed the toughest time of its history with budget issues. 
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Seoul has so many and diverse housing programs that it is really hard to discern the 
difference of the applicant qualifications of each program due to its complexity and duplicity. 
The real problem is that the overlap of business model among agencies and subsidized programs 
can lead to the inefficient usage of government budget; therefore, it is required to examine the 
whole current subsidized housing programs universally in terms of targets class, beneficiaries, 
target market, methodologies, and policy aims, etc. Based on the results of the assessments, the 
affordable housing policy must be re-categorized and integrated. The overlapped parts among 
programs must be minimized or purged according to policy priority and the level of impacts. An 
incumbent loan agent who has dealt with housing subsidy programs for years in a private bank in 
Seoul confessed he also oftentimes made mistakes to provide customers with wrong information. 
How can general people understand the programs’ details and choose their best-suitable program 
by themselves? LH insisted that they have tried to simplify the complex and overlapped diverse 
programs, but they failed to show meaningful improvements. The information dissymmetry in 
subsidized housing programs should be reduced entirely through the merge process to improve 
the accessibility to the social benefits of target beneficiaries. Simultaneously, it must be kept in 
mind that unless subaltern groups are not specifically targeted, iniquitous housing support tools 
may increase housing disparity. 
 
Suggestion 3) Keep policy consistency and coherence persistently  
There is a long debating questioning about the effectiveness of housing policy in Seoul. Even 
though Seoul has various and relatively strong market regulations in a comprehensive way 
including new apartments price ceiling, finance restrictions, and taxes, it cannot be said that the 
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national government and the Seoul City succeeded in putting the housing market under control 
and properly manage housing inequality issues. Housing prices in Seoul skyrocketed over the 
last 5 years and kept soaring despite that Seoul’s population has slightly decreased and plateaued 
since its peak in 1990. The capital gains by the short sales of less than 3 years tenure from 2013 
to 2017 were KRW 22.98 trillion. In 2017, capital gain income numbered KRW 84.8trillion 
(Ohmynews, 2019). Given the recent statistics, one of the drivers that pushed up the housing 
prices might not be real demands on a decent residence, but speculations or investments on 
housing properties. That is, exchange values crowded out the usage value in the Seoul housing 
market. It cannot be denied that the Korean government’s quantitative easing policy such as the 
real estate tax cut for private landlords became a facilitator of the rapid property price rise. 
Last year, the national government tightened the rules to slash the tax benefits for the 
private landlords in reaction to the criticism. Simultaneously, the government promised to raise 
property tax for multi-home buyers and luxury homeowners to curb apartment prices without 
reins. However, the belated efforts just short-lived; after a couple of months of sluggish increase, 
housing prices started to gallop again. The primary reason why the regulation would not work is 
those market participants have strong anticipation that government regulation would not last long. 
They knew this trend from experience. When new election season comes, politicians, without a 
doubt, tried to utilize the housing tools regardless of their political colors in attracting voters. 
Typically, the government lowered property tax and alleviated the regulations. The market knew 
the politicians’ behavioral patterns, so they just wait without responding. 
This inconsistency of policymakers’ whims enervates their housing policy effectiveness. 
The Korean government, particularly in terms of real estate policy, has already lost the policy 
reliability from the market participants of all developers, tenants, and landlords. To stabilize the 
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housing market, the government must have the long-term, unwavering principals and philosophy 
along with clear policy goals and visions. And even when they are confronted with any political 
compressions and the conflict of interests, the principles of significance must not be forfeited and 
remain untouchable persistently. That is the only way to recover the policing power of public 
authority and policy impacts on unruly market participants. Policymakers are obliged to focus on 
what the marginalized people need, not politicians do. Policymakers should beware of the new 
populism, which doesn’t promise the market trust. I suggest stopping the schizophrenic policy 
stance toward the housing market. Unfortunately, the new Assembly election is scheduled this 
month, and the ruling party pledged to slash housing-related tax again, which lasted just less than 
6 months since they promulgated it. 
 
Suggestion 4) Develop new blue oceans and expand the role of housing agencies 
As we explored so far, Seoul City is also struggling with budget shortage and backlog with 
regard to public housing and affordable housing just like New York. MOLIT and LH are doing 
their best to keep up with the funding gap between the need and the funding capacity. LH is 
suffering from a serious deficit; the agency has been under the water for a long time. It is known 
that LH has lost more than KRW 100 million ($83,000) per public rental unit that they built from 
2014 through 2018 (Korea Housing Institute, 2019). It is definitely because the increases in land 
values, construction costs, labor costs, inflation, and so forth have not been reflected enough in 
the government subsidy for the agency. This is the same issue with New York as we already 
scrutinized in the earlier chapter. What options does the Seoul City have as a solution then? Is it 
the best strategy to follow the Big Apple’s trajectory? As we have already delved into, it could be 
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a good tactic to soothe financial concerns to use affluent private liquidity. But policymakers must 
be vigilant that too much reliance on the public money could be a shackle; there is no free lunch. 
Based on the lesson from New York, a more sustainable affordable housing model is required. 
 Someone can think of the role of NHUF again as a solution. Yes, NHUF is the biggest 
fund source for affordable housing development in Seoul; however, it must be noted that most of 
NHUF consist of debts, which mostly are housing bonds and individual housing subscribers’ 
deposits. As of 2018, the fund has KRW 150.5 trillion ($ 125.4 billion) debts, which account for 
87.9 percent of total assets. It means that the funding must be paid back someday in the future, 
and the financial soundness of the fund is of significance given its very limited equity. That is the 
primary reason why the fund’s role is limited and not easy to support public housing further. 
While the housing burdens of vulnerable population groups are ongoing, the available capacity 
and the span of policy effects of the biggest housing fund are diminishing. 
However, there is a dark horse for the sustainable housing finance market; Housing 
Finance Credit Guarantee Fund (HFCGF) could shed new light upon the current bleak projection. 
The fund is a national fund that is used to support affordable housing developments and housing 
affordability of low-income people by way of providing credit guarantee service to commercial 
banks in lieu of its customers. The fund was launched in 1988 and was originally administered 
by a national agency, Korea Credit Guarantee Fund, and later its management was transferred to 
HF in 2004 when HF, a new housing finance-specialized institution y was established. Since its 
installment in 1988, the accumulated credit guarantee numbered KRW 343.87 trillion in 2017. 
The fund supported a total of 10.74 million low-income households. Net guarantee balance 
reached KRW 93.17 trillion ($ 77.6 billion) as of 2019, but the default rate of its customer 
remains at a low level: 0.5 percent for individuals and zero percent for corporate clients in 2019. 
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The funding sources consist of government equity, banks’ contributions, collecting from 
defaulted loans, guarantee fees, and interest earned. 
Owing to the sound business performances and sufficient contributions
60
 from banks, 
HFCGF’s net equity amounts to KRW 8.17 trillion ($ 6.8 billion) without debts as of 2019. I 
suggest utilizing the fund’s capacity for affordable housing projects. HFCGF can participate as 
an equity investor in affordable housing developments that are initiated by LH and local housing 
agencies as well as Seoul City itself. For instance, Seoul City launches new legal entities such as 
REITs together with HF, and HF contributes its equity as a financial partner. Then the REITs can 
construct or purchase affordable rental housing properties for low-income households at below-
market rates. Structurally it is plausible and feasible because HF does not pursue profits as a 
national housing finance agency, which will make the big difference from private investors in 
terms of publicness and sustainability as well as permanency. Profits from public development 
will go back to the public’s hands again. 
 
Suggestion 5) Facilitate Community-led housing Development tools 
Korean government as well as the Seoul City government traditionally focused on government-
led housing developments. The largest national developer, LH has provided public housing for 
low- and medium-income families while subsidizing private developers’ rental housing provision 
through diverse finance tools including subsidized loans from NHUF and credit guarantee. 
However, soaring construction costs became an impediment to the agency’s ongoing new 
                                           
60
 Under the Korea Housing Finance Corporation Act, commercial banks are required to contribute a certain portion 
of fees based on the mortgage loans balance in exchange for the benefits from credit guarantee service of HFCGF. 
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housing supply too like New York City. Given the current high level of land value in Seoul, 
contemporary government-oriented initiatives might not be sustainable anymore. Instead, the 
Korean government needs to think about various alternatives, one of which would be a 
community-based development scheme, known as Community Land Trust (CLT). I have not 
dealt with the development models in detail in this paper because those tools are not a formal 
public finance tool but a sort of alternative housing development model. Even though this model 
has not been that popular these days in New York City because of several reasons, it could bring 
up a meaningful message and insight into Korean Society. 
 CLT is an independent non-profit organization that community members form and run by 
themselves while sharing the values from the properties together. CLT model deals with the land 
as a public good, not a personal asset. Under the community-controlled model, land title is split 
from the title of the building on the land. Community members transfer the ownership of land to 
CLT and share all the benefits from the land developments. CLT can build affordable housing for 
community members, develop public spaces and community gardening, and steward commercial 
spaces on behalf of a community. One important point of this model is that CLT retains an option 
to repurchase housing from the individual owners. The existing owners cannot sell their 
residential units at market prices according to the ground lease because the land is owned by CLT. 
Through this mechanism, CLT can maintain housing affordability in perpetuity. This mechanism 
can work because of its community-led governance. To make important decisions on running the 
entity, CLT operates its unique board of directors system, called “tripartite board,” whose 
members consist of CLT residents, non-resident community members, and public representatives. 
Public representatives typically include government officials, housing agencies, and funders. The 
community-based planning and benefit-sharing structure are a core value of this program.  
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 There is another specific model for housing, called the Mutual Housing Association 
(MHA), which is also a non-profit community-based corporation that owns and administers 
housing. The basic structure is similar to CLT, and the difference is that MHA shares the housing 
not land. MHA can rent affordable housing permanently for low-income community members. 
Housing is owned by MHA, so it is not possible to realize profits by selling. MHA can reduce 
rents by subsidizing operating costs via commercial rents and buying supplies and services in 
bulk as well as self-management (NYCCLI). CLT and MHA program can not only provide 
sustainable affordable housing but also enhance social cohesion and collective efficacy among 
community members. New York City’s oldest CLT is the Cooper Square CLT and MHA, which 
started in 1991. To date, the Cooper Square has operated 400 apartments and 20 small businesses 
(Splvack, 2019). These models depend on active community engagement and social solidarity 
for the community developments in a way to meet communities’ real needs. The philosophy 
underneath is very similar to the Korean “Saemaul movement”, which is a grassroots 
community-led revitalization that began in the 1970s. So, CLT and MHA models can easily 
apply to the Korean community too. This housing policy that favors people over profit could 
benefit Korean as well. 
 But the community ownership model also has two big issues: one is how to finance the 
project, and the other is who should get the subsidy from the government. CLT model could be 
popular from the 1960s through the 1980s because there exited abundant empty land and 
abandoned housing stocks in New York City mainly because of the white flight and 
deindustrialization of the city. So, the communities could have access to the city-owned land at a 
very low price or for free. But now given the current exorbitant land price and scarcity of public 
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land in the city, the ownership-sharing model might not easy to succeed like decades ago. That is 
the reason why the local government should provide some funding and subsidy for them. 
 
Suggestion 6) Promote a cost-effective Public-Private Partnership 
The Korean government also has tried to utilize private sectors and market investors to expand 
the housing supply, particularly the monthly rental market. Policymakers in Korea struggled to 
support private sector activities in the housing market through diverse finance tools including 
direct subsidized loans, credit guarantees, and tax incentives as well as Inclusionary zoning 
codes. The approach was quite similar to the U.S in terms of its kind. It was because the Korean 
government realized the limitation of direct subsidy programs given their budget limits and 
current housing market prices as well. Despite the funding difficulty, the Korean government 
maintains public housing program while focusing on purchasing existing cheaper homes rather 
than constructing new residential units. This effort must be applauded without a doubt. 
 However, Korean policymakers' efforts seem not to be enough compared with New York 
City Cases. They have a long way to go yet. It is important and necessary for the Korean 
government to diversify the funding sources and prepare for additional sustainable programs to 
help provide affordable housing continuously. As we have already seen, New York City can 
provide some implications and lessons that the Korean government can refer to with regard to 
expanding the public-private partnership scheme in Korea. New York City operates substantial 
tax incentive programs as well as direct subsidy under the strong public-private partnership with 
private developers and financial investors instead of stopping public housing programs. Public 
sectors de jure stopped the supply of affordable housing by themselves, and instead they support 
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private developers with diverse funding sources including LIHTC, RAD, 51-J, 420-a/c, 421-a, 
PABs, and subsidized mortgage loans from HDC, etc. That is an efficient way of funding. One 
important point that we should note from the New York case might be the clear requirements to 
ask developers to dedicate at least some portion of units to very low- and low- income 
households in exchange for the benefits that the developers could have. 
For instance, every housing project that is subsidized by LIHTC should meet the 
requirement that either 20 percent of the units are rented to the families with income at or below 
50 percent of AMI, or 40 percent of the units are rented to the households whose income is up to 
60 percent of AMI. Moreover, the rents for qualified marginalized families should be below 30 
percent of AMI. That fundamental mechanism also applies to mixed-income development even 
though mixed-income developers can have more leeway and discretionary authority to modify 
the portion of units dedicated to low-income people because of Income Averaging (IA). 
 But unfortunately, most of the housing finance support tools in Seoul only concentrate 
on the supply of rental housing through private sectors while neglecting the efficient allocation 
of housing units for low-income households. Currently, private developers are asked to set aside 
any residential units for marginalized households. The only requirement of developers is the 
residential unit size; policymakers request to provide smaller-sized units less than 85m
2
 for low-
income earners. It means that for-profit developers can rent all of their apartments at market-rate 
rents to anyone who can afford the rents regardless of the financial rewards that they received 
from the government. It might be neither a fair and nor good policy decision in terms of efficient 
and just usage of limited government funding resources. 
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Another instance might be the “New Stay” project. The new recent funding form of 
public-private partnership that was launched in2015 originally did have no limits on the tenants’ 
eligibility including income and assets until 2017 when the program was reformed to “publicly 
support private rental housing.” Currently, the program enhanced requirements, but it is not still 
enough to dispel worries of the tax-payers. For example, only 20 percent of total housing units 
are allocated to special care classes such as young singles, newlyweds, and seniors. Additionally, 
tenants’ income limit is 120 percent of the average income of urban area workers; rents are also 
set at a maximum of 90 ~ 95 percent of market rents for general tenants, and 70 to 85 percent of 
market rates for young people and newlyweds. That is definitely for middle-income households. 
 The reason why policymakers made the requirements so loose might be that the private 
residential monthly rental markets are relatively less-developed. The Jeonse-dominant money 
deposit market may not be lucrative from the point of private developers because Jeonse cannot 
generate enough cash inflow from the rental properties. At the same time, the monthly rental 
market is very small in Seoul, so average monthly rents are also relatively low. For example, if a 
landlord leases a three-bedroom, 135m
2 
apartment valued at $1,000,000, it is not easy to receive 
more than $1,500 per month in Seoul. But, the average monthly rent for 65.3m
2-
apartment in 
Manhattan, New York amounts to $4,208 because New York City is the monthly rental market.
 
 Even though we admit the market difference between the two cities, it is necessary to 
keep in mind that just providing small-sized rental housing is not enough. At least a certain 
percentage of new residential units must be dedicated to the very low- and low- income 
households. To solve the relevant issue, I suggest setting a minimum limit on the allocation of 
units for marginalized households just like New York City’s case. Instead, the extent of subsidy 
benefits for the developers could be enhanced further. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, I examined the trajectory of uneven housing affordability and efforts for redressing 
the worsening housing disparity in both New York City and Seoul City. Each city has shown its 
idiosyncratic housing tools that are adaptive to its cultural and economic background. No one 
can judge whose program is better or worse because every affordable housing program has its 
ontological validity. Affordable housing policies have been acclimated to environmental changes 
in situ like a living organ; therefore, the current policy might be the best model that reflects its 
unique contemporary market and socioeconomic conditions. That is, no panacea exists that can 
be applied to every nook and cranny. But urban planners and policymakers have to learn from 
the past because urban history is full of lessons on how to navigate multifarious challenges. 
In summary, New York City has primarily focused on indirect subsidy rather than direct 
sponsorship to the disadvantaged classes. While utilizing the cutting-edge financial technique as 
a forte of global financial hub city, NYC zeroes in on public-private partnerships by providing 
mainly tax incentives and subsidies to private participants. LIHTC is the best example of this 
trend; developers can finance a maximum of 70 percent of their affordable housing development 
costs by selling awarded tax credits from the government to investors in the financial market. 
Even if New York City also subsidizes people-based supports such as housing vouchers, it is not 
the mainstream. On the other hand, Seoul City still concentrates on direct subsidy scheme. The 
national government and local municipality keep providing public housing while promoting the 
expansion of the private rental market. Also, the government subsidizes direct loans with below-
market interest rates to private constructors and developers through National Housing Urban 
Fund (NHUF) as well as Housing Finance Credit Guarantee Funds (HFCGF) for housing. 
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Both cities’ affordable housing finance tools have clear pros and cons. Seoul tries to 
embrace a wide range of classes and centers on the direct regulatory intervention that could have 
more impact. However, at the same time, it means that each policy is not specifically targeted to 
low-income households, and the “visible hand” could have the possibility to distort the 
autonomous power of the "invisible hand". Contrarily, New York tries to maximize policy 
efficiency through deregulation and private expertise. Instead, the city increases the reliance on a 
strategic alliance with private partners too much, which could weaken the authorities’ control on 
the market. Policymakers can be criticized for being off the hook from active interventions to the 
abject life of the marginalized class struggling with pervasive marginality and unsecured habitat. 
It is because the authorities handed over the responsibility to private managers and developers’ 
hands just while supplying tax credits and money to private developers. The government 
confidently asserted that they could control the private sectors; however, a caveat must be put on 
that there are still many grumblings about misbehaviors of private property managers and 
developers regarding RAD and LIHTC. 
As for takeaways, here I give some policy recommendations in common for both cities. 
First, the government authorities must stay in the front line and on the hook for the underserved 
classes. The current housing crisis is a matter of “housing inequality,” not just “housing disparity.” 
Housing unaffordability is a systemic problem driven by market failure and policy mistakes in 
some points. It is not natural and not unavoidable. To resolve this crisis, the government has to 
put down desires to embrace every single person under the beneficiary policy umbrella, which is 
not possible with limited budget resources. Affordable housing policy must select and 
concentrate on specific targets such as marginalized people including extremely low-income 
households. Particularly, Seoul’s recent housing policy seems to have an overambitious political 
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tendency; the unscrupulous use of a politician's authority must refrain. The government should 
take responsibility for housing issues. Just the provision of funding to private developers is not 
enough; money does not always talk. Housing issues must not be understood from the 
perspective of a business. Housing quality and dwelling security are closely related to other 
social issues including income disparity, health inequality, crime concentration, social exclusion, 
physical segregation (known as ghettoization), and so forth. If at least one of them cannot be met, 
our cities can be put under unstable conditions or at risk. The government must not step away 
from the everyday scenes; they should get involved more proactively. That is the reason why the 
government exists. 
Second, the public housing program must be maintained as the last resort for the 
extremely-low income class. Policymakers’ concern can be understandable on the ground that it 
costs a lot of budgets and arduous works to maintain the quality of public properties as landlords. 
Moreover, particularly in the U.S, public housing was branded as a center of crime, prostitution, 
drug dealing, and poverty. The poor design and cookie-cutter development of traditional public 
housing and the disinvestment of social infrastructure were perceived as principal actors of the 
failure of public housing programs, which led to racial segregation and the concentration of 
poverty. Conversely, Seoul’s public housing model was not that bad; the public housing program 
in Seoul helped low-income households’ home security and did not evoke social issues like in 
New York. The problems are the construction costs increase and maintenance issues regarding 
public housing projects; LH, the largest national public housing provider has been under the 
water for decades because of the increasing business costs. 
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Granted that both cities are struggling with the cost challenge, I suggest that, at all costs, 
the minimum levels of public housing must keep being supplied by the government's hands. 
Given skyrocketing housing prices, it seems not plausible to build new properties at acceptable 
prices, but instead, purchasing existing homes and turning them into public rental housing could 
still work. Especially, abandoned deteriorated homes such as Zombie homes can be acquired at 
cheaper prices from landlords in financial troubles. It can be an option for PHAs to consider. 
NYC HPD estimates New York City currently has approximately more than 3,000 Zombie 
homes across the five boroughs, which were occupied by the homeless and squatters without 
permission. Regarding maintenance issues, the government must set aside more funding to cover 
the necessary costs. At the same time, property management works can be outsourced through 
contracts with private management. I believe that this could cost less and be more efficient than 
just giving private developers tax abatements. 
Third, housing speculation must be curbed. As examined in an earlier chapter, one 
of the main actors of the current housing crisis may be speculators, or investors in the housing 
market. Even though the population in New York has not increased over the past few years, 
housing prices steeply soared. It was the same in Seoul. Instead, the number of multi-
homeowners drastically increased. As we all already know, New York is a rent-dominant market; 
more than 60 percent of housings are for rental, which means that two-thirds of housing units are 
owned by multi-home investors. Rich people and retired seniors purchased more housing units 
and enjoyed housing price appreciation as well as higher rental incomes. The spurious demand 
with speculation purposes became a trigger to run short of housing inventory in the market and 
drove the housing property prices up. There are no clear shreds of evidence that real demand 
pushed the price up according to fundamental economic theory. Housing ownership in New York 
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remains still below the pre-crisis level, but housing prices already surpassed and hit the record 
high. Without speculation, this phenomenon cannot be explained. Based on this, housing 
speculation on median-priced and affordable housing units must be under control.  
Seoul was the same, housing speculation by record-low interest rate and the government 
tax relief for multi-homeowners spurred a series of housing investments, and finally transformed 
a lot of the general public as housing speculators. In particular, private real estate agents and 
media instigated nation-wide housing investments to instill people with concerns about the 
further housing price increase. However, the government has not done anything effective enough 
to curb the frenzy. That is a government policy failure. Last year, the Korean government finally 
announced new regulations to wage a war against housing speculation by tightening financial 
tools such as raising the property tax for multi homeowners and putting limits on mortgage loan 
capacity. Unfortunately, the regulation would not work as expected, because it is too late to put 
brake surging housing prices due to the inertia. Essentially, housing policy is a matter of 
reliability. Once the government loses the trust from the market, no policy remedies would work. 
The government must send the market strong and consistent signals for the market stabilization. 
Flexibility on the housing finance policy oftentimes can create more dangers. 
In conclusion, affordable housing is very complex as an everyday life issue that is 
intertwined with varied factors such as built environment, public health, equality, community 
development, security, races, economy, and social cohesion, etc. But the uneven distribution of 
resources and the rise of spatial inequalities in the urban fabric have widened the housing gap in 
urban areas. As a result, urbanites have suffered and would suffer from a serious housing crisis 
persistently. The perpetuating vicious loop that looks like a “Möbius strip” must be cut to end 
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housing inequality and reach the balance. The invisible hand alone never can address this; 
therefore, the public sectors’ role is undoubtedly significant, and the broader, integrated, 
grassroots and more health-aware approach to the poor community development must be 
followed. Public authorities have to get involved in housing issues more preemptively with their 
clear philosophy and clear policy goals. That being said, at the same time it should not be 
forgotten that the interventions must be adjusted over time and flexible instead of pursuing one-
size-fits-all rules. Any theoretical or armchair pondering could not work; the government 
authorities should keep listening to the small voice of the vulnerable people. 
As Henri Lefebvre insisted, everyone urbanite has “the right to the city”, and the 
vulnerable classes also have the “right to the housing.” However, unfortunately, the low-income 
classes cannot make a necessary voice because they have no capacity to participate in the 
planning process due to everyday menial works they participated in and the lack of knowledge 
on the issues. That is the reason why most of the community board members in Manhattan 
are old white males with hoary hairs; they cannot represent the whole community, particularly 
lower-income households; it is a systematic problem of new urbanism and neoliberalism. 
Politicians, the city government, urban planners, community members, and all other stakeholders 
must remember that political interference and bureaucratic bungling can spoil the game. 
Affordable housing is life itself to people in the marginal edge of urban structure. The point I 
want to make is that housing must be but “the place for making a life”, not “the place for 
investment”. Affordable housing policy must transition from the view that affordable housing is 
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